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ABSTRACT 
Biodiversity versus Nature: Values in Conflict 
In just a few decades, biodiversity conservation has become the 
dominant goal within natural area management. The rapid rise to 
predominance of this concept is widely regarded as a triumph for 
conservation. However, biodiversity values form only a subset of the 
many values broadly associated with nature. As the concept of 
biodiversity becomes more deeply entrenched within management 
structures, official activities will gradually remake the natural 
landscape in a way that reflects this subset of values. It is argued that 
this is a problem, and one that is generated not just by the dominance 
of the concept per se, but by a general lack of awareness of the full 
range of values associated with nature, or, more precisely, our actual 
motivations for valuing nature in the variety of ways that we do. 
To explore this problem, and to generate some insight into 
possible solutions, the justifications typically presented for 
conserving biodiversity are examined. It is demonstrated that the 
ubiquitous claim that biodiversity is essential for the maintenance of 
ecosystem services is undermined by the dependence of most 
services on species associations that are highly substitutable or 
resilient to environmental change. By contrast, the strongest 
argument for conserving 'diversity' is that it has intellectual interest, 
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particularly for those who dedicate themselves to the biological 
sciences. 
The values more broadly associated with nature are then 
examined, initially through review of such terms as 'naturalness', 
'wildness', and the 'autonomy of nature'. The most prevalent 
explanation for the value of such qualities is that wild nature is 
evocative of some larger-than-human context. However, the view 
that nature has value 'for itself' — that is, inherent value — is 
subsequently shown to have a number of other sources. These are 
described as 'motives', of which four are identified: 
(1) The experience of connection with nonhuman life; 
(2) Scientific interest in nature; 
(3) Respect for the larger context; and 
(4) Dissatisfaction with the abstractions of modern society. 
The first constitutes the dominant motive for animal welfare 
groups, while the second provides the dominant motive for biologists 
whose primary concern is the conservation of biodiversity. Motive 
three is particularly associated with 'spiritual' values, while motive 
four provides a convincing explanation for the value of naturalness 
and wildness, being qualities diminished by intentional human 
activity. 
The potential for conflict and convergence between these motives 
and the subset of values associated with biodiversity are then 
explored. This exercise is assisted by two conflict case studies: the 
debates between animal welfare activists and conservationists, and 
between proponents of ecological restoration and wilderness 
preservation. The latter serves to highlight the need for wildness 
values to be accorded a greater level of legal protection, as there is 
the risk that such values will be eroded by conservation programs 
oriented primarily toward safeguarding biodiversity. Greater 
awareness of the motives underlying the value of wild nature will 
assist in achieving this end. 
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Chapter One 
INTRODUCTION 
Suppose one could make out a good case for conserving the variety of 
nature on all three grounds — because it is a right relation between man and 
living things, because it gives opportunities for richer experience, and 
because it tends to promote ecological stability... 
Charles Elton (1958) 1 
Is the only reasonable conservation objective to which we can aspire in the 
twenty-first century the construction of so-called protected areas that are 
nothing more than scientifically designed and intensively managed arks to 
salvage as much biodiversity as possible from the deluge of humanity? 
Most current literature on international conservation proceeds from the 
assumption that the answer is "yes" and therefore seeks scientific and 
technical solutions developed by conservation biologists, park planners, 
and public-land managers. There is almost no formal discussion in 
international conservation circles today of how we might resist the 
disappearance of the wild both within and outside of so-called protected 
areas around the world. 
Edward Whitesell (2001)2 
Charles S. Elton, The Ecology of Invasions by Plants and Animals, (London: 
Methuen, 1958), p. 145. 
2 Edward A. Whitesell, "Mapping the Wild," in The World and the Wild, ed. 
David Rothenberg and Marta Ulvaeus (Tucson: University of Arizona Press, 
2001), p. 191. 
I. THE PROBLEM 
Biodiversity is shorthand for biological diversity. In just a few decades, 
it has become the dominant concept within natural area management. 
Assessments of biodiversity are used to evaluate the success of 
management strategies in existing reserves, and provide a crucial 
justification for creating new reserves. This is not just the case in one or 
two western countries where, as a result of unusual circumstances, the 
concept has managed to capture the collective imagination. Rather it is a 
global phenomenon, being a feature of all United Nations agreements 
relating to environmental management since the Convention on Biological 
Diversity was introduced in 1992, and most environmental policy 
documents produced by multinational corporations and internationally-
focused environmental non-government organisations. Similarly, all 
western countries, and a great proportion of other countries, have accorded 
biodiversity a crucial role within legislative frameworks for environmental 
management and protection. Such enthusiasm is reflected in the attitude of 
the general public — at least among the environmentally-aware middle 
classes — which has also come to acknowledge the value of conserving 
`biodiversity'. This trend follows the widespread conversion of 
practitioners of the biological sciences, with the prevalence of the term 
`biodiversity' within scientific databases having escalated since the first 
articles to include it were published in the mid-1980s. 
That the meteoric rise of this concept might be something other than a 
triumph for conservationists is rarely acknowledged. Increased concern for 
biodiversity on the part of global organisations, governments, private 
enterprise, and the average citizen, is invariably perceived as a good thing 
by those who value 'nature' not just for its instrumental uses but simply 
because it exists. The suggestion that a greater management focus on 
biodiversity might constitute a 'problem' could well be dismissed as a 
contrived quibble, hyped-up and embroidered by a struggling researcher 
hoping to generate the contention necessary to launch his academic career. 
However, this is far from the case. 
The concept of biodiversity is not, in itself, a problem. It is, rather, a 
potential source, and manifestation, of problems. These arise because 
biodiversity values — the values particularly associated with biodiversity 
form only a subset of the many values that are broadly associated with 
nature. It is fallacious to suggest that declining species diversity renders a 
natural area devoid of natural values. For most people untrained in the 
biological sciences diminished biodiversity is unlikely to be noticed. Up to 
a point, the aesthetic, spiritual, recreational, educational, and psychological 
values of natural areas will be little affected by the loss of obscure species. 
Yet, the dominance of the concept of biodiversity ensures that biodiversity 
values are prioritised by default, with the remaining values protected only 
to the extent that they are consistent with biodiversity values. With popular 
support for the conservation of biodiversity grounded to a large extent in 
concern for the more general values of nature it can be argued that the 
success of the concept of biodiversity has a destabilising effect on efforts to 
protect nature. Two possible outcomes present themselves: 
(1) Support for the conservation of biodiversity is undermined by 
popular dissatisfaction with the detrimental effect of 
conservation policies on the values of nature that are inconsistent 
with biodiversity values. 
(2) The concept of biodiversity becomes more deeply entrenched 
within the governing structures of society, leading to 
transformation of the natural landscape such that it reflects 
values consistent with the conservation of biodiversity. 
Given the current emphasis on biodiversity it seems more likely that what 
will be lost in the process are the values of nature that are incompatible 
with the values of biodiversity. This seems particularly tragic when it is 
recognised that, for many people, value is attributed to biodiversity under 
the mistaken assumption that the term is simply a technical way of 
referring to 'nature'. By this path, a significant proportion of the values 
popularly attributed to biodiversity might well be wrongly assigned. This is 
an important issue, and one that is generated not just by the dominance of 
biodiversity values, but by a general lack of awareness of the full range of 
values associated with nature, or, more precisely, our actual motivations 
for valuing nature in the variety of ways that we do. Recognition of this 
risk, at least within the academic literature, appears to be limited to a 
handful of authors from the United States and the United Kingdom. Their 
specific concerns will be elaborated during the course of the dissertation. 
II. THESIS STRUCTURE 
To fully explore this problem, and generate some insight into possible 
solutions, this dissertation is structured around the following question: 
"Is management undertaken to conserve biodiversity compatible with 
protecting the values associated with nature?" 
In working towards this objective, the thesis is divided into four parts and 
twelve chapters: 
PART A 	What is biodiversity? 
Chapter Two — Background information on the concept of biodiversity, 
including a basic definition, clarification of its meaning, and an overview 
of the degree to which it has been incorporated within international and 
national systems for managing natural areas. 
PART B 	What values are protected by the conservation of 
biodiversity? 
Chapter Three — Consideration of the value of biodiversity for sustaining 
ecosystem services. 
Chapter Four — Consideration of the commercial value of biodiversity, and 
of problems associated with justifying conservation on the basis of 
instrumental values. 
Chapter Five — Consideration of the non-instrumental values of 
biodiversity, being its intrinsic value, and values arising from an 
intellectual interest in biodiversity. 
PART C 	What are the values associated with nature? 
Chapter Six — Examines the definition and value of 'naturalness', which 
has a significant bearing on the value of nature. 
Chapter Seven — Examines the meta-ethical issue of what category of value 
should be investigated. The most appropriate category is deemed to consist 
of values that are both non-instrumental and non-intrinsic. These are 
termed 'inherent values'. 
Chapter Eight — Proposes an axiology of inherent value, consisting of four 
'motives' for valuing nature 'for itself'. 
Chapter Nine — Describes the fourth motive. 
PART D 	How do the values associated with biodiversity and 
nature conflict? 
Chapter Ten — Considers the conflict between advocates of biodiversity 
conservation and animal welfare groups. 
Chapter Eleven — Considers the conflict between advocates of biodiversity 
conservation and 'preservationists'. 
Chapter Twelve — Considers the ethical prospects opened up by the 
axiology of inherent value. 
Chapter Thirteen — Conclusion. 
III. METHODOLOGY 
In addressing the above question this dissertation traverses a variety of 
methodological terrain. While this much at least can be gleaned from the 
structural overview, a breakdown of the methods employed will be useful. 
Chapter three involves examination of the ecological arguments 
deployed in support of the notion that the conservation of biodiversity is 
essential for the maintenance of ecosystem services. In consequence the 
literature examined is largely scientific, or consists of commentary 
provided by scientists. Most of chapter six, and parts of chapter two, 
involve clarification of the definitions of various terms, again through 
critical review of the available literature. Chapters ten and eleven are 
largely dedicated to case-studies that serve to demonstrate the values and 
motives uncovered in earlier chapters. Chapter twelve considers the 
insights generated by the dissertation so far, and applies them to the 
management of natural areas. In a methodological sense, these various 
approaches are relatively unproblematic, provided the tasks are undertaken 
in as even-handed a manner as possible. However, more needs to be said 
regarding the philosophical approach taken in the discussion of values, and 
the motivations underlying values, which dominates chapters four and five, 
the end of chapter six, and all of chapters seven, eight and nine. 
Most of the literature referred to in the text that follows is sourced from 
environmental philosophers, although occasional contributions from 
sociologists and psychologists are also included. The benefits of a 
philosophical approach to environmental questions are described by 
Christopher Belshaw as being "first a clarification of the many issues 
involved and secondly the detailed pursuit of a range of moral and value 
questions that thought about the environment is bound to raise." 3 He also 
points out that, when attempting to persuade people to adopt particular 
values over others, a philosophical approach is unavoidable. 4 However, this 
dissertation is not intended to be a treatise on why we should conserve 
nature, but railer an investigation into why we already do so. This is not 
dissimilar to the project undertaken recently by Allan Greenbaum, who 
asked: 
How do people come to value nature 'for its own sake'? 
Specifically, how do ecologists, conservation biologists, naturalists 
and others who seek to defend species, ecosystems, 'ecologically 
significant' natural areas, or (more abstractly) wildness, biodiversity 
or ecological integrity, come to hold these entities or conditions to 
be intrinsically valuable?3 
Such an approach is in keeping with the advice of Eugene Hargrove that, 
rather than attempting to revolutionise how people think about the world, 
environmental philosophers should direct their energy to describing how 
people think about the world. 6 It follows that the axiology developed 
3 Christopher Belshaw, Environmental Philosophy: Reason, Nature and Human 
Concern, (Chesham: Acumen, 2001), P.  9. 
4 Ibid., p. 14. 
5 Allan Greenbaum, "Nature Connoisseurship," Environmental Values 14 
(2005): 389. 
6 Eugene C. Hargrove, "Environmental Ethics Without a Metaphysics," in 
Land, Value, Community: Callicott and Environmental Philosophy, ed. Wayne 
Ouderkirk and Jim Hill (Albany: State University of New York Press, 2002), p. 
143. 
partway through the dissertation should not be thought of as 'an ethic' in 
the same way that consequentialism or deep ecology are. It is more a 
device for highlighting some of the inadequacies of existing ethical 
approaches, including the identification of issues that environmental ethics 
needs to consider if it is to increase its relevance for the understanding of 
environmental attitudes and resolution of environmental conflicts. In this 
regard, Belshaw's comment — that "a philosophical approach is 
unavoidable" — remains relevant, insofar as the case is made below for 
greater recognition of certain values that have been somewhat neglected. 
Perhaps the most potent criticism that can be directed towards a 
theoretical philosophical approach is the likelihood of it being essentially 
irrelevant for the actual, physical, conservation of nature. Some comfort is 
provided here by Bernard Williams, who notes that such approaches: 
can indeed run the risk of seeming frivolous or indecently abstract 
when questions of practical urgency are at the front of political 
attention. Moreover, it is not simply a matter of urgent political 
decisions; some of the broader philosophical considerations are not 
immediately shaped to any practical decision, and it is a mistake to 
make it seem as though they were. They are, rather, reflective or 
explanatory considerations, which may help us to understand our 
feelings on these questions, rather than telling us how to answer 
them.' 
7 Bernard Williams, Making Sense of Humanity and Other Philosophical 
Papers 1982-1993, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995), p. 233. 
It is the critical evaluation of existing practices that might arise from such 
reflection that elicits the following response from David Takacs, a passage 
that is just as apt here as it was in the opening chapter of his book, The Idea 
of Biodiversity: Philosophies of Paradise: 
To 'deconstruct' an idea is not difficult, and I attempt to do that here 
with biodiversity. Yet how does one deconstruct constructively? 
How to make it so that others do not misuse my analyses to obstruct 
those biologists attempting to stem the destruction of biological 
diversity? How does one bring advocacy to scholarship while 
remaining far enough removed from the events one chronicles to 
make some stab at objectivity? How can one feel about the natural 
world as strongly as I do... and not believe that those feelings 
approach the truth in some sense? How can I balance my healthy 
skepticism about conservation biologists' proselytizing on behalf of 
biodiversity against my fervent hope that they succeed? In reporting 
the tensions at whose nexus biodiversity is located, I hope to resolve 
some of them in myself' 
William Cronon, in his introduction to the controversial Uncommon 
Ground: Rethinking the Human Place in Nature, extends the value of such 
'constructive deconstruction' beyond the generation of insights that might 
be regarded as closer to 'the truth'. He makes the persuasive claim that the 
environment movement as a whole will benefit: 
8 David Takacs, The Idea of Biodiversity: Philosophies of Paradise, (Baltimore: 
The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1996), p. 8. 
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We believe that any movement that merits the most passionate 
support of its followers — as environmentalism surely does — also 
deserves their most thoughtful and soul-searching criticism. 
Troubling as such criticism can sometimes seem, its goal in the end 
must be to deepen and enrich our understanding of the problems we 
struggle to solve, by helping us see the unexamined, sometimes 
contradictory, assumptions at the core of our own beliefs — 
assumptions that can distract or defeat us if we embrace or act on 
them unthinking,ly. 9 
It is with these weighty ambitions in mind that the following investigation 
of the 'problem' of biodiversity takes place. It is time to delve into the 
background material presented in chapter two, after a brief comment on the 
meaning of the key terms 'conservation' and 'preservation'. 
IV. TERMINOLOGY 
'Nature conservation' has traditionally described the protection of nature 
for human benefit, whereas 'nature preservation' was once the term 
reserved for the protection of nature on grounds other than the assessment 
of utility. Since the days of Gifford Pinchot and John Muir, 
conservationists and preservationists have disagreed over these divergent 
principles. However, in recent years there has been a shift away from these 
9 William Cronon, "Introduction: In Search of Nature," in Uncommon Ground: 
Rethinking the Human Place in Nature, paperback edition, ed. William Cronon 
(New York: W.W. Norton, 1996), p. 26. 
11 
established meanings,` ° encouraged by the tendency of scientists to refer to 
all efforts to protect nature as 'conservation', even when those efforts are 
justified by non-instrumental arguments. This inconsistency is 
encapsulated in the sub-disciplinary title 'conservation biology', the 
practitioners of which are largely unified by a belief in the intrinsic value 
of biodiversity (discussed in chapter two). Similarly, 'preservation' has 
come to refer to the protection of natural areas by way of a 'hands-off 
management approach. These new terminological habits will be respected 
in the text below. 
The term 'environmentalist' will be employed to refer to people who are 
likely to attribute some form of non-instrumental value to nature, and 
consider that, in some situations, these values take precedence over the 
exploitation of nature for human benefit. 
As to the meaning of 'nature', much has been written on this difficult 
term and its social construction.' There is little reference to this literature 
in the text that follows, although a similar approach is adopted insofar as 
the dissertation amounts to a study of the social construction of the value of 
nature. The differences between the two are subtle, and in many respects 
they comprise the same project, for what determines our understanding of 
something other than its value? Value is determined by the intersection of 
the personal, the social, and the physical reality of nature, each of which 
I° William M. Adams, "Rationalization and Conservation: Ecology and the 
Management of Nature in the United Kingdom," Transactions of the Institute of 
British Geographers 22 (1997): 278-79. 
I I A review of this literature is provided by David Demeritt, "What is the 
'Social Construction of Nature'? A Typology and Sympathetic Critique," Progress 
in Human Geography 26 (2002): 767-90. 
12 
will contribute to the thesis under examination as it unfolds. To avoid the 
possibility of confusion, 'nature' will almost invariably be used to describe 
that which is not human, rather than the essential character of things, which 
can also be described by this term. 
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PART A 
WHAT IS BIODIVERSITY? 
14 
Chapter Two 
THE DOMINANCE OF BIODIVERSITY 
"Biological diversity" means the variability among living organisms from 
all sources including, inter alia, terrestrial, marine and other aquatic 
ecosystems and the ecological complexes of which they are part; this 
includes diversity within species, between species and of ecosystems. 
Convention on Biological Diversity (1992) 
If the biota, in the course of aeons, has built something we like but do not 
understand, then who but a fool would discard seemingly useless parts? To 
keep every cog and wheel is the first precaution of intelligent tinkering. 
Aldo Leopold (1953) 1 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Outlined below is the history of the term `biodiversity', and examples of its 
dominance within environmental management systems at the international 
and national levels. This is followed by discussion of the meaning of 
biodiversity, with particular focus on the existence of two different 
1 Aldo Leopold, A Sand County Almanac With Other Essays on Conservation 
from Round River, (New York: Oxford University Press, 1966), p. 177. 
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interpretations, and the value of the concept of biodiversity, as distinct 
from the value of biodiversity itself. The chapter concludes with a review 
of authors who have suggested that the dominance of biodiversity, by 
which is meant the dominance of the concept, is not entirely in the best 
interests of those who value nature. 
II. THE ASCENDANCY OF BIODIVERSITY 
The most commonly cited definition of biodiversity, reproduced above, is 
that contained within the United Nations Convention on Biological 
Diversity. This definition refers to three levels of diversity — genes, species, 
and ecosystems — although, in theory, any criteria for distinguishing living 
organisms could be considered. The term's wide scope has generated 
considerable discourse on its meaning, reviewed in 2004 by Julia 
Koricheva and Helena Siipi. 2 Most of the concerns raised about the 
definitional shortcomings of biodiversity are of little relevance to the topic 
at hand, except for the ease with which it can be extended beyond a 
particular focus on diversity to refer to nonhuman life in general. This issue 
is discussed in detail later in this chapter. 
2 Julia Koricheva and Helena Siipi, "The Phenomenon of Biodiversity," in 
Philosophy and Biodiversity, ed. Marldcu Olcsanen and Juhani Pietarinen 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004), pp. 29-38. 
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The first public appearance of the term was at a conference — the Forum 
on BioDiversity — held in 1986 in Washington, DC. 3 On its acceptance by 
the scientific community, David Takacs notes that "in 1988, biodiversity 
did not appear as a keyword in Biological Abstracts, and biological 
diversity appeared once. In 1993, biodiversity appeared seventy-two times, 
and biological diversity nineteen times."4 Updating these statistics to 2005, 
and using the Web of Science database rather than Biological Abstracts, it 
appears that the meteoric rise of biodiversity has continued. Between 1981 
and 1990, 'biological diversity' appears between one and 11 times per 
year. 5 The first occurrence of `biodiversity' is in 1987, appearing in two 
articles. By 1990 this figure is up to 19, and increases steadily to 1,158 in 
2000, and 2,729 in 2005. In comparison, 'biological diversity' increases in 
occurrence from 35 in 1991, to 76 in 2000, and 121 in 2005. This is 
depicted in figure one below. 
3 Edward 0. Wilson (ed.), Biodiversity, (Washington, DC: National Academy 
Press, 1988) 
4 David Takacs, The Idea of Biodiversity: Philosophies of Paradise, (Baltimore: 
The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1996), p. 39. 
5 Figures provided for 'biological diversity' include the small number of articles 
— five per year on average between 1991 and 2005 — that contain the term 'biotic 
diversity'. 
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Figure One: The appearance of `biodiversity', 'biological diversity', and 
'biotic diversity' in the Web of Science database. 
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It is the attribution of value to biodiversity that elevates its status above 
that of the average unit of measurement. The term was invented in the mid-
1980s by conservation biologists for the express purpose of communicating 
to the non-scientific community the escalating rate of species extinctions 
and the loss of value that this entailed. 6 That biodiversity encompasses all 
levels of diversity, rather than just species richness, reflects the increasing 
recognition that protecting species from extinction requires attention to 
genetic diversity within species populations and the maintenance of 
6 Takacs, The Idea of Biodiversily, p. 37. 
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ecosystem processes upon which the species depends. This holistic, long-
term perspective has been termed the 'ecosystem approach', 7 the need for 
which is emphasised by a particular shortcoming of endangered species 
legislation, being that by the time a species is listed for protection, its 
population may be so diminished, and its habitat so disrupted, as to make 
extinction inevitable.' 
Conservation biology attained recognition as an independent discipline 
after a conference on the subject was held in California in 1978. 9 The 
number of journals dedicated to conservation biology has proliferated since 
this time, and includes Biological Conservation (since 1969), Conservation 
Biology (since 1987), Biodiversiry and Conservation (since 1992), Pacific 
Conservation Biology (since 1993), and Conservation Genetics (since 
2000). Such is the dominance of biodiversity that it is possible for all 
conservation journals with a focus on biology or ecology to be reconceived 
as biodiversity journals. 
7 Timothy M. Hennessey and Dennis L. Soden, "Ecosystem Management: The 
Governance Approach," in Handbook of Global Environmental Policy and 
Administration, ed. Dennis L. Soden and Brent S. Steel (New York: Marcel 
Dekker, 1999), pp. 29-48. 
8 See Daniel J. Rohlf, "Six Biological Reasons Why the Endangered Species 
Act Doesn't Work — and What to Do About It," in Environmental Policy and 
Biodiversity, ed. R. Edward Grumbine (Washington, DC: Island Press, 1994), pp. 
184-94. 
9 George W. Cox, Conservation Biology: Concepts and Applications, second 
edition, (Dubuque: Wm. C. Brown Publishers, 1997), pp. 2-6; Malcolm L. Hunter, 
Fundamentals of Conservation Biology, second edition, (Malden, USA: Blackwell 
Science, 2002), pp. 14-16. 
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It should be noted that not all conservation biologists immediately 
jumped onto the biodiversity bandwagon. For example, the index of 
Conservation Biology in Theory and Practice, by Graeme Caughley and 
Anne Gunn, published in 1996, includes no reference to 'diversity', 
'biological diversity', or `biodiversity'. The focus of the text is instead 
directed to the particular management issues surrounding endangered 
species. While there is only the barest mention of the Convention on 
Biological Diversity, many pages are dedicated to the Convention on 
International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora and 
the 'red books' produced by the World Conservation Union (IUCN) 
containing listings of rare and endangered species." ) Gunn has since 
indicated that their neglect of the concept of biodiversity reflected the 
belief that 'species' were (and are still) the primary focus of most 
biodiversity conservation efforts!' 
In the years since the emergence of conservation biology and the 
neologism `biodiversity', immense energy has been expended on surveys 
to document unknown species and the historic and current biodiversity of 
particular areas, on experiments investigating the role of diversity in 
population dynamics and ecosystem function, and on programs to 
maintain, restore, and promote biodiversity. This scientific interest and 
activity has stimulated, and in turn has been driven by, the demands of 
10 Graeme Caughley and Anne Gunn, Conservation Biology in Theory and 
Practice, (Cambridge: Blackwell Science, 1996), pp. 379-388. 
"Email from Anne Gunn to Ben Ridder, 17 February 2006. 
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environmental activists, governments, and the general public, who seek 
action to prevent harm to natural systems, remedy past damage, and 
conserve particular species and ecosystems. Such demands manifest in a 
plethora of organisations, agreements, policies, and nature reserves whose 
purpose relates to the conservation of biodiversity. Of particular 
significance in this process has been the role of the United Nations. 
III. ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY 
• Most international activity on biodiversity is coordinated and funded by the 
United Nations (UN), particularly through the UN Environment Program 
(UNEP) and the UN Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organisation 
(UNESCO). The most relevant agreement administered by the UN is the 
Convention on Biological Diversity (CBD), which emerged from the 
Conference on Environment and Development (UNCED) in Rio de Janeiro 
in 1992. Under the convention, participating nations essentially agree to do 
all they reasonably can to protect biodiversity. At the 2002 UNCED, held 
in Johannesburg, the convention was strengthened by the commitment of 
participating nations to establish an international network of national and 
regional protected areas by 2010. At present, 168 countries are signatories 
to the CBD. I2 Related to the convention, and also proposed at the Rio 
conference, is Local Agenda 21, which is administered by the UN 
12 See the website for the Convention on Biological Diversity 
(http://www.biodiv.org). 
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Commission on Sustainable Development. Signatories to this agreement 
acknowledge, among other things, that to be beneficial in the long-term, 
development must not diminish biodiversity." 
The CBD and the concept of biodiversity have given rise to a process of 
conversion among existing UN conventions, such as the Ramsar 
Convention on Wetlands, which came into existence in 1971. Although this 
predates widespread interest in biological diversity it has since been 
reinterpreted such that biodiversity is now a central priority: 
The official name of the treaty — The Convention on Wetlands of 
International Importance especially as Waterfowl Habitat — reflects 
its original emphasis on the conservation and wise use of wetlands 
primarily to provide habitat for waterbirds. Over the years, however, 
the Convention has broadened its scope to cover all aspects of 
wetland conservation and wise use, recognizing wetlands as 
ecosystems that are extremely important for biodiversity 
conservation in general and for the well-being of human 
communities. 14 
This conversion has also occurred with the Man and the Biosphere 
Programme (MAD), which was officially launched in 1970 and is 
13 See the website of the UN Division for Sustainable Development 
(http://www.un.orgjesa/sustdev/documents/agenda21).  
14 See the website for the Ramsar Convention 
(http://www.ramsar.org/about1about_infopack_2e.htm).  
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administered by UNESCO. In 1995 the International Coordinating Council 
of MAB reviewed the existing objectives in light of the Rio conference, 
and particularly the CBD. This gave rise to 'the Seville Strategy', which 
places far greater emphasis on the role of MAB in conserving 
biodiversity. 15 
Other high-level UN sponsored agreements of significance for the 
protection of biodiversity, although not explicitly justified in these terms, 
include the international ban on commercial whaling administered since 
1946 by the International Whaling Commission, the Washington 
Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna 
and Flora (CITES — 1973), the Bonn Convention on the Conservation of 
Migrating Species of Wild Animals (1979), the Convention to Combat 
Desertification (1994), and the UN Forum on Forests (2000). 16 Other 
significant projects sponsored by the UN include the World Conservation 
Monitoring Centre (WCMC), whose work is specifically targeted towards 
gathering information on global biodiversity, and the Millennium 
Ecosystem Assessment. I7 
15 See the website for the MAB (http://www.unesco.org/mab/doc/Strategy.pdf).  
16 See the websites for the International Whaling Commission 
(http://www.iwcoffice.org), CITES (http://www.cites.org), the Bonn Convention 
(http://www.cms.int), the Convention to Combat Desertification 
(http://www.unccd.int), and the Forum on Forests (http://www.un.org/esa/forests).  
17 See the websites of the WCMC (http://www.unep-wcmc.org) and the 
Millennium Ecosystem Assessment (http://www.millenniumassessment.org). 
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There are also many non-government organisations involved in similar 
activities. The IUCN, for example, was instrumental in drafting the CBA, 18 
and has been producing the 'red books' since 1962. 19 Through the World 
Commission on Protected Areas (WCPA), the IUCN is particularly 
influential in the field of protected area management, 2° and significantly 
defines 'protected area' as "an area of land and/or sea especially dedicated 
to the protection and maintenance of biological diversity, and of natural 
and associated cultural resources, and managed through legal or other 
effective means." 21 
For the European Union, which currently consists of 25 member states, 
the first significant nature conservation agreement was the Bern 
Convention on the Conservation of European Wildlife and Natural 
Habitats, which came into effect in 1982. In the 2004 Declaration on the 
Role of the Bern Convention in the Conservation of Biological Diversity, 
the standing committee of the convention provides some indication of the 
extent to which the concept of biodiversity has become the primary focus 
18 Fiona McConnell, The Biodiversity Convention: A Negotiating History, 
(London: Kluwer Law International, 1996), pp. 26-27. 
19 See the biography for Sir Peter Scott available on the website of the Wildfowl 
& Wetlands Trust (http://www.wwt.org.uldabout/Peter%20Scott.pdf).  
20 See the website of the WCPA (http://www.iucn.org/themes/wcpa).  
21  International Union for the Conservation of Nature and Natural Resources, 
Guidelines for Protected Area Management Categories, (Gland: IUCN, 1994), p. 
7. 
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of their efforts. 22 The conservation of biodiversity was itself written into 
legislation in the 1992 European Union Directive on the Conservation of 
Natural Habitats and Wild Fauna and Flora (the 'Habitats Directive').23 It 
was under this Directive that the Natura 2000 network of protected areas 
was established. 24 In addition, the European Union approved a 
`Biodiversity Strategy' in 1998, which made provision for the preparation 
of `biodiversity action plans' by member countries. 25 
At the national level, there has been a widespread shift, particularly in 
affluent countries, to incorporate the concept of biodiversity within 
legislation and systems governing the management of natural areas and, to 
a lesser extent, other activities that impact on nonhuman life. This is 
apparent from the national reports that are submitted to the secretariat of 
22 Standing Committee of the Convention on the Conservation of European 
Wildlife and Natural Habitats, Strasbourg Declaration on the Role of the Bern 
Convention in the Conservation of Biological Diversity. Adopted 30 November 
2004. Available from the website of the Council of Europe 
(http://www.coeint/t/e/Cultural_Co-operation/Environment). 
23 Council of the European Committees, Directive on the Conservation of 
Natural Habitats and Wild Fauna and Flora, Adopted 21 May 1992. Available 
from the website of the European Commission 
(http://ec.europa.eu/environment/nature).  
24 See the website summarising the activities and legislation of the European 
Union (http://europa.eu/scadplus/legjen/lvb/128076.htm).  
25 See the website of the European Commission 
(http://ec.europa.eu/environment/docum/9842sm.htm).  
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the CBD outlining the measures taken to satisfy the requirements of the 
Convention. 26 
Biodiversity also features within the mission statements of many large 
corporations, such as BHP Billiton, 27 Coca-Col a,28 DuPont,29 
ExxonMobil,3° and General Motors. 31 
IV. CLARIFYING THE MEANING OF 
BIODIVERSITY 
Of particular relevance for consideration of the value of biodiversity is the 
confusing use of this term in contexts that are one or more steps removed 
from the quality of 'diversity'. An explanation is found in the Biodiversity 
Synthesis produced by the Millennium Ecosystem Assessment (MEA): 
the value of the diversity of genes, species, or ecosystems per se is 
often confused with the value of a particular component of that 
26 See the website of the CBD (http://www.biodiv.org/reports/default.aspx).  
27 See the website of BHP Billiton 
(http://sustainability.bhpbilliton.com/2006/environrnent/caseStudies/biodiversity)  
28 See the website of Coca-Cola Enterprises 
(http://www.cokecce.com/srclib/corporate_responsibility/envirotunent14.html).  
29 See the website of DuPont Biotechnology 
(http://www2.dupont.corn/Bioteclutology/en_US/difference/principles.htm).  
30  See the website of ExxonMobil 
(http://exxonmobil.com/Corporate/Citizenship/biodiversity.asp).  
31  See the website of General Motors 
(http://www.gm.com/company/gmability/sustainability/reports/05/600_enviromne  
nt). 
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diversity. Species diversity in and of itself, for example, is valuable 
because the presence of a variety of species helps to increase the 
capability of an ecosystem to be resilient in the face of a changing 
environment. At the same time, an individual component of that 
diversity, such as a particular food plant species, may be valuable as 
a biological resource. The consequences of changes in biodiversity 
for people can stem both from a change in the diversity per se and a 
change in a particular component of biodiversity. Each of these 
aspects of biodiversity deserves its own attention from decision-
makers, and each often requires its own (albeit connected) 
management goals and policies.32 
Koricheva and Siipi describe this as a distinction between the scientific 
concept and the popular concept of biodiversity, 33 although given that 
scientists also have a tendency to conflate the two when arguing for 
conservation, a more accurate way of understanding the distinction is that it 
is between 'biological diversity' and 'nonhuman life'. Whereas the focus 
of the former is on 'diversity', the latter can be used to refer to a single 
organism or species, the diversity of species, or all species in total. Given 
that the formal definition of `biodiversity' relates specifically to 'diversity', 
it should be emphasized that although the 'nonhuman life' sense of 
32 Millennium Ecosystem Assessment, Ecosystems and Human Well-being: 
Biodiversity Synthesis, (Washington, DC: World Resources Institute, 2005), p. 2. 
33 Koricheva and Siipi, "The Phenomenon of Biodiversity," pp. 42-43. 
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biodiversity is often convenient, it is also incorrect and misleading. 
Conflation of the two is widespread and has a range of policy implications, 
which arise because management oriented toward the conservation of 
'diversity' can be quite different to management oriented toward protecting 
certain valued species. To avoid confusion, Philipp Mayer recommends 
that "specific features of biodiversity should be distinguished, for reasons 
of clarity, from biodiversity per se... a study titled 'The biodiversity of 
arthropods' is much vaguer than one titled `The species richness of 
arthropods — a feature of biodiversity.'"34 Although he prefers the term 
'feature', similar terms include `facet', 'element', and 'component' (of 
biodiversity). 
As suggested by the MEA, this distinction has particular significance 
when considering the value of biodiversity, for the values associated with 
biological diversity form a tiny subset of the values more broadly 
associated with nonhuman life. However, the MEA does not emphasise the 
extent to which conflation of these two meanings can mislead. For 
example, the textbook Living in the Environment includes the sub-heading 
"why should we care about biodiversityr, beneath which is presented a list 
of values associated with particular species and natural areas, including 
34 Philipp Mayer, "Biodiversity — The Appreciation of Different Thought Styles 
and Values Helps to Clarify the Term," Restoration Ecology 14 (2006): 109. 
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ecosystem services, recreation opportunities, aesthetics, and so on. 35 This 
list makes it clear that the author is referring to the values of particular 
components of biodiversity, rather than biological diversity itself. If he had 
confined himself to the more formal usage, retaining a focus on 'diversity', 
then the list of values would have been much reduced. For example, only a 
few recreation opportunities could be listed, such as photographing 
specimens of many different species of bird. A similar mistake is apparent 
in a study of "public perceptions of biodiversity" in Canada, which actually 
questioned people on the value of forests and natural areas. 36 Another 
example is the enormous (750-page) report commissioned by UNEP, 
entitled Cultural and Spiritual Values of Biodiversity, throughout which is 
discussed the spiritual value of particular trees, certain plants with healing 
properties, and crops essential to indigenous diets." In some respects it 
makes sense to refer to these values as being associated with a 'diversity' 
of species, rather than particular species, as the report does contain a 
'diversity' of examples. Yet in each particular case described in the report 
it is not usually a diversity of species that is valued, but certain useful or 
35 G. Tyler Miller, Living in the Environment: Principles, Connections, and 
Solutions, thirteenth edition, (Pacific Grove: Brooks/Cole-Thomson Learning, 
2004), pp. 568-570. 
36 Loren Vanderlinden and John Eyles, "Public Perceptions of Biodiversity: 
Models and a Case Study," in Biodiversity in Canada: Ecology, Ideas, and Action, 
ed. Stephen Bocldng (Peterborough: Broadview Press, 2000), pp. 237 -270. 
37 Darrell A. Posey (ed.), Cultural and Spiritual Values of Biodiversity, 
(Nairobi: United Nations Environment Program, 1999) 
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significant species. It is the compilers of the report, engaging in a process 
of generalisation, who are associating the values with the aggregate rather 
than the specific. 
The definitional ambiguity is most apparent when arguments are being 
presented for the conservation of biodiversity. Gretchen Daily and ten co-
authors, for example, highlight a variety of human benefits associated with 
the use of particular species, including the harvesting of fish from aquatic 
ecosystems, the use of animals and animal products found in grassland 
ecosystems, timber, fibre, and foodstuffs from forest ecosystems, and so 
on. The authors state that biodiversity is the source of these ecosystem 
goods, yet in most of their examples it is not the diversity of species that 
provides the goods, but particular species. Despite the contradiction, these 
arguments are presented in support of conserving the full diversity of 
species.38 
The ambiguity surrounding the meaning of biodiversity is a significant 
contributing factor to the problem at the heart of this dissertation. That 
biodiversity values form only a subset of the values generally associated 
with nonhuman life is a notion that will be viewed with scepticism by those 
who have come to believe that biodiversity values encompass all of these 
values. 
38 Gretchen C. Daily, et al., "Ecosystem Services: Benefits Supplied to Human 
Societies by Natural Ecosystems," Issues in Ecology 2 (1997): 1-16. 
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V. THE VALUE OF THE CONCEPT 
Aside from the values associated with biodiversity itself, which are 
discussed through the course of the next three chapters, the concept of 
biodiversity also has considerable value. One of the most important 
grounds for this value is its scientific basis. The concept of biodiversity is 
associated with an ecological approach, which in turn provides an 
empirical grounding for the management of natural areas. Management 
strategies that do not take account of ecological interdependencies, species 
population dynamics, habitat requirements, and so on, are less likely to be 
successful in the task of conserving valued aspects of nature. 39 
Because biodiversity can be quantified (although not without 
difficult?) it becomes possible to rank areas on this basis, which is 
especially useful for bureaucratic processes such as determining priorities 
and assigning resources. Thus, Timo Peuhkuri and Pekka Joldnen tie the 
escalating interest in biodiversity to the "globalization and scientization" of 
environmental problems.41 Similarly, in his description of an influential 
39 Takacs, The Idea of Biodiversity, pp. 52-59. 
443 See Sahotra Sarkar, "Defining 'Biodiversity% Assessing Biodiversity," The 
Monist 85 (2002): 131-55. 
41 Timo Peuhkuri and Pekka Jokinen, "The Role of Knowledge and Spatial 
Contexts in Biodiversity Policies: A Sociological Perspective," Biodiversity and 
Conservation 8 (1999): 135. See also David John Frank, "Science, Nature, and the 
Globalization of the Environment, 1879-1990," Social Forces 76(1997): 409-35. 
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report produced in 1993 on biodiversity in the United Kingdom, Adams 
observes that: 
In some ways the most remarkable feature of this latest turn of 
debate about conservation concerns not the details of the action 
proposed, but the way in which that action is conceived of. 
Biodiversity Challenge is a set-piece of applied business 
management thinking. In the new language of biodiversity, 
conservation efforts must be targeted on critical priorities, and 
locked into a tight programme of activities designed to achieve a 
specified and agreed output in a predicted time and within a known 
budget. These ideas match the contemporary rhetoric of public life, 
and quite fundamental shifts in the way people think — not only 
about the proper work of government, but also about themselves and 
world about them.42 
It has been suggested that the scientific nature of the concept might prove 
problematic for conservationists. Desiree McGraw notes that the "species-
specific and site-specific treaties, which pre-dated the CBD, made it easier 
for the public to embrace 'charismatic animals', such as pandas and seal 
pups, and to explore 'exotic sites' such as the rainforests of Borneo and 
42  William M. Adams, Future Nature: A Vision for Conservation, revised 
edition, (London: Earthscan Publications, 2003), p. 50. 
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Brazil."43 Yet, `biodiversity' does have a high public profile, and, arguably, 
would not feature so prominently within legislation and organisation 
mission statements if it did not. 
As discussed in the previous section, in the shift from a scientific to a 
managerial concept, `biodiversity' has undergone a process of 
simplification that has not necessarily disadvantaged conservationists. An 
inherent conservation bias is also apparent in the way the concept 
generalises value from specific nonhuman entities to, potentially, 
everything. Biodiversity describes a quality of the natural world to which 
all its aspects, including humans, contribute. As each organism, species or 
ecosystem is potentially dependent upon other organisms, species, and 
ecosystems, assigning value to any individual thing implies assigning an 
associated value to all the things upon which it depends. 	individual 
organisms can be assigned value for contributing to the genetic diversity of 
their community and species. This reflects the application of the 
precautionary principle, which is discussed in the following two chapters. 
The willingness of conservationists to exaggerate the dangers of 
exploiting nature in order to strengthen the grounds for its protection is a 
frequent theme of 'anti-environmentalist' authors like Bjorn Lomborg, 
43 Desiree M. McGraw, "The Story of the Biodiversity Convention: From 
Negotiation to Implementation," in Governing Global Biodiversity: The Evolution 
and Implementation of the Convention on Biological Diversity, ed. Philippe G. Le 
Prestre (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2002), p. 26. 
44 Bryan G. Norton, Why Preserve Natural Variety?, (Princeton: Princeton 
University Press, 1987), pp. 62-66. 
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Gregg Easterbrook, and Ronald Bailey. 45 However, there also exists a 
related discourse among conservationists whereby criticism is directed 
towards those who promote arguments for conserving biodiversity that do 
not truly reflect their own personal reasons for doing so. This tendency has 
led some to suggest that the honesty of conservation scientists has been 
compromised by the desire to build support for conservation goals. 46 In 
August 2000, debate among scientists investigating relationships between 
biodiversity and ecosystem functioning spilled onto the pages of Science 
after a letter was published in the Bulletin of the Ecological Society of 
America (ESA), signed by eight prominent researchers, accusing the ESA 
of unscientific bias.47 This led to a meeting of the aggrieved parties at a 
45 Ronald Bailey, Eco-Scam: The False Prophets of Ecological Apocalypse, 
(New York: St. Martins Press, 1993); Gregg Easterbroolc, A Moment on the Earth: 
The Coming Age of Environmental Optimism, (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1995); 
Nom Lomborg, The Skeptical Environmentalist: Measuring the Real State of the 
World, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001). 
46 See, for example, K.S. Shrader-Frechette and Earl D. McCoy, "How the Tail 
Wags the Dog: How Value Judgments Determine Ecological Science," 
Environmental Values 3 (1994): 107-20; Talcacs, The Idea of Biodiversity, pp. 253- 
254, 266-270; Dwight Barry and Max Oelschlaeger, "A Science for Survival: 
Values and Conservation Biology," Conservation Biology 10 (1996): 905-911; 
Paul Roebuck and Paul Phifer, "The Persistence of Positivism in Conservation 
Biology," Conservation Biology 13 (1999): 444-46. 
47 David A. Wardle, et a/., "Biodiversity and Ecosystem Function: An Issue in 
Ecology," Bulletin of the Ecological Society of America 81(2000): 235-239; 
Jocelyn Kaiser, "Rift Over Biodiversity Divides Ecologists," Science 289 (2000): 
1282-83. 
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specially organized conference in December 2000 and the eventual 
publication of a consensus paper in 2005.48 
As discussed further in chapter four, the 'personal reasons' for valuing 
biodiversity are difficult to extricate from the non-instrumental values 
associated with nature and nonhuman life more generally. As noted by 
William Cronon: 
an apparently more 'scientific' concept than wilderness, biological 
diversity in fact invokes many of the same sacred values, which is 
why organizations like the Nature Conservancy have been quick to 
employ it as an alternative to the seemingly fuzzier and more 
problematic concept of wildemess. 49 
Many people might support the rational arguments presented for 
biodiversity conservation, such as the maintenance of ecosystem services 
or the commercial benefits of as-yet =exploited genetic material, but their 
true reasons for this support are less utilitarian. Their stated belief in the 
value of biodiversity might instead reflect a more general concern for 
48 Jennifer B. Hughes and Owen L. Petchey, "Merging Perspective on 
Biodiversity and Ecosystem Functioning," Trends in Ecology and Evolution 16 
(2001): 222-23; D.U. Hooper, etal., "Effects of Biodiversity on Ecosystem 
Functioning: A Consensus of Current Knowledge," Ecological Monographs 75 
(2005): 3-35. 
49 William Cronon, "The Trouble With Wilderness," in Uncommon Ground: 
Rethinking the Human Place in Nature, paperback edition, ed. William Cronon 
(New York: W.W. Norton, 1996), p. 81. 
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nature. These value-priorities encourage and reinforce the conflation of the 
two different interpretations of tiodiversity', which, in turn, bolsters the 
case for biodiversity conservation. 
Because of its numerous benefits for government bureaucrats, natural 
area managers, and conservation activists, the concept of biodiversity has 
gained considerable momentum since its entry into the public arena, akin to 
'efficiency' for economic administrators, or 'journal impact' for academic 
administrators. As in these other spheres, the domination of particular 
management concepts can have unforeseen, and unwelcome, 
consequences. A brief review of those authors who have drawn attention to 
the potential problems arising from the dominance of `biodiversity' is 
presented below. 
VI. RECOGNITION OF THE PROBLEM 
The 'problem' under investigation is that management oriented to 
conserving global biodiversity does not necessarily protect the full range of 
values associated with nature and nonhuman life. Recognition of this 
problem generally appears in tandem with expressions of concern for the 
loss of 'wildness' or 'wilderness values'. Such concerns appear to be most 
prevalent in the United States, having been discussed by authors including 
David Cole, Jack Turner and Edward Whitesell. Turner has been the most 
forceful of this group, with the last chapter of his collection of essays, The 
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Abstract Wild, largely dedicated to a lament for the fate of wildness under 
scientific management by conservation biologists. 50 Whitesell, whose 
output on this subject appears to consist of just one chapter in the edited 
volume, The World and the Wild, employs a similar tone to Turner.51 
Cole's observations are more measured, being confined to the pages of 
journals relating to conservation science and wilderness management This 
is perhaps a reflection of his position as a scientist with the Aldo Leopold 
Wilderness Research Institute, which is funded by the United States Forest 
Service. Of his work, Most pertinent to the subject at hand is a 2005 paper 
published in the International Journal of Wilderness. Here he raises the 
concern that the symbolic values of wilderness are potentially undermined 
by the scientifically-justified activities taken to protect ecological values. 52 
In the United Kingdom the dominance of the concept of biodiversity in 
environmental management is also the occasional subject of concern. For 
example, there have been several brief articles in the journal of the British 
Association of Nature Conservationists that have drawn attention to this 
5° Jack Turner, The Abstract Wild, (Tucson: The University of Arizona Press, 
1996), pp. 107-25. 
51 Edward A. Whitesell, "Mapping the Wild," in The World and the Wild, ed. 
David Rothenberg and Marta Ulvaeus (Tucson: University of Arizona Press, 
2001), pp. 185-197. 
52 David N. Cole, "Symbolic Values: The Overlooked Values That Make 
Wilderness Unique," International Journal of Wilderness 11 (2005): 10, 23-27. 
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issue." Perhaps the highest profile author of recent time to express such 
concerns has been Peter Taylor, whose book, Beyond Conservation: A 
Wildland Strategy, is the most comprehensive account of `rewilding' in 
Europe and the UK. He suggests that a focus on conserving habitat suitable 
for rare species will soak up funds that might otherwise be made available 
for returning agricultural land to nature. Most rare species in the UK 
survive only under conditions that require ongoing active management to 
maintain, and because of the impetus behind the UK Biodiversity Action 
Plan, there is less money available for `rewilding , . 54  Other British authors 
who have drawn attention to the potential for conflict between wildness 
and the focus on conserving biodiversity include William Adams and 
Steven Trudgi11. 55 A more focused piece is presented by Kate Rawles. 
Although she recognises the danger posed to 'naturalness' by biodiversity- 
oriented management, her primary interest is the callous attitude toward the 
53 See, for example, Paul Evans, "Biodiversity: Nature For Nerds?" ECOS 17 
(1996): 7-12; James Fenton, "Scotland: Reviving the Wild," ECOS 20 (2000): 67- 
69; Peter Rhind, "Give Nature a Chance," ECOS 25 (2004): 85-91. 
54 Peter Taylor, Beyond Conservation: A Wildland Strategy, (London: 
Earthscan, 2005), p. 217. 
"William M. Adams, "When Nature Won't Stay Still: Conservation, 
Equilibrium and Control," in Decolonizing Nature: Strategies for Conservation in 
a Post-Colonial Era, eds. William M. Adam and Martin Mulligan (London: 
Earthscan Publications, 2003), pp. 220-46; Adams, Future Nature, revised edition; 
Steven Trudgill, The Terrestrial Biosphere: Environmental Change, Ecosystem 
Science, Attitudes and Values, (Harlow: Pearson Education, 2001); Steven 
Trudgill, "Psychobiogeography: Meanings of Nature and Motivations for a 
Democratized Conservation Ethic," Journal of Biogeography 28 (2001): 677-98. 
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lives of sentient animals encouraged by attention to the survival of species 
and ecosystems. 56 
In Australia, this issue has apparently aroused no interest. In addition to 
the lack of scholarly discussion on the matter, there appears to be little 
interest from the general public. In 2005, for example, the Department of 
Conservation and Land Management in Western Australia conducted a 
public consultation program for a proposed biodiversity conservation 
strategy for that state. Of the 173 submissions, none mentioned the natural 
values that might possibly be threatened by policies oriented towards 
biodiversity. 57 
VII. ALTERNATIVE CONCEPTS 
It should be acknowledged that biodiversity is only one among a wide 
range of concepts employed to assess and manage natural areas. Not only 
are there other ecological concepts, such as ecological integrity and 
ecosystem health, but there exist broader management concepts, such as 
social and economic sustainability, in addition to traditional considerations 
like legality, public and political opinion, and cost. The position taken here 
56 Kate Rawles, "Biological Diversity and Conservation Policy," in Philosophy 
and Biodiversity, ed. Marklcu Olcsanen and Juhani Pietarinen (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2004), pp. 199-216. 
"Department of Conservation and Land Management, Summary and Analysis 
of Public Submissions on the Discussion Paper Towards a Biodiversity 
Conservation Strategy for Western Australia, (Perth: Department of Conservation 
and Land Management, 2005). 
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is that, in the management of natural areas, biodiversity is the dominant 
ecological concept. Also that, on account of its central role within relevant 
international agreements and national legislation, biodiversity concerns can 
usurp even such politically important factors as popularity and cost. 
The dominance of the concept of biodiversity among other ecological 
concepts is demonstrated by its prominence within treaties, laws, policies 
and management plans at every scale from the United Nations to local 
government authorities. It is also apparent that biodiversity is an 
indispensable component of other concepts employed to manage natural 
areas, including sustainable development, ecological health, and ecological 
integrity. 
The need to conserve biodiversity is a key aspect of sustainable 
development. Both concepts figured prominently at the 1992 UNCED in 
Rio de Janeiro. Robert Costanza, et al., note that: 
Biologically, sustainability means avoiding extinction, and living to 
survive and reproduce. Economically, it means avoiding major 
disruptions and collapses, hedging against instabilities and 
discontinuities. At its most basic level, sustainability always 
concerns temporality and, in particular, longevity. 58 
58 Robert Costanza, Michael Mageau, Bryan Norton and Bernard C. Patten, 
"What is Sustainabilityr in Ecosystem Health, ed. David Rapport, Robert 
Costnn7a, Paul R. Epstein, Connie Gaudet and Richard Levins (Malden: Blackwell 
Science, 1998), P.  234. 
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Included within the Rio Declaration on Environment and Development was 
reference to the need to "conserve, protect and restore the health and 
integrity of the Earth's ecosystem". 59 Although the architects of the 
declaration were referring to 'health' and 'integrity' in a general sense, this 
terminology coincides with two management concepts that might be seen 
as alternatives to `biodiversity'. David Rapport defines ecosystem health as 
follows: 
Its essence is to marry knowledge of how environmental systems 
behave (that is, impacts of stress pressures on ecosystems) with 
knowledge of what is desirable and acceptable. This question 
necessitates considering the widest possible implications of change — 
change in human health, economic opportunity, cultural integrity, 
and aesthetics — in terms of societal values... As an integrative 
science, ecosystem health goes far beyond the boundaries of stress 
ecology, a field that concerns itself with the strictly biophysical 
aspects of the problem. It explicitly takes into account the wider 
territory of socioeconomic, human health, legal, and policy 
aspects.° 
59 Rio Declaration on Environment and Development (Principle 7). Available 
from the website of the UN Division for Sustainable Development 
(http://www.un.orglesa/sustdevidocuments/agenda21). 
6° David Rapport, "Need for a New Paradigm," in Ecosystem Health, ed. 
Rapport, et al., pp. 3-17. 
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J. Baird Callicott suggests a 'working definition' of ecosystem health to be 
"a condition of normality in the linked processes and functions that 
compose ecasystems."61 Laura Westra notes that ecosystem health is a 
"condition that may apply even to nonpristine or somewhat degraded 
ecosystems, provided they function successfully as they presently are."62 
Ecosystem health has much in common with sustainability, in so far as a 
'healthy' ecosystem must be able to sustain itself; to "maintain its 
metabolic activity level as well as its internal structure and organization... 
[and] prove resilient to outside stresses over a time and space frame 
relevant to that system". 63 With 'organization' to a large extent described 
by biodiversity, and, as is claimed by many ecologists, with the resilience - 
of ecosystem functioning largely determined by biodiversity, 64 maintaining 
biodiversity is therefore considered necessary for the maintenance of 
ecosystem health. As discussed in the next chapter, it is likely that the 
conservation of biodiversity is not essential for the maintenance of many 
ecosystem services, in which case it is possible that an ecosystem could be 
61 J. Baird Callicott, "The Value of Ecosystem Health," Environmental Values 4 
(1995): 357. 
62 Laura Westra, "Ecosystem Integrity and Sustainability: The Foundational 
Value of the Wild," in Perspectives on Ecological Integrity, ed. Laura Westra and 
John Lemons (Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1995), p. 32. 
63 Robert Costanza, Michael Mageau, Bryan Norton and Bernard C. Patten, 
"Predictors of Ecosystem Health," in Ecosystem Health, ed. Rapport, et al., p. 241. 
"Hooper, et al., "Effects of Biodiversity on Ecosystem Functioning," pp. 3-35. 
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considered healthy, from a societal rather than a biological perspective, 
despite a decline in biodiversity. 
Biological integrity is defined by Paul Angermeier and James Karr as 
"the capability of supporting and maintaining a balanced, integrated, 
adaptive community of organisms having a species composition, diversity, 
and functional organization comparable to that of natural habitat of the 
region."65 Laura Westra emphasises the significance of the conservation of 
biodiversity to integrity, which "is achieved when the system's optimum 
capacity for the greatest possible ongoing developmental options within its 
time/location remains undiminished." In addition to minimising 
`anthropogenic stress', this is "fostered by the greatest possible 
biodiversity."66 Given the uncertainty inherent in distinguishing natural and 
anthropogenic stress purely on the basis of ecological effect, as discussed 
in chapter six, this leaves integrity to be in many respects dependent on 
conserving biodiversity. 
65 Paul L. Angermeier and James R. Karr, "Biological Integrity Versus 
Biological Diversity as Policy Directives," BioScience 44 (1994): 692. 
" Westra, "Ecosystem Integrity and Sustainability," p. 33. 
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VIII. CONCLUSION 
Since the term was coined in the mid-1980s, tiodiversity' has come to 
be the dominant ecological concept within UN conventions and 
environmental legislation. This has been largely due to the influence of 
conservation biologists who recognised a need to adopt an ecosystem 
approach in order to manage vulnerable species populations. The most 
significant instrument by which this influence has been translated into 
action at the national level is the UN Convention on Biological Diversity. 
However, despite its prominence, tiodiversity' is often taken to refer to 
nonhuman life in a more general sense. This enables many values more 
broadly associated with nature to be misleadingly attributed to biodiversity. 
Only a limited number of authors in the United State and the United 
Kingdom have suggested that the dominance of the concept of biodiversity 
might constitute a 'problem', mostly because it encourages a focus on the 
management of nature, a focus that potentially undermines the quality of 
'wildness'. 
PART B 
WHAT VALUES ARE 
PROTECTED BY THE 
CONSERVATION OF 
BIODIVERSITY? 
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Chapter Three 
THE VALUE OF BIODIVERSITY: 
ECOSYSTEM SERVICES 
Natural ecosystems support human life through an array of absolutely 
essential, free public services. Once we look closely at the nature of those 
services and the systems that provide them, and at the roles that individual 
species and populations play within ecosystems, then it should become 
clear why any enemy of the Snail Darter is an enemy of yours and ours, 
too. 
Paul and Anne Ehrlich (1981)' 
I. INTRODUCTION 
In considering whether a focus on the conservation of biodiversity is 
compatible with protecting the values associated with nature we first need 
to determine what are the values specifically protected by such a focus. 
Examination of these values will occupy chapters four and five in addition 
to the current chapter, as follows: 
Chapter Three: Consideration of the value of biodiversity for 
maintaining ecosystem services essential to human well-being. 
Paul R. Ehrlich and Anne H. Ehrlich, Extinction: The Causes and 
Consequences of the Disappearance of Species, (London: Victor Gollancz, 1982), 
p. 77. 
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Chapter Four: Consideration of the commercial value of biodiversity, 
and problems associated with justifying conservation purely on the basis of 
instrumental values. 
Chapter Five: Consideration of the non-instrumental values of 
biodiversity, including its intrinsic value, and values arising from an 
intellectual interest in biodiversity. This is followed by discussion of the 
value of biodiversity as a surrogate for values more generally associated 
with nonhuman life and nature. 
One significant value that has been omitted from this investigation is the 
cultural value of biodiversity. This is because such value will either be 
encompassed by one of the other values that has been included, is more 
readily associated with nonhuman life and nature rather than biodiversity in 
particular, or is sufficiently personal and individualistic that it cannot be 
considered a general case. 
II. THE ECOSYSTEM SERVICES ARGUMENT 
The argument that the maintenance of biological diversity is essential for 
the sustainable provision of ecosystem services (ES) is perhaps the most 
powerful justification for the conservation of biodiversity. The ES 
argument is grounded in science, and compatible with impersonal, 
economic assessments of value in a way that aesthetic and moral 
arguments are not. It is promoted within international treaties, national 
legislation, government reports, academic textbooks, popular 
environmental books, and by scientific organisations, grassroots 
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conservation groups, state-funded and commercial media, and so on. From 
presidents to the Pope, concern has been expressed that conservation of 
biodiversity is necessary for the future material well-being of humanity. 2 
However, an important observation that undermines the universal 
applicability of the ES argument is that most services are provided not by 
whole ecosystems, but by any group of species that fulfils certain basic 
functional criteria and which is capable of flourishing on a given site. This 
chapter articulates and explores the implications of this rarely 
acknowledged counterargument. 
The most authoritative description of the meaning of 'ecosystem 
services' is given by the Millennium Ecosystem Assessment (MEA). 
Under this definition ES include both the material and non-material 
benefits from both natural and human-modified ecosystems. ES are divided 
into four categories: provisioning services, regulating services, cultural 
services, and supporting services. 3 Framed in terms of the MBA definition, 
biodiversity is a regulating and supporting ecosystem service that is itself 
essential to the provision of all ES. It is the latter half of this statement that 
will be examined below; that is, the argument that biodiversity is essential 
2 See the speech given by the President of France, Jacques Chirac, on 24 
January 2005, at the UNESCO conference "Biodiversity: Science and 
Governance", which is available from the website of the French embassy in the 
United Kingdom (http://www.ambafrance-uk.org). See also the apostolic 
exhortation "Ecclesia in America" (paragraph 25), given by Pope John Paul 11 in 
Mexico City, 22 January 1999, which is available from the Vatican website 
(http://www.vatican.va/holy  father/john_paul_ii/apost_exhortations). 
3 Millennium Ecosystem Assessment, Ecosystems and Human Well-being: A 
Framework for Assessment, (Washington, DC: World Resources Institute, 2003), 
pp. 55-60. 
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for all ES, rather than the argument that biodiversity is itself an ecosystem 
service. It should also be noted that because of the controversy surrounding 
the identification of relationships between biodiversity and ecosystem 
functioning, discussed in the previous chapter, the consensus paper 
published by Hooper et al. in 2005 will be used in preference to other 
sources where appropriate. 4 Note also that in the text below tiodiversity' 
will generally refer to 'species richness' because it is the link between 
species extinction and the provision of ES that has generated the most 
debate. 
One of the foundation texts for the argument that biodiversity 
conservation is necessary to ensure the provision of ES is Extinction: The 
Causes and Consequences of the Disappearance of Species, written by 
Paul and Anne Ehrlich, and first published in 1981. The essential structure 
of their argument is as follows: 
la. 	Ecosystems provide ES. 
lb. 	Ecosystems may collapse if species become extinct. 
2. 	Therefore ES may collapse if species become extinct. 
3a. If ES collapse they will have to be provided artifically, which in 
many cases will be expensive and inadequate. 
3b. Our ability to predict the effect of species extinction on 
ecosystem functioning and provision of ES is not infallible. 
4. Therefore all species must be conserved to avert catastrophe 
(precautionary principle). 
5. Given the high rate of species extinction we must act now. 
4 D.U. Hooper, et al., "Effects of Biodiversity on Ecosystem Functioning: A 
Consensus of Current Knowledge," Ecological Monographs 75 (2005): 3-35. 
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This argument was dramatically illustrated with the metaphor of rivets 
being progressively 'popped' from the wing of an aeroplane. Each rivet 
removed represented the extinction of a species. The plane represented 
individual ecosystems, or, in its broadest sense, 'Spaceship Earth': 
The natural ecological systems of Earth, which supply these vital 
services, are analogous to the parts of an airplane that make it a 
suitable vehicle for human beings. But ecosystems are much more 
complex than wings or engines. Ecosystems, like well-made 
airplanes, tend to have redundant subsystems and other 'design' 
features that permit them to continue functioning after absorbing a 
certain amount of abuse. A dozen rivets, or a dozen species, might 
never be missed. On the other hand, a thirteenth rivet popped from a 
wing flap, or the extinction of a key species involved in the cycling 
of nitrogen, could lead to serious accident. 5 
Perhaps the most contentious aspect of the biodiversity-ES argument is 
the precautionary principle (line 4 above). ES are associated with particular 
ecosystem functions. Because some ecosystem functions are strongly 
dependent on the activities of particular species, and because these 
dependencies are often not well understood, it is claimed that a prudent, 
precautionary approach requires protection of the full diversity of species 
to ensure long-term provision of ES and human prosperity. In making this 
argument, the application of the precautionary principle is grounded in the 
5 Ehrlich and Ehrlich, Extinction, pp. xii-xiii. 
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perception of risk, which is itself strongly influenced by value orientation. 6 
Much of the debate surrounding the ES argument for biodiversity 
conservation hinges on perception of the effect that species extinctions 
might have on the provision of ES. It seems reasonable to suggest that 
people who place a high value on biodiversity are more sensitive to 
potential threats to species survival, and hence more likely to adopt a 
precautionary approach favoring biodiversity in any given situation. The 
usefulness of the precautionary principle is that it permits these values to 
be taken into account. As stated by Ronnie Harding and Elizabeth Fisher, 
"we need to acknowledge the precautionary principle for what it is — a 
principle which is open to value-based interpretation."' 
One significant challenge to the precautionary principle in this context is 
posed by non-equilibrium ecology, which holds that ecosystem functioning 
is largely the result of opportunistic interactions between fluctuating and 
unstable species populations. 8 Those leaning toward the non-equilibrium 
perspective will tend to down play the precautionary principle as they 
perceive ecosystem change to be ubiquitous rather than necessarily 
catastrophic, which leads to a lower perception of risk that species loss, on 
6 Henk van den Belt and Bart Gremmen, "Between Precautionary Principle and 
'Sound Science': Distributing the Burdens of Proof," Journal of Agricultural and 
Environmental Ethics 15 (2002): 103-22. 
7 Ronnie Harding and Elizabeth Fisher, "Introducing the Precautionary 
Principle," in Perspectives on the Precautionary Principle, ed. Ronnie Harding 
and Elizabeth Fisher (Leichhardt: The Federation Press, 1999), p. 20. 
8 See, for example, Daniel B. Botkin, Discordant Harmonies: A New Ecology 
for the Twenty-first Century, (New York: Oxford University Press, 1990), pp. 25- 
49; Mutsunori Tokeshi, Species and Coexistence: Ecological and Evolutionary 
Perspectives, (Oxford: Blackwell Science, 1999), pp. 347-60; Robert V. O'Neill, 
"Is it Time to Bury the Ecosystem Concept?" Ecology 82 (2001): 3275-84. 
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its own, will cause ecosystem collapse. 9 Below we discuss another 
challenge to the precautionary principle: the notion that many ES are not 
species-specific and will therefore continue to be provided despite 
declining biodiversity. 
III. RESILIENT ECOSYSTEM SERVICES 
Most ES are provided not by whole ecosystems but by functional groups 
of species that are either resilient to change, or easily substitutable. 
Consequently these services will continue to be provided despite rare 
species fluctuation or loss. The greatest threats to the provision of such 
services are impacts that so severely damage the ecosystem that even the 
most basic functions and dominant species are essentially destroyed, such 
as occurs when natural ecosystems are replaced by intensive agriculture or 
urban infrastructure. 
ES can be divided into three categories reflecting their sensitivity to 
species loss. The first includes services not dependent on particular species. 
The second includes services dependent on species that are resilient to 
changes in species richness and environmental conditions. The third 
includes services that are dependent on species that are sensitive to changes 
in species richness and environmental conditions. 
The first category consists of ES that are provided by functional groups 
of species that are easily substitutable. Provision of such services will be 
9 See, for example, Mark Sagoff, "Muddle or Muddle Through? Takings 
Jurisprudence Meets the Endangered Species Act," William and Mary Law Review 
38 (1997): 825-993; Lawrence B. Slobodkin, "The Good, the Bad and the 
Reified," Evolutionary Ecology Research 3(2001): 1-13. 
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maintained as long as one or more of these 'groups' of species continues to 
flourish under the prevailing environmental conditions. Recognition of this 
category of ES within the literature is generally fleeting with little effort 
made to explore its implications. 10 Describing such services as 'ecosystem 
services' is misleading in so far as it implies dependence of the service on a 
particular ecosystem or species community. 
For example, it is apparent that many ES are principally dependent on 
the presence of trees and undergrowth. These services include carbon 
sequestration, the supply of drinking water, salinity prevention, flood 
mitigation, and erosion control. The specific identity of tree species present 
is of far less importance than whether any tree species are present. One 
study noted a "developing realisation that, from the perspective of 
vegetation water flux at catchment scales, a tree is a tree is a tree and 
consideration of species becomes superfluous." 11 In most ecosystems 
capable of supporting large woody vegetation, the primary risk posed to 
these non-species specific ES is from destructive events that denude the 
area of vegetation and inhibit recolonisation. Some examples include 
volcanic explosion, open-cut mining, salination, urban development, or 
10 See, for example, Manuel Lerdau and Lawrence Slobodkin, "Trace Gas 
Emissions and Species-Dependent Ecosystem Services," Trends in Ecology and 
Evolution 17 (2002): 309; Norman Myers, "Environmental Services of 
Biodiversity," Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences USA 93 (1996): 
'2767; Paul F. Steinberg, "Defining the Global Biodiversity Mandate: Implications 
for International Policy," International Environmental Affairs 10 (1998): 116; 
Peter Weesie and Jelte van Andel, On Biodiversity and its Valuation, The CDS 
Research Report Series, Centre of Development Studies, (Groningen: University 
of Groningen, 2003), p. 16. 
I I Derek Eamus, et al., "Ecosystem Services: An Ecophysiological 
Examination," Australian Journal of Botany 53 (2005): 3. 
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overgrazing in marginal farmland resulting in desertification. While such 
events can have a great impact on local (and possibly global) biodiversity, 
diminished biodiversity does not, in itself, constitute a threat to non-species 
specific ES. 
The second category includes ES that are dependent on functional 
groups of species that are themselves resilient to likely changes in species 
diversity and environmental conditions. This category includes those 
groups of species that exist in large numbers and upon which humans have 
long been dependent for survival and the generation of wealth. All of the 
species concerned are extremely successful in so far as they are resilient to 
change and reproduce easily. Sometimes their profligacy results from 
deliberate human management but often it derives from their superior 
capacity to out-compete other species. Such species are at risk of 
population decline, as occurred among whale species and the American 
chestnut tree, yet it is misleading to suggest that such catastrophic losses 
are primarily caused by declining biodiversity when in most cases human 
mismanagement is to blame. 
It needs to be recognized that in presenting these categories the 
ecological relationships that exist between species have been described in a 
manner that greatly oversimplifies reality. 'Functional groups' of species 
have been described as though they are unchanging entities, but this will 
rarely be the case as the composition of such groups will vary both in time 
and space. Such simplification is justified on the grounds that, no matter 
the underlying complexity of the ecological interactions taking place, the 
ES described by these two categories remain resilient to change. There 
seems to be a tendency among conservationists for awareness of the former 
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to overwhelm recognition of the latter, which is understandable given the 
policy implications of acknowledging that the ES argument for conserving 
biodiversity is not universally valid. 
Both of these categories of ES, which would encompass the vast 
majority of services, are dependent not on conserving biodiversity but on 
ensuring that the relevant ecosystems and species are allocated sufficient 
freedom from exploitation in order to thrive in the long term and to 
adequately provide the relevant services. Such freedom requires the 
reservation of minimum areas of habitat, maintenance of appropriate 
disturbance regimes, and enforcement of sustainable harvest quotas. When 
considering the restoration of resilient ES in an area that has suffered 
damage, it is apparent that the conservation of species richness is of 
minimal importance relative to halting destructive processes, ensuring 
there are sufficient species available for recolonisation, and undertaking 
remediation/restoration works that complement the natural recovery 
process. As indicated by the Society for Ecological Restoration (SER), 
such activities are more appropriately described as 'rehabilitation' rather 
than `restoration'. 12 
The potential change in species distributions resulting from climate 
change adds another dimension to be considered. To maintain the provision 
of resilient ES in the face of global warming and other large-scale 
disruptions requires the protection not necessarily of all biodiversity, but of 
robust populations of species from a range of climatic zones that are the 
functional equivalent of those currently providing essential ES. This is in 
12 SER, The SER International Primer on Ecological Restoration, (Tuscon: 
Society for Ecological Restoration International, 2004), p. 12. 
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addition to backup populations of the service-providing species 
themselves. These observations suggest a shift in conservation focus from 
biodiversity towards what is termed 'environmental diversity'. Although 
understood primarily as a useful surrogate for determining relative 
biodiversity in areas where detailed surveys of species are not available, 13 
environmental diversity itself emerges as an important target of 
conservation efforts. 
So long as ES are presumed to be highly sensitive, any evidence of 
species interdependence or connections between biodiversity and 
ecosystem functioning may be used, with reference to the precautionary 
principle, to justify the conservation of all species in order to maintain the 
provision Of ES. However, the strength of the precautionary principle is 
diminished in areas where all ES can be assigned to the first two 
categories. It is a far less taxing task to determine which ES are resilient 
than to prove beyond any doubt, for all scenarios of future environmental 
change, that a species is redundant with regard to ecosystem functioning. 
Whereas the latter requires the modeling of complex ecological 
relationships, the former can be determined through observation of how 
particular ES are affected by various ecological stresses within a particular 
bioregion. Different stresses will impact upon ES in different ways. 
Bushfire, for example, will give rise to higher rates of soil erosion until the 
post-fire recovery of vegetation is underway. Yet other services will be 
13 D.P. Faith, S. Ferrier and P.A. Walker, "The ED Strategy: How Species-
Level Surrogates Indicate General Biodiversity Patterns Through an 
'Environmental Diversity' Perspective," Journal of Biogeography 31 (2004): 
1207-1217. 
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enhanced by fire, as the growth of certain plants is promoted, and hunting 
made easier by the clearing of scrub and resulting improvement in 
visibility. 
It is apparent that if the rationale for conservation is limited to the 
provision of ES, it would make more sense for conservation efforts to be 
devoted primarily to protecting and managing each species population or 
ecosystem necessary for the sustainable provision of an identified 
ecosystem service. I4 The conservation of all species — of biodiversity — is 
required only in situations where valued ES are particularly sensitive to 
change. 
W. ECOSYSTEM SERVICES SENSITIVE TO 
CHANGE 
The third category consists of ES dependent on functional groups of 
species whose fate is somewhat marginal due to such factors as natural 
rarity, inherent sensitivity to change, or excessive loss of habitat. Consider 
the wild species of bees in agricultural areas of California that assist in the 
pollination of watermelon, tomato and sunflower crops. Populations of 
wild bees are in decline because of increased expansion of agriculture into 
remnant natural habitat, forcing farmers to expend resources on 
maintaining their own bee hives." General research on ecosystem 
14 See, for example, Gary W. Luck, Gretchen C. Daily and Paul R. Ehrlich, 
"Population Diversity and Ecosystem Services," Trends in Ecology and Evolution 
18 (2003): 331-336; Claire Kremen, "Managing Ecosystem Services: What Do We 
Need to Know About Their Ecology?" Ecology Letters 8 (2005): 468-479. 
15 Ksemen, "Managing Ecosystem Services?" pp. 476-77. 
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functioning suggests that increased biodiversity may increase ecosystem 
stability in response to changing environmental conditions. I6 However, it 
needs to be acknowledged that studies of the capacity of biodiversity to 
contribute to ecosystem stability in times of flux have also found that the 
stabilising effect levels off, or saturates, at less than 50 percent of total 
diversity. 17  In relation to the example of crop pollination, the more 
optimistic finding suggests that a management strategy oriented to the 
conservation of biodiversity might buffer the 'provision of pollination 
services' during periods of climate change or other environmental 
fluctuation, as currently subdominant bee species that might perform better 
under the changed environmental conditions will remain available, as will 
other species upon which the various bee species depend. Hooper et al. 
identify a number of relationships between biodiversity and ecosystem 
functioning, each of which could be sufficient to prevent a decline in 
species populations that would otherwise result in cessation of a valued 
ecosystem service. 18  Use of the precautionary principle and the 
conservation of biodiversity therefore seems appropriate in relation to ES 
classed as 'sensitive'. 
16 Hooper, et. al., "Effects of Biodiversity on Ecosystem Functioning," pp. 15- 
21. 
'7 M Schwartz, et cd., "Linking Biodiversity to Ecosystem Function: 
Implications for Conservation Ecology," Oecologia 122 (2000): 297-305. 
18 Hooper, et. al., "Effects of Biodiversity on Ecosystem Functioning," pp. 15- 
21. 
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V. THE LOW RESILIENCE ASSUMPTION 
Advocates for the conservation of biodiversity as the priority goal of 
environmental management tend not to acknowledge the distinction 
between resilient and sensitive ES. This 'low resilience assumption' gives 
rise to, and is reinforced by the almost ubiquitous claim within the 
conservation literature that ES depend on biodiversity. Such claims are 
notably present in the controversial Issues in Ecology paper on biodiversity 
and ecosystem functioning that sparked the controversy mentioned above. ° 
This appears to reflect a general tendency among authors in this field. 2° 
Although such authors may not actually espouse the low resilience 
assumption, by presenting such claims in the absence of any clarification 
they suggest a willingness for the assumption to be perpetuated. This is 
apparent in the following passage from David Rapport: 
In most cases, declines in ecological services are permanent, and 
efforts to restore such services have met with meager results... In 
most cases... transformations of ecosystems under stress result in 
19 Shahid Naeem, et al., "Biodiversity and Ecosystem Functioning: Maintaining 
Natural Life Support Processes," Issues in Ecology 4 (1999): 1-12. 
20 See, for example, A. Hector, J. Joshi, S.P. Lawler, E.M. Spehn and A. Wilby, 
"Conservation Implications of the Link Between Biodiversity and Ecosystem 
Functioning," Oecologia 129(2001): 627; Sharon P. Lawler, Juan J. Annesto and 
Peter Kareiva, "How Relevant to Conservation are Studies Linking Biodiversity .  
and Ecosystem Functioning," in The Functional Consequences of Biodiversity: 
Empirical Progress and Theoretical Extensions, ed. Ann P. Kinzig, Stephen W. 
Pacala and David Tilman (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2002), pp. 312- 
13; K.G. Lyons, C.A. Brigham, B.H. Traut and M.W. Schwartz, "Rare Species and 
Ecosystem Functioning," Conservation Biology 19 (2005): 1020. 
59 
irreversible damage, where even heroic efforts are unlikely to 
succeed in re-establishing ecosystem services. 21 
The reference provided by Rapport relates to desertification, implying that 
all 'transformations of ecosystems' are equivalent in severity to this most 
severe of processes. 
That the low resilience assumption is largely false is apparent in the 
number of examples of species extinctions that have not brought about 
catastrophic ecosystem collapse and decline in ES, and in the generally 
limited ecosystem influence of species on the cusp of extinction. These 
points have been made by numerous authors, although given the absence of 
systematic attempts to verify propositions of this sort, the evidence 
assembled is generally anecdotal and we are forced to trust that such 
authors are both well-informed and relatively unbiased in their assessment 
of this issue. Fortunately a number of highly respected people are included 
among those who have expressed these views, not least being the 
prominent conservation biologist David Ehrenfeld. In 1978 he described 
the 'conservation dilemma', which "arises on the increasingly frequent 
occasions when we encounter a threatened part of Nature but can find no 
rational reason for keeping it." 22 He then observed: 
I agree... that the clearing of the Valley of the Ganges must have 
permanently altered the ecology of the Bay of Bengal in important 
21 David Rapport, "Defining Ecosystem Health," in Ecosystem Health, ed. 
David Rapport, Robert Costanza, Paul R. Epstein, Connie Gaudet and Richard 
Levins (Malden: Blackwell Science, 1998), pp. 19-20. 
22 David Ehrenfeld, The Arrogance of Humanism, (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 1981), p. 177. 
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ways. But have there been permanent and significant 'resource' 
effects of the extinction, in the wild, of John Bartram's great 
discovery, the beautiful tree Franklinia alatamaha, which had 
almost vanished from the earth when Bartram first set eyes upon it? 
Or a thousand species of tiny beetles that we never knew existed 
before or after their probable extermination? Can we even be certain 
than the eastern forests of the United States suffer the loss of their 
passenger pigeons and chestnuts in some tangible way that affects 
their vitality or permanence, their value to us?23 
Later, at the first conference on biodiversity, Ehrenfeld reflected that: 
The sad fact that few conservationists care to face is that many 
species, perhaps most, do not seem to have any conventional value 
at all, even hidden conventional value. True, we cannot be sure 
which particular species fall into this category, but it is hard to deny 
that there must be a great many of them. And unfortunately, the 
species whose members are the fewest in number, the rarest, the 
most narrowly distributed — in short, the ones most likely to become 
extinct — are obviously the ones least likely to be missed by the 
biosphere. Many of these species were never common or 
ecologically influential; by no stretch of the imagination can we 
make them out to be vital cogs in the ecological machine. If the 
California condor disappears forever from the California hills, it will 
be a tragedy but don't expect the chaparral to die, the redwoods to 
23 Ibid., p. 192. 
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wither, the San Andreas fault to open up, or even the California 
tourist industry to suffer — they won't. 24 
The appearance of comments within the environmental literature that are 
consistent with Ehrenfeld's — and from authors whose academic standing is 
also worthy of respect — is uncommon but not unheard of. 25 
The low resilience assumption would appear to be confirmed by Lyons, 
et al., who reiterate the precautionary approach in their assertion that 
because some rare species — such as top predators — have a keystone role, 
therefore any rare species might be similarly crucial to ecosystem 
functioning.26 An appropriate example is the removal of wolves from 
Yellowstone National Park, which gave rise to an overpopulation of elk 
and subsequent environmental impacts, such as erosion and overgrazing of 
plant species palatable to the elk. 27 
24 David Ehrenfeld, "Why Put a Value on Biodiversity?" in Biodiversity, ed. 
Edward 0. Wilson (Washington, DC: National Academy Press, 1988), pp. 214-15. 
25 See, for example, Colin Tudge, "The Rise and Fall of Homo sapiens 
sapiens," Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society of London B (1989): 
480-81; Alexej Ghilarov, "What Does Tiodiversity' Mean — Scientific Problem or 
Convenient Myth?" Trends in Ecology and Evolution 11(1996): 304-306; Sagoff, 
"Muddle or Muddle Through?", pp. 902-907, 930-31; Slobodlcin, "The Good, the 
Bad and the Reified," pp. 5-6; David Western, "Human-Modified Ecosystems and 
Future Evolution," Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences USA 98 
(2001): 5462. 
26  Lyons, et al., "Rare Species and Ecosystem Functioning," pp. 1019-24. In 
relation to an earlier quotation from Ehrenfeld, it should be noted that the 
California condor, despite being a top predator, is not a keystone species, an 
important reason being that there are very few condors surviving in the wild. This 
is discussed further in chapter eleven. 
27 M 	Chase, Playing God in Yellowstone: The Destruction of America's 
First National Park, (San Diego: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1986), pp. 77-84. 
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However, despite the influence that rare species can have on ecosystem 
functioning, the concept of resilient ES decouples to some extent the 
relationship between provision of the service and ecosystem functioning. 
Although some rare species might be keystone species, resilient ES are 
those that remain relatively unaffected by comparatively 'normal' 
environmental fluctuations. In the case of Yellowstone, the wolves were 
wiped out not by natural environmental fluctuation, but by a deliberate 
hunting policy. It is not that the ES available in Yellowstone were 
necessarily sensitive, but that the species comprising this ecosystem were 
poorly managed. Through severe human mismanagement, any ecosystem 
may be degraded sufficiently that the provision of ES is threatened. As 
suggested earlier, although biodiversity decline might be a useful indicator 
of ecosystem degradation, it does not necessarily follow that such a 
decline, in itself, constitutes a threat to ES. 
The low resilience assumption is undermined by the overwhelming 
tendency for the protection of identified endangered species to be justified 
by moral or aesthetic arguments, or a basic appeal to the necessity of 
conserving biodiversity, rather than by emphasising the specific ES these 
species provide or might be able to provide humanity. Often the only 
services that can be promoted in this regard relate to the 'scientific' or 
'cultural' value of conserving a particular species, and the tourism revenue 
that might be associated with its continued presence in a particular area. 
The preservation of such services are of an entirely different order to the 
collapse of human civilization predicted by the more pessimistic 
environmental authors. It is apparent that some conservation projects 
actually have a negative impact on particular ecosystem services. For 
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example, the removal of forest and subsequent restoration of grassland will 
reduce the capacity of an area to sequester carbon dioxide and, in relation 
to 'cultural' ecosystem services, can cause a change in local character that 
is resented by the local community.28 Another example is the 
reintroduction of large predators, such as wolves and grizzly bears, into 
areas where they had been formerly hunted to extinction. Plans for the 
latter prompted one United States Governor, in 2000, to comment that 
"many of us have made it clear we oppose the introduction of this flesh-
eating, anti-social animal into Idaho. This is probably the first federal 
policy that knowingly can, and will, lead to injury and death of citizens." 29 
It is clear that in this case, the restoration of ES was not the primary 
justification. 
The low resilience assumption can reasonably be described as 
'reification', in that it is a hypothesis that has assumed the status of an 
unimpeachable truth despite being seriously flawed. 3° Use of the term 
'ecosystem services' perpetuates and reinforces the assumption in so far as 
it implies dependence of all services on particular ecosystems or species 
communities. In this regard, the term 'environmental services', employed 
28 This hypothetical example has parallels with the 'Chicago restoration 
controversy' as described in Paul H. Gobster and R. Bruce Hull (eds.), Restoring 
Nature: Perspectives from the Social Sciences and Humanities, (Washington, DC: 
Island Press, 2000). 
29 Dick Kempthome, quoted in Todd Wilkinson, "The Once and Future 
Grizzly," in Return of the Wild: The Future of Our National Lands, ed. Ted 
Kerasote (Washington, DC: Island Press, 2001), p. 173. 
30 Slobodkin, "The Good, the Bad and the Reified," pp. 1-4. 
by authors such as Norman Myers in place of 'ecosystem services', would 
be more appropriate.3I 
The widespread implicit acceptance of the low resilience assumption is 
linked to the notion that biodiversity is the primary value of any natural 
area, and that biodiversity conservation should be the first priority of all 
natural area management. It is in this sense that a great many 
conservationists have been 'blinded by biodiversity' to the flaws in the 
biodiversity-ES argument. 
VI. BLINDED BY BIODIVERSITY 
Those who accept the low resilience assumption, and support the ES 
argument for biodiversity conservation, tend not to acknowledge that a 
great many ES may be maintained by management practices that do not 
involve the conservation of every component of biodiversity. As a result, it 
is frequently implied that natural area management is wasted without 
biodiversity conservation. 
Mutsunori Tokeshi demonstrates this tendency in the book Species 
Coexistence, in which he reiterates the likelihood that destruction of natural 
ecosystems will bring about reductions in human material wellbeing. This 
relatively straightforward argument for taking measures to protect the 
ozone layer or large areas of forest provides the basis for discussion of the 
conservation of biodiversity without any intervening explanation for why 
one requires the other. This is especially confusing as it comes immediately 
31 Myers, "Environmental Services of Biodiversity," pp. 2764 -69. 
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after an overview of the difficulties inherent in drawing connections 
between species extinction and ecosystem stability. 32 
Another illustration of this tendency to focus on biodiversity 
conservation and exclude consideration of any alternative is found in 
Extinction, where any consideration of land degradation in general is 
overwhelmed by the concern for species loss: 
It is impossible to separate protection of species from protection of 
natural ecosystems; they are two aspects of the same fundamental set 
of resources. Any of the public-service functions of an ecosystem 
may theoretically be affected by the deletion of any species from the 
system, and continued extinctions in the system are certain to cause 
disruption. 33 
This leads to the statement that "all [ecosystem services] will be threatened 
if the rate of extinctions continues to increase" followed by the observation 
that attempts to artifically replicate natural processes "are no more than 
partially successful in most cases. Nature nearly always does it better. 
When society sacrifices natural services for some other gain.., it must pay 
the costs of substitution."34 By assuming that the only alternative to 
protecting every species is a world in which all ES have been substituted 
by artificial alternatives, the Ehrlichs fail to acknowledge that natural areas 
may be conserved, and ES maintained, without dedicating particular 
attention to total species diversity. Paul Ehrlich revisits this flawed logic in 
32 Tokeshi, Species and Coexistence, p. 362. 
33 Ehrlich and Ehrlich, Extinction, p. 86. 
34 Ibid., pp. 95-96. 
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1997 in his response (with four co-authors) to doubts expressed by Mark 
Sagoff regarding economic arguments for species conservation. Sagoff s 
doubts are misconstrued as support for "the idea that technology can fully 
substitute for natural life-support systems"; an idea the authors then 
demonstrate to be "dangerously absurd" by describing the fate of the failed 
Biosphere 2 experiment.35 Again, by casting biodiversity conservation as 
the only possible alternative to artificially optimizing the entire planet these 
authors fail to acknowledge that most ES may be maintained without 
requiring the dedication of resources to protecting every rare and 
threatened species. 
Another common rhetorical device that betrays the same underlying 
motive is to present dramatic statistics on species abundance and extinction 
rates, or examples of land degradation, alongside the ES justification for 
conserving biodiversity, without acknowledging that the high extinction 
rates have little bearing on ES, and that land degradation is not caused by 
biodiversity decline. This device is evident in the popular environmental 
tract It's a Matter of Survival, by Anita Gordon and David Suzuki. The 
basic premise of this book is that "we have fewer than 10 years to turn 
things around or 'civilization as we know it will cease to exist'." 36 Concern 
about declining ES, arguments for conserving biodiversity, extinction 
35 Paul R. Ehrlich, Gretchen C. Daily, Scott C. Daily, Norman Myers and James 
Salzman, "No Middle Way on the Environment," The Atlantic Monthly 280 
(1997): 101; This discussion of Biosphere 2 is also cited in a critique of Sagoff by 
Ernest Partridge, "Reconstructing Ecology," in Ecological Integrity: Integrating 
Environment, Conservation, and Health, ed. David Pimentel, Laura Westra and 
Reed F. Noss, (Washington, DC: Island Press, 2000), p. 88. 
36 Anita Gordon and David Suzuki, It's a Matter of Survival, (London: 
HarperCollins, 1991), p. 3. 
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statistics and examples of land degradation are so intermingled that the 
layperson could be forgiven for concluding that biodiversity loss is 
somehow to blame for the effects of large-scale rainforest clearance! 
Globally projected extinction statistics are particularly misleading in this 
context. Estimates of total species numbers and current extinction rates 
gain their impressive magnitude, and rhetorical force, from the millions of 
types of insects, algae and micro-organisms whose existence can be 
extrapolated from current knowledge. The extinction rates, estimated by 
E.O. Wilson to be in the order of 27,000 species every year, are largely the 
result of multiplying the number of unknown species that have been found 
in small areas of tropical rainforest with the current rates of rainforest 
clearance in places like the Amazon and Indonesia?' These various 
estimates are essentially superfluous to ES because most of the species are 
of such small distribution, such as the 3,000 species of beetle recorded 
from 5 by 12 m2 plots in the Amazon, 38 that they have negligible influence 
on the provision of ES. Such species are not even useful as indicators of • 
habitat destruction given their extreme endemism and largely theoretical 
existence. Perhaps their only 'practical' value is to provide conservationists 
with rhetorically useful statistics. 39 
37 Edward 0. Wilson, The Diversity of Life, (Cambridge: Harvard University 
Press, 1992) 
38 Terry L. Erwin, "The Tropical Forest Canopy: The Heart of Biotic 
Diversity," in Biodiversity, ed. Wilson, pp. 123-129. Each of these study areas was 
only twelve metres square. 
39 See, for example, Stephen Budianslcy, Nature's Keepers: The New Science of 
Nature Management, (New York: The Free Press, 1995), pp. 164-68; Richard J. 
Ladle, Paul Jepson, Miguel B. Arirjo and Robert J. Whittaker, "Crying Wolf on 
Climate Change and Extinction," Nature 429 (2004): 799. 
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The intermingling of ES arguments with dramatic examples of land 
degradation and ecological collapse is similarly misleading. For example, 
in a background paper to the 2002 United Nations Conference on 
Environment and Development, scientists commissioned by the Swedish 
government draw on such impacts as over-consumption of water in Greece, 
land salination in Australia, and over-grazing in Jordan to highlight the 
need for biodiversity conservation in order to improve ecosystem resilience 
and long-term provision of ES.4° Yet, as noted earlier, biodiversity 
conservation is largely irrelevant when considering the effect of these sorts 
of impacts on ES. Diminished provision of such services is caused not by 
declining biodiversity but human mismanagement. Although management 
programs dedicated to conserving biodiversity may ameliorate such 
impacts, or prevent them taking place, it would be more straightforward to 
orient management to the services themselves, as demonstrated by the 
restrictions on certain activities in catchment reserves all over the world to 
safeguard the quality of drinking water. 
In some respects the tendency to reconceive all environmental 
management activities in terms of biodiversity conservation is the result of 
the conflation of two senses of biodiversity, as discussed in the previous 
chapter. However, it is also possible that proponents of biodiversity 
conservation are deliberately taking advantage of the complexity inherent 
in these distinctions in order to present their cause in the most dramatic 
light. 
4° Carl Folke, et al., Resilience and Sustainable Development: Building 
Adaptive Capacity in a World of Transformation, (Stockholm: The Environmental 
Advisory Council to the Swedish Government, 2002), pp. 34-36. 
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VII. CONCLUSION 
The maintenance of ES provides a powerful argument for the 
conservation of biodiversity. However, this argument is flawed insofar as it 
does not acknowledge the extent to which different ES vary with regard to 
their dependence upon particular species groupings. While some services 
are especially sensitive to ecosystem change, many are not, and will 
continue to be provided despite considerable shifts in ecosystem dynamics. 
In the case of these more resilient ES, the precautionary principle is less 
relevant as it is less difficult to determine whether an ES is susceptible to 
species loss than whether the loss of a particular species will have 
disproportionate ramifications for ecosystem functioning. Therefore it is 
easier to determine which species are essentially superfluous to the 
provision of ES. Advocates of biodiversity conservation tend to assume 
that all ES are highly sensitive to changes in species composition. This 
'low resilience assumption' is reinforced by the term 'ecosystem services', 
by a fixation on the necessity of conserving rare species, and by over-
dramatising extinction rates and examples of degradation in support of the 
ES argument for biodiversity conservation. As discussed in the next 
chapter, excessive reliance on such instrumental arguments for the 
conservation of biodiversity is a risky strategy given the shortcomings 
identified here. 
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Chapter Four 
THE VALUE OF BIODIVERSITY: 
COMMERCIAL OPPORTUNITY 
Today those who wish to protect the natural environment rarely offer 
ethical or spiritual reasons for the policies they favor. Instead they say we 
are running out of resources or causing the collapse of ecosystems on 
which we depend. Predictions of resource scarcity appear objective and 
scientific, whereas pronouncements that nature is sacred or that greed is 
bad appear judgemental or even embarrassing in a secular society. 
Mark Sagoff (1997) 1 
I. INTRODUCTION 
We now turn our attention to another important instrumental argument 
for conserving biodiversity, the commercial opportunities. This is followed 
by consideration of the risk to environmentalists that stems from 
overemphasis of the instrumental benefits of biodiversity when, for many 
people, it is the non-instrumental values that are felt to be more important. 
II. ME COMMERCIAL VALUE OF BIODIVERSITY 
An important argument for conserving biodiversity is that we cannot 
know for certain whether what is lost has potential commercial value, 
under current socio-economic conditions or at some time in the future. 
Mark Sagoff, "Do We Consume Too Much?" The Atlantic Monthly 279 
(1997): 82-83. 
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Hence the precautionary principle dictates that we should not allow any 
aspect of nature to be lost in case we contribute to the demise of genes, 
organisms, or ecosystems whose value is not yet fully comprehended. 
Arguments of this type, supported by many examples of commercially 
useful products sourced from wild species, are used to support the 
protection of biodiversity hotspots such as the Amazon rainforest, 2 and 
were an important consideration in drafting the Convention on Biological 
Diversity.3 
Whether or not it is economically prudent to conserve biodiversity is a 
question on which there is a variety of conflicting perspectives. There are 
certainly many examples available where obscure plant species have been 
discovered to have extremely beneficial properties, resulting in 
considerable wealth generation and improvements to human health and 
material well-being. 4 However, not all of these species are particularly rare. 
For example, Hanne Svarstad identifies two high profile instances where 
conservationists have used particular examples of successful 
bioprospecting — the periwinkle, and the 'Hardangervidda fungus' — to 
2  Paul R. Ehrlich and Anne H. Ehrlich, Extinction: The Causes and 
Consequences of the Disappearance of Species, (London: Victor Gollancz, 1982), 
pp. 53-76; Andrew Beattie and Paul Ehrlich, Wild Solutions: How Biodiversity is 
Money in the Bank, (Melbourne: Melbourne University Press, 2001). 
3 John A. Hannigan, Environmental Sociology: A Social Constructionist 
Perspective, (London: Routledge, 1995), pp. 147-48; Valerie Boisvert and Franck-
Dominique Vivien, "The Convention on Biological Diversity: A Conventionalist 
Approach," Ecological Economics 53 (2005): 463-65. 
4 Hugh H. Iltis, "Serendipity in the Exploration of Biodiversity," in 
Biodiversity, ed. Edward 0. Wilson (Washington, DC: National Academy Press, 
1988), pp. 98-105; Christopher Joyce, "Taxol: Search for a Cancer Drug," 
BioScience 43 (1993): 133-36. 
72 
justify biodiversity conservation while overlooking the fact that both these 
species were under no threat of extinction. 5 Conservation activities would 
not have increased the likelihood of humans gaining commercial benefit 
from these particular species. They provide justification for biodiversity 
conservation only as examples of the potential benefits that species might 
have. Again, the precautionary principle has an important role to play in 
supporting the case for conservation. 
From a conservation perspective, the most persuasive examples of 
successful bioprospecting are from the biodiversity hotspots, as it is these 
areas that have the highest global conservation priority. The best example 
comes from Costa Rica where large areas of rainforest have been reserved 
and contracts signed with companies who wish to search these areas for 
commercially valuable species. 6 Authors such as Tamayo, Guevara and 
Gamez are optimistic in their assessment of the success of this venture, 
despite emphasising the costs and low probability that a particular patent 
will ever become a marketable product.' In contrast, Kerry ten Kate and 
Sarah Laird state that: 
Currently, capital markets, corporate mergers and research directors 
are less attracted to natural products than to alternative fields of 
discovery and development. In many sectors, research dollars are 
5 Hanne Svarstad, "The Historical Context of Present Bioprospecting — Four 
Cases," in Microbial Diversity and Bioprospecting, ed. Alan T. Bull, (Washington, 
DC: ASM Press, 2004), pp. 440-44. 
6 David Takacs, The Idea of Biodiversity: Philosophies of Paradise, (Baltimore: 
The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1996), pp. 288-308. 
7 Giselle Tamayo, Lorena Guevara and Rodrigo Gamez, "Biodiversity 
Propsecting: The 1NBio Experience," in Microbial Diversity, ed. Bull, pp. 445-49. 
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flowing out of natural products and into synthetic chemistry to fund 
rational drug design, combinatorial approaches and genetics, often 
with a focus largely on human material. The jury is out on the future 
of natural products. 8 
Similarly, Valerie Boisvert and Franck-Dominique Vivien suggest that the 
bioprospecting boom anticipated in the wake of the Convention on 
Biological Diversity has failed to materialise.9 In Costa Rica, the major 
contract between INBio and the large pharmaceutical company Merck was 
only for the period 1991 to 1999. It was not renewed, presumably because 
in this time sufficient genetic material was collected for research purposes, 
with 27 patents eventually registered. A number of smaller companies 
remain involved. ° Theoretical investigations of the economics of 
bioprospecting have tended to reinforce the more pessimistic view of the 
potential for funding biodiversity conservation from the profits of 
pharmaceutical development." 
Whether or not the experience in Costa Rica proves to be economically 
sustainable it needs to be acknowledged that bioprospecting supports the 
case for biodiversity conservation only in biodiversity hotspots, where 
8 Kerry ten Kate and Sarah A. Laird, "Biocliversity and Business: Coming to 
Terms With the 'Grand Bargain,' International Affairs 76 (2000): 260-61. 
9 Boisvert and Vivien, "The Convention on Biological Diversity," p. 442. 
o Tamayo, et al., "Biodiversity Propsecting," pp. 446-49. 
I I See, for example, David Pearce, "Environmental Market Creation: Saviour or 
Oversell?" Portuguese Economic Journal 3 (2004): 132-38; Christopher Costello 
and Michael Ward, "Search, Bioprospecting and Biodiversity Conservation," 
Journal of Environmental Economics and Management 52 (2006): 615-26; Robin 
Naidoo and Taylor H. Ricketts, "Mapping the Economic Costs and Benefits of 
Conservation," PloS Biology 4 (2006): 2159. 
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there exists an almost unlimited reservoir of species that could be 
commercially useful and which are at risk of extinction. Outside such areas 
the extinction rate is much lower and there is a greater likelihood that 
threatened species will already have been assessed and found to have no 
commercial value, or have been sufficiently conserved by ex situ means for 
possible future use. 
The amount of genetic material conserved in artificial environments has 
greatly expanded during the past few decades, particularly through the use 
of 'gene banks' as opposed to traditional methods such as zoos and botanic 
gardens. Some of the largest repositories include the various facilities 
administered by the Consultative Group on International Agricultural 
Research (CGIAR), and the Millennium Seed Bank Project at Kew in 
England. I2 Such efforts have culminated in the International Treaty on 
Plant Genetic Resources for Food and Agriculture, administered by the 
UN Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO), which came into force in 
2004. 13 The conservation of biodiversity by such means is not generally 
presented as justification for diminishing the protection of wild 
populations. 14 However, it seems unavoidable that the commercial 
12 See the websites of the CGIAR (http://www.cgiar.org) and the Millennium 
Seed Bank Project (http://www.rbgkew.org.uldmsbp ). 
13 See the website of the FAO (http://www.fao.org/ag/cgrfa).  
14 Edward 0. Guerrant, Kayri Havens and Mike Maunder (eds.), Ex Situ Plant 
Conservation: Supporting Species Survival in the Wild, (Washington, DC: Island 
Press, 2004). 
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justification for the protection of biodiversity hotspots will be diminished 
somewhat as gene bank collections grow in size. ° 
Another aspect of the commercial value of biodiversity is the capacity of 
species richness . to generate tourist revenue. As Naidoo and Adamowicz 
demonstrate in their study of a rainforest reserve in Uganda, some tourists 
are willing to pay more to visit locations with greater number of species:16 
However, such findings do not indicate that all concentrations of 
biodiversity have potential commercial value. Some species, such as birds, 
will attract greater attention than others. Further, the commercial viability 
of ecotourism ventures is governed by the usual rules of supply and 
demand. For example, although a variety of sites might feature the same 
diverse array of species, commercial exploitation of people wishing to 
experience this diversity might only be viable if all tourist demand is 
concentrated at one of these sites. 
III. THE PRECAUTIONARY PRINCIPLE 
As in the previous chapter, the precautionary principle has an important 
role to play in buttressing commercial arguments for biodiversity 
conservation, and application of the principle is a value-laden process. Cass 
Sunstein points out that the principle can be used to justify the status quo 
15 Desiree M. McGraw, "The Story of the Biodiversity Convention: From 
Negotiation to Implementation," in Governing Global Biodiversity: The Evolution 
and Implementation of the Convention on Biological Diversity, ed. Philippe G. Le 
Prestre (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2002), pp. 27, 38. 
16 Robin Naidoo and Wiktor L. Adamowicz, "Economic Benefits of 
Biodiversity Exceed Costs of Conservation at an African Rainforest Reserve," 
Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences (USA) 102 (2005): 16712-16. 
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or dramatic intervention depending on how one phrases the problem. He 
demonstrates this with reference to the decision of the United States to 
invade Iraq prior to completion of the UN weapons inspection program. 
President George W. Bush believed that ensuring the safety of his 
country's interests outweighed the requirement for proof of weapons of 
mass destruction!' When applied to the potential commercial value of 
biodiversity it is apparent that the direction suggested by the precautionary 
principle is similarly ambiguous. Following Sunstein, if one adopts the 
perspective of many people who live in biodiversity hotspots, the 
precautionary approach suggests that it is better to clear the forest now, to 
generate forestry income and provide room for new farms, than to wait for 
the indirect and unassured future economic benefits of conserving and 
exploiting biodiversity. 
The highest concentrations of biodiversity, and the greatest threats to 
biodiversity, are found in the tropical rainforests of developing countries 
such as Brazil, Peru, Indonesia, Papua New Guinea and Madagascar. For 
most citizens of these countries, the profits arising from bioprospecting or 
ecotourism ventures are unlikely to have much effect on their quality of 
life. In most instances, forest clearance and agricultural development will 
generate greater income, thereby leading to considerable social pressure for 
this outcome. The experience of 'debt for nature swaps' — pioneered in the 
late-1980s, and involving the agreement of a developing country to 
increase expenditure on conservation in exchange for a reduction in its 
foreign debt — demonstrates the difficulty of convincing local communities 
17 Cass R. Sunstein, Laws of Fear: Beyond the Precautionary Principle, (New 
York: Cambridge University Press, 2005), pp. 13-63. 
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to conserve biodiversity. Most of the resources liberated by such schemes 
for conservation are committed to enforcing reserve boundaries and 
deterring poachers. The reduction in foreign debt attributed to such 
schemes amounts to a tiny proportion of the total, and hence the capacity of 
respective national governments to improve local services is in no way 
improved." While the conservation projects may provide local 
employment opportunities and tourist revenue, the desire of local 
communities and primary producers to utilise their rainforests more 
intensively than considered appropriate by conservationists is unlikely to 
be mollified by optimistic promises from outsiders. Societies like Australia 
and the United States, whose traditions have been heavily influenced by the 
development of 'wild' land, are well aware of the momentum associated 
with ideologies of progress linked to the clearance of forest. 
As argued by Henk van den Belt and Bart Gremmen, and discussed 
briefly in the previous chapter, the application of the precautionary 
principle always requires trade-offs in relation to the benefits and risks 
associated with particular courses of action. Science cannot provide 
definitive answers, merely guidance as to the possible range of outcomes 
and an indication of their probability, although even in this regard some 
Is Robert T. Deacon and Paul Murphy, "The Structure of an Environmental 
Transaction: The Debt for Nature Swap," Land Economics 73 (1997): 1-24; Dal 
Diciia, "Debt-for-Nature Swaps, Market Imperfections, and Policy Failures as 
Determinants of Sustainable Development and Environmental Quality," Journal of 
Economic Issues 35 (2001): 477-486. 
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degree of subjective input remains necessary. 19 As observed by Mark 
Sagoff: 
To be sure, one never knows that any of the 600,000 kinds of beetles 
on earth might prove valuable... One never knows, for that matter, 
that the next person born could be another Shakespeare. Uncertainty 
provides no more reason to protect every creature than to produce 
every conceivable child or hire every worker or publish every book. 
There are costs and benefits to be weighed in all these instances. 20 
Ultimately the choice about which opportunities ought to be pursued will 
reflect the values considered important by those with the most influence. If • 
the commercial opportunities associated with conserving biodiversity are 
as promising as some conservationists suggest, then the regular action of 
the free-market will assist in bringing about this end. Otherwise, the best 
that can be hoped for is that bioprospecting helps to offset the costs of 
conservation, which will take place despite the low economic return, 
demonstrating that the commercial argument was never the primary reason 
for conserving biodiversity. As noted by David Talcacs, conservation 
biologists have a tendency "to use anything that works to convince people 
to adopt their values."21 He concludes that "if economic concerns are not 
their primary motivation for valuing biodiversity — and they do not seem to 
19 Henk van den Belt and Bart Gremmen, "Between Precautionary Principle and 
'Sound Science': Distributing the Burdens of Proof," Journal of Agricultural and 
Environmental Ethics 15 (2002): 103-22. 
20 Mark Sagoff, "Muddle or Muddle Through? Takings Jurisprudence Meets the 
Endangered Species Act", William and Mary Law Review 38 (1997): 986. 
21 Talcacs, The Idea of Biodiversity, p. 131. 
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be for any of the biologists profiled here — then it is dangerous, 
disingenuous, and dishonest to pitch this argument too feverishly." 22 
IV. NEGATIVE IMPLICATIONS OF THE FOCUS ON 
INSTRUMENTAL VALUES 
Instrumental arguments for conserving biodiversity, or anything that is 
primarily valued for non-instrumental reasons, carry the risk that the 
argument will be found to contain some flaw, that circumstances will 
change such that the argument is no longer valid, or that, when taken to its 
logical extreme, the argument will have a detrimental impact on the 
qualities that are valued non-instrumentally. These shortcomings are 
apparent in justifications for the conservation of biodiversity on the basis 
of commercial opportunity. The argument is flawed in that it does not take 
into account the commercial benefits associated with forest development. 
In addition, changing circumstances, such as developments in genetic 
engineering or increased representation within gene banks, will further 
reduce the validity of the argument. Taken to its logical extreme, justifying 
biodiversity conservation on the basis of commercial opportunity would 
condemn any rare species to extinction in the wild if it could be shown that 
the economic benefits associated with development of its habitat 
outweighed its commercial value. As noted by Ian Swingland: 
If species are to be viewed as a resource, and their maintenance is to 
be cost-effective, conservation should concentrate on systems and 
22 Ibid., p. 283. 
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areas rich in species, and on those species known to be useful. Thus 
biodiversity and its conservation would be defined purely along 
operational or cost-benefit lines. This bioasset perspective on 
biodiversity would therefore rest upon economic arguments more 
than biological ones. 23 
Commercial opportunity comprises one facet of the ecosystem services 
(ES) argument for biodiversity conservation. It was noted in the previous 
chapter that to best ensure provision of ES, a prudent approach would be to 
direct management attention to the actual species and populations that 
provide particular services, rather than to biodiversity in general. Such an 
approach has been articulated by a variety of authors, most significantly in 
a paper published in 2003 by Luck, Daily and Ehrlich. They suggest that 
understanding the link between biodiversity loss and ES is better served by 
identifying those particular species populations that most contribute to the 
provision of particular services. These services may then be maintained by 
ensuring that the various populations of the relevant species (described as 
'service-providing units') remain viable, which is achieved by orienting 
management toward 'population diversity ' 24 It seems inevitable that such 
an approach will only reinforce what has been stressed above: that land 
management practices have much greater influence on most ES than the 
status of biodiversity. It is a short step from here to the likelihood that 
23 Ian R. Swingland, "Biodiversity, Definition Of," in Encyclopedia of 
Biodiversity, volume one, ed. Simon Asher Levin (San Diego: Academic Press, 
2001), P.  389. 
24 Gary W. Luck, Gretchen C. Daily and Paul R. Ehrlich, "Population Diversity 
and Ecosystem Services," Trends in Ecology and Evolution 18 (2003): 331-336. 
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greater knowledge of which species are best able to provide certain ES will 
encourage a more interventionist approach to managing natural areas in 
order to maximise the success of these particular species and the associated 
ES. For example Guo, Xiao and Li identify forest communities that 
regulate the storage and release of water in a manner most beneficial for 
the generation of hydroelectric power.25 Manuel Lerdau and Lawrence 
Slobodkin note the varying capacity of certain tree species to emit volatile 
organic compounds, which play an important role in regulating 
atmospheric chemistry. 26 
Many conservationists have called for the economic value of ES to be 
incorporated into• government and corporate decision-making processes. 27 
Daniel Janzen, for example, suggests that we reconceive "conserved 
tropical wildlands as wildland gardens" so that we might come to think of 
25 Z.W. Guo, X.M. Xiao and D.M. Li, "An Assessment of Ecosystem Services: 
Water Flow Regulation and Hydroelectric Power Production," Ecological 
Applications 10 (2000): 925-36. 
26 Manuel Lerdau and Lawrence Slobodkin, "Trace Gas Emissions and Species-
Dependent Ecosystem Services," Trends in Ecology and Evolution 17 (2002): 309- 
312. 
27 Gretchen C. Daily, et al., "Ecosystem Services: Benefits Supplied to Human 
Societies by Natural Ecosystems," Issues in Ecology 2 (1997): 1-16; Derek Eamus, 
et al., "Ecosystem Services: an Ecophysiological Examination," Australian 
Journal of Botany 53 (2005): 14-15; Claire ICremen, "Managing Ecosystem 
Services: What Do We Need to Know About Their Ecology?" Ecology Letters 8 
(2005): 475-76. For a critique of this policy see Mark Sagoff, "Locke was Right: 
Nature Has Little Economic Value," Philosophy and Public Policy Quarterly 25 
(2005): 2-9. 
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natural are .as and their biodiversity as productive investments. n With this • 
possibility in mind, an ES-centered approach to conservation could give 
rise to a situation whereby species identified as best able to regulate water 
flows, emit useful gases, fix carbon, filter nutrients, reduce water tables, 
and so on, are encouraged at the expense of natural communities. This 
would be a 'natural' outcome of the routine operation of market forces. 29 
Related fears have been expressed by a great number of authors. For 
example, Peter Taylor observes that: 
There is a mentality in the industrialized world that would see each 
and every component of our supporting ecosystems managed and 
engineered for our global benefit as expressed in a market of 
commodities and services. For those with this mentality, the 
Amazon constitutes a planetary control service... Some eco-
technicians have emerged with plans for global forest cover to be 
managed for optimum carbon efficiency... Deserts could be 
plastered with photovoltaic solar collectors to power the emerging 
hydrogen economy. And the wild? Little pockets of eco-tourism — 
service providers for the remnant sensitives. If we are to avoid this 
soul-less future, I believe we have to move now and go beyond the 
utilitarian arguments of ecosystem dynamics. 3° 
28  Daniel Janzen, "Gardenification of Tropical Conserved Wildlands: 
Multitasking, Multicropping, and Multiusers," Proceedings of the National 
Academy of Sciences USA 96 (1999): 5987-94. 
29 Sagoff, "Muddle or Muddle Through?" p. 901. 
3° Peter Taylor, Beyond Conservation: A Wildland Strategy, (London: 
Earthscan, 2005), pp. 13-14. 
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A number of authors have raised the point that by presenting ES as the 
most compelling justification for protecting biodiversity, conservationists 
leave themselves vulnerable to any observations that might suggest 
otherwise, such as if a particular ES can be more efficiently provided by 
artificial means, or if adverse interpretations of experiments on biodiversity 
and ecosystem functioning come to be accepted. 31 
On the one hand it is appropriate that the management of natural areas 
be informed by attention to exactly what aspects are required to support 
human material well-being. Yet at the same time it must be recognised that, 
above a minimum threshold of need, material well-being is not the only 
criterion of value; there are other values that must be considered. The ES 
justification for conserving biodiversity is dangerous precisely because it 
de-emphasises these other values, which some argue provide the basis of 
our concern for biodiversity in the first place. 
V. CONSIDERATION OF OTHER VALUES 
Instrumental arguments do not provide the only justification for the 
conservation of biodiversity. Several prominent authors and institutions 
have suggested that values other than the purely utilitarian more accurately 
reflect the sentiments of conservationists. One of the most respected critics 
31 	• David Ehrenfeld, The Arrogance of Humanism, (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 1981), pp. 200-204; Takacs, The Idea of Biodiversity, pp. 281-87; David A. 
Wardle, et al., "Biodiversity and Ecosystem Function: an Issue in Ecology," 
Bulletin of the Ecological Society ofAmerica 81(2000): 238; Michael L. 
Rosenzweig, Win-Win Ecology: How the Earth 's Species Can Survive in the Midst 
of Human Enterprise, (New York: Oxford University Press, 2003), p. 41; Clive 
Hambler, Conservation, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004), p. 317. 
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of utilitarian justifications for species conservation is David Ehrenfeld. In 
1978, he suggested that the intrinsic value of a species should be sufficient 
"to justify its protection — but not necessarily to assure its safety in this 
human-obsessed world culture."32 This reflects the view of Aldo Leopold, 
who believed that species should be allowed to persist "as a matter of 
biotic right, regardless of the presence or absence of economic advantage 
to us."33 
In a similar vein is the perspective of the prolific English science 
journalist, Colin Tudge, who also believes that utilitarian reasons for 
protecting natural variety have been overemphasised, and that the actual 
motivations of those who wish to preserve species are better captured by 
moral and theological arguments. 34 This sits easily alongside the 
observation from English geographer Steven Trudgill that "the 
conservation ethic is more firmly based on notions of peace, enjoyment and 
feelings of being with nature rather than on any functional arguments about 
ecosystems."35 Trudgill provides a long list of 'emotional' values, many of 
which will be explored in the chapters following this one: 
32 Ehrenfeld, The Arrogance of Humanism, p. 210. 
33 Aldo Leopold, A Sand County Almanac With Other Essays on Conservation 
from Round River, (New York: Oxford University Press, 1966), p. 226. 
34 
 
Cohn Tudge, "The Rise and Fall of Homo sapiens sapiens," Philosophical 
Transactions of the Royal Society of London B (1989): 481-86; Colin Tudge, The 
Variety of Life: A Survey and a Celebration of all the Creatures That Have Ever 
Lived, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000), pp. 625-26. 
35 Stephen Trudgill, "Psychobiogeography: Meanings of Nature and 
Motivations for a Democratized Conservation Ethic," Journal of Biogeography 28 
(2001): 692. 
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The important motivators are the feelgood' factor of saving 
something rare, the feeling of privilege of seeing what not everyone 
can see, it is the stewardship feeling, the feeling of our facilitation 
through nature, it is the diversity and richness feeling, it is the 
putative wildness and naturalness feeling, it is the enthusiasm and 
passion for particular species, the sense of wonder and, above all, the 
personal feelings and meanings which we have to deal with if we 
wish to foster the democratized will to conserve. 36 
Sagoff and Neil Evemden are two other prominent authors in firm support 
of the position that religious, aesthetic, cultural, and moral arguments for 
species preservation are more appropriate than economic ones. 37 
Non-utilitarian justifications for preserving biodiversity have in recent 
years attracted increasing attention at the international level, from both the 
United Nations Environment Program, 38 and the World Conservation 
Union (IUCN). 39 In his introduction to the IUCN publication The Full 
Value of Parks: From Economics to the Intangible, Allen Putney observes 
that: 
Current international discourse on protected areas and the 
programmatic themes of international organizations (with the 
36 Ibid., p. 694. 
37 Sagoff, "Muddle or Muddle Through?", pp. 901, 911; Sagoff, "Do We 
Consume Too Much?" p. 96; Neil Evemden, The Natural Alien, (Toronto: 
University of Toronto Press, 1985), pp. 18-34. 
38 Darrell A. Posey (ed.), Cultural and Spiritual Values of Biodiversity, 
(Nairobi: United Nations Environment Program, 1999) 
39 David Harmon and Allen D. Putney (eds.), The Full Value of Parks: From 
Economics to the Intangible, (Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield, 2003) 
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notable exception of the World Heritage and Biosphere Reserve 
Programs of UNESCO) pay scant attention to intangible values. It is 
as if science and economics were considered adequate tools for 
characterizing the qualities of the intricate web of life... This seems 
to be a reflection of the Western tendency to concentrate on 
'knowing' based on scientific, technical, and economic criteria, 
while assigning less importance to other ways of knowing through 
humanistic, cultural, and spiritual means.° 
The Millennium Ecosystem Assessment (MEA) also acknowledges the 
significance of non-utilitarian values, indicating that if such values are not 
incorporated into decision-making processes far less biodiversity will 
eventually be conserved.4 ' However, recognition of the importance of these 
non-utilitarian or 'intangible' values creates something of a dilemma for 
scientists working in the relevant disciplines. Non-instrumental arguments 
are less persuasive than evidence linking species extinction to the loss of 
life-saving drugs, poverty-alleviating wealth, or even the collapse of 
human civilization. In addition, as discussed in chapter two, recognition of 
the significant influence of 'intangible' values on those who advocate the 
conservation of biodiversity undermines the credibility of the science that 
supports this end. 
40 Allen D. Putney, "Introduction: Perspectives on the Values of Protected 
Areas," in The Full Value of Parks, ed. Harmon and Putney, p. 4. 
41 Millennium Ecosystem Assessment, Ecosystems and Human Well-being: 
Biodiversity Synthesis, (Washington, DC: World Resources Institute, 2005), pp. 7- 
8. 
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VI. CONCLUSION 
Towards the end of his book, concluding a lengthy discussion and many 
interviews with leading conservation biologists, Takacs feels able to refer 
to "the wobbly foundation of biodiversity." 42 Investigation of the values 
associated with biodiversity in this and the preceding chapter has expanded 
on why the biodiversity concept may be considered 'wobbly'. The 
arguments examined, although rational and compelling to some degree, 
have numerous shortcomings. None are sufficient to justify the 
conservation of biodiversity. It is only when considered together, with the 
objections specific to each obscured by generalisation, that the 
conservation of biodiversity seems justified on purely instrumental 
grounds. As noted in chapter two, the non-instrumental values of 
biodiversity play a significant role in supporting the instrumental 
arguments. It is to these non-instrumental values that we now turn. 
42 Talcacs, The Idea of Biodiversily, p. 336. 
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Chapter Five 
THE NON-INSTRUMENTAL VALUES OF 
BIODIVERSITY 
Concern for biological diversity stands, in a sense, as the most central 
value of environmentalism because other environmental goals such as 
resource protection, pollution abatement, and so forth all depend upon the 
continued functioning of complex ecosystems. 
Bryan Norton (1987) 1 
I. INTRODUCTION 
For many people, the non-instrumental values of biodiversity, being those 
values that are not derived through an assessment of utility, are of greater 
significance than the instrumental values that tend to be more often 
presented in support of biodiversity conservation. Two non-instrumental 
values will be examined here: the intrinsic value of biodiversity, and values 
associated with its capacity to inspire scientific interest. With regard to the 
intrinsic value of biodiversity, consideration of this claim requires first that 
one contemplate whether or not objective intrinsic value can be located in 
nature at all. Although of interest, investigation of this question is so 
unlikely to yield a definitive answer that no attempt will be made. Instead, 
it will be assumed that objective intrinsic value does exist in nature, with 
the broader question concerning the validity of this assumption left alone. 
'Bryan G. Norton, Why Preserve Natural Variety?, (Princeton: Princeton 
University Press, 1987), p. 156. 
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II. THE INTRINSIC VALUE OF BIODIVERSITY 
Intrinsic value, in so far as it relates to things in nature, is generally taken 
to refer to values that are independent of human valuation. Entities with 
intrinsic value are deemed valuable even if they exist on a planet on the far 
side of the galaxy, forever lying outside the boundaries of human 
knowledge. Warwick Fox observes that various qualities of nature have 
been described as sources of intrinsic value, including sentience, the 
capacity for autopoiesis (self-sustaining organization) and collective 
autopoiesis (ecosystems, for example), and the cosmic purpose seen to 
manifest in all living things.2 It has also been suggested that biological 
diversity has intrinsic value. This claim has consistently been promoted by 
conservation biologists, for whom the intrinsic value of biodiversity is 
something of a foundation principle. 3 Deep ecology also includes the 
intrinsic value of biodiversity as one of its central principles, both as a 
norm of `Ecosophy T' and within the 'deep ecology platform'. 4 Most 
2 Warwick Fox, Toward a Transpersonal Ecology: Developing New 
'Foundations for Environmentalism, (Foxhole: Resurgence, 1995), pp. 161-84. 
3 Statements to this effect by Aldo Leopold and David Ehrenfeld were cited in 
the previous chapter. See also discussions by Michael E. Soule, "What is 
Conservation Biology?" Bioscience 35 (1985): 727-34; Reed F. Noss and Allen Y. 
Cooperrider, Saving Nature's Legacy, (Washington, DC: Island Press, 1994), p. 
84; David Takacs, The Idea of Biodiversity: Philosophies of Paradise, (Baltimore: 
The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1996), pp. 247-49; Dwight Barry and Max 
Oelschlaeger, "A Science for Survival: Values and Conservation Biology," 
Conservation Biology 10 (1996): 905-911. 
4 Ame Naess (translated by David Rothenberg), Ecology, Community and 
Lifestyle, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989), pp. 29, 46. However, 
the proponents of deep ecology are unwilling to commit to the formal notion of 
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significantly, this principle is restated in the first paragraph of the preamble 
of the Convention on Biological Diversity. 
The claim that biodiversity has intrinsic value will be approached by 
considering the three different forms of intrinsic value identified by John 
O'Nei11. 5 The first is that it desCribes values that are subjective, and 
therefore anthropocentric, yet have not been derived through consideration 
of utility. Such values are associated with the sensation that something is 
valued 'for itself', while recognizing that this value is not independent of 
the process of valuation. The term 'inherent value' is often used to describe 
this category of value. One example of inherent value is the scientific 
interest that biodiversity can inspire, which is discussed in detail below. 
Another relates to the aesthetic qualities of a diversity of living organisms. 
A diversity of flowers, for example, or of bird species, can generate a 
stimulating combination of colour, sound and movement. In addition to 
valuing the individual organisms for their contribution to this display we 
may also value the diversity itself. Two related theories that can be seen to 
ascribe this form of intrinsic value to biodiversity are the 'land ethic' 6 and 
`biophilia'. 7 Both suggest that reverence for biodiversity and its 
components is the result of the competitive advantage that such feelings 
objective intrinsic value. See Peter Hay, Main Currents in Western Environmental 
Thought, (Sydney: UNSW Press, 2002), pp. 35, 46-47. 
5 John O'Neill, "The Varieties of Intrinsic Value," The Monist 75 (1992): 119- 
20. 
6 J. Baird Callicott, "Non-Anthropocentric Value Theory and Environmental 
Ethics," American Philosophy Quarterly 21(1984): 299-307. 
7 Edward 0. Wilson, Biophilia: The Human Bond with Other Species, 
(Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1984); Stephen R. Kellert & Edward 0. 
Wilson (eds.), The Biophilia Hypothesis, (Washington, DC: Island Press, 1993). 
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would have conferred on our distant ancestors, and that humans have 
subsequently developed an instinctive predisposition to value a diversity of 
living organisms. 
It is possible that all intrinsic values relate back to this first form of 
intrinsic value. If a person feels something in nature to be valuable 'for 
itself', but is not aware of any explanation for this feeling, then they might 
well believe that the value is independent of themselves and their 
valuation. This perspective accords with the third form of intrinsic value, 
although, as noted above, detailed analysis of this meta-ethical issue is 
beyond the scope of this thesis. We return to inherent values in chapter 
seven, although considered with respect to nature more generally rather 
than just biodiversity. 
The second form of intrinsic value describes values associated with the 
intrinsic qualities of that which is valued. However, it is unlikely that this 
interpretation encompasses the value of biodiversity. As O'Neill explains, 
'intrinsic qualities' are 'non-relational qualities', and rarity and diversity do 
not satisfy this criteria, being good examples of relational qualities. 8 A 
similar point is made by Cuomo: "to claim that something is ethically 
valuable merely because it is unlike something else is incoherent — to be 
ethically valuable something must itself have a certain quality or status, 
even if that quality or status is contextually determined."9 Hence, with 
regard to the second interpretation it appears that the claim that 
biodiversity has intrinsic value is untenable. 
8 O'Neill, "The Varieties of Intrinsic Value," p. 124. 
9 Chris J. Cuomo, Feminism and Ecological Communities: An Ethic of 
Flourishing, (London: Routledge, 1998), p. 132. 
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This leaves us to consider the third interpretation of intrinsic value, 
which is that it describes values that are 'objective', being independent of 
human valuations. Although a strong argument has so far been made for 
the 'subjective' intrinsic value of biodiversity, consistent with the first 
form of intrinsic value, there are many who believe that its value can be 
independent of human valuation. For example, in his interviews with 
twenty-three prominent conservation biologists, Takacs found that over 
half believed this to be the case. 10  O'Neill links these values to the 
condition of having 'goods', in that some things can be said to be 'good' 
for the entity in question." In biological terms this translates into objective 
value being derived from the condition of having 'a life'; a position held by 
a variety of authors. I2 Of significance for the question of whether 
biodiversity has intrinsic value is O'Neill's subsequent claim that 
ecosystems can also be said to have 'goods', because "we can 
meaningfully talk of what is damaging to them." 13 He then argues that we 
ought to value the flourishing of such collective entities because "such care 
for the natural world is constitutive of a flourishing human life." He 
explains that this is not an anthropocentric position because we are capable 
of valuing "items in the natural world for their own sake, not simply as an 
external means to our own satisfaction." 14 However, it is in this crucial 
transition from 'is' to 'ought' that his argument comes unstuck. In noting 
our capacity to value things 'for themselves' he ties the intrinsic value of 
I° Talcacs, The Idea of Biodiversity, pp. 247-70. 
"O'Neill, "The Varieties of Intrinsic Value," pp. 128-29. 
12 See Hay, Main Currents in Western Environmental Thought, pp. 50-51. 
13 O'Neill, "The Varieties of Intrinsic Value," p. 130. 
14 Ibid., p. 133. 
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collective entities back to the first form of intrinsic value. Hence their 
value cannot be said to be independent of human valuations. 
This conclusion accords with Rolston's perspective on ecosystems. For 
him, the notion of intrinsic value is not "satisfactory at the level of the 
ecosystem. Though it has value in itself, the system does not have any 
value for itself. Though a value producer it is not a value owner." I5 Instead 
of intrinsic value he suggests the term 'systemic value': "duties arise in 
encounter with the system that projects and protects these member 
components in biotic community." I6 Hence the 'systemic value' of an 
ecosystem is derived from the contribution of species interdependencies 
and associated physical processes to the flourishing of the individual 
organisms that comprise the ecosystem. 
But to what extent does systemic value equate to intrinsic value? 
Rolston suggests that they are not the same, given that the value of an 
ecosystem is derived from the individuals it benefits. However, if intrinsic 
value is taken to mean 'independent of human valuation', then it seems that 
systemic value must be intrinsic, because a particular ecosystem will be 
'good' for the flourishing of the organisms that comprise it. Yet, while this 
value might be intrinsic, it does not follow that ecosystem change will 
result in a decline in value. Ecosystems undergo changes in population 
dynamics as a matter of course. ° These shifts cause some organisms to 
flourish at the expense of others that might previously have been 
15 Holmes Rolston, Conserving Natural Value, (New York: Columbia 
University Press, 1994), p. 177. 
16 ibid., p. 177. 
17 Daniel B. &Akin, Discordant Harmonies: A New Ecology for the Twenty- 
First Century, (New York: Oxford University Press, 1990) 
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flourishing. So unless there are some objective criteria by which the 
interests of particular organisms can be elevated above others, there is no 
reason to believe that there has been a decline in objective value. There are 
some possible candidates for such criteria. One is sentience, such that if 
ecosystem change took place that undermined the interests of sentient 
organisms to a greater extent than non-sentient organisms, then it could be 
said that there had been a decline in objective value. However, this 
criterion is inconsistent with the notion that value is held by all living 
entities. Another possible criterion is provenance. It is held by advocates of 
biodiversity conservation that introduced species should be removed from 
natural ecosystems. However, given that their reason for doing so is to 
conserve biodiversity, the intrinsic value of which has not yet been 
demonstrated (at least with regard to the third form), the validity of this 
criterion remains an open question. A third criterion is the abundance of 
life, which could be measured in a variety of ways, including the number 
of distinct organisms or the mass of organic matter created. If ecosystem 
change took place that resulted in a decline in the abundance of life, then it 
could be said that there had been a decline in objective value. This final 
criterion is the one that will be applied below. 
The question of whether 'systemic' value equates to intrinsic value Is of 
considerable relevance to the question of whether biodiversity has intrinsic 
value. Biodiversity is generally considered to refer to three primary levels 
of diversity the genetic diversity within species populations, the species 
diversity of ecosystems, and the diversity of ecosystems within a 
landscape. In each case, the relationship between diversity and the 
flourishing of individual organisms is analogous to the relationship 
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described by Rolston between ecosystems and individual organisms. 
Consequently, while it could be said that biodiversity has intrinsic value, it 
does not follow that a decline in biodiversity results in a decline in value. 
The value is derived ultimately from the organisms whose flourishing is 
affected, for good or bad, by changes in biodiversity, and so a decline in 
value can only be said to occur if changes in biodiversity cause a decline in 
the overall flourishing of organisms in the area in question, not just those 
of a particular species. 
It could be argued that, at all levels of biodiversity, there is a 
proportional relationship between diversity and flourishing. As explained 
by Kay Milton: 
The more diversity there is, the greater the chance that some life 
forms will be able to adapt to changing conditions, and that life itself 
will continue. In this way, the protection of biodiversity can be seen 
as safeguarding nature's long-term independence, which is also its 
autonomy, its capacity for self-realization.. •18 
There is scientific consensus that species richness can contribute to 
ecosystem stability and productivity, and hence also to the flourishing of 
the organisms comprising the ecosystem. However, such effects can be 
clearly outweighed by the contributions of particular species, and by 
factors such as soil fertility and the disturbance regime. For example, 
Hooper, et al., include the following observations: "cross-system 
comparisons suggest that abiotic conditions, disturbance regime, and 
18 Kay Milton, Loving Nature: Towards an Ecology of Emotion, (London: 
Routledge, 2002), p. 116. 
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functional traits of dominant plant species have a greater effect on many 
ecosystem properties than does plant species richness", I9 and "allometric 
scaling relationships suggest no relationship between plant diversity and 
total community biomass across a wide variety of tree-dominated 
communities"." Hence, at the species level it is apparent that while the 
prevailing biodiversity in a given area might have potential intrinsic value, 
in reality some species will be essentially superfluous to the overall 
flourishing of life. If they were to disappear, their niches would be filled by 
other organisms with no apparent decline in stability or productivity. This 
runs counter to the argument that species diversity has intrinsic value. 
Instead, only those species populations that have a significant influence on 
ecosystem dynamics can be said to have intrinsic value of the systemic 
kind. It is not biodiversity that has intrinsic value but keystone species. 
Nicolas Agar reaches a similar conclusion, noting that "if a population is 
especially important to ecosystemic health, then its members should also 
be viewed as more valuable. Individuals belonging to other species will 
depend disproportionately on them." 21 
At the level of genetic diversity we arrive at a similar conclusion. 
Although limited genetic diversity within a species population can have 
negative consequences for the flourishing of the organisms comprising that 
population, other organisms within the same ecosystem may well benefit 
from these negative consequences. It is only when a decline in the 
19 D.U. Hooper, etal., "Effects of Biodiversity on Ecosystem Functioning: A 
Consensus of Current Knowledge," Ecological Monographs 75 (2005): 8. 
20 ibid., p. 19. 
21 Nicolas Agar, Life's Intrinsic Value: Science, Ethics, and Nature, (New 
York: Columbia University Press, 2001), p. 152. 
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flourishing of a particular species has negative consequences for the overall 
flourishing of those organisms that could thrive in a given area that 
intrinsic value can be said to have declined. Again, it is not biodiversity 
that has intrinsic value but keystone species. 
It would be unproductive to work through this reasoning for the 
ecosystem level of diversity as it is simply too difficult to distinguish the 
influence of ecosystem diversity on the flourishing of individuals from the 
influence of species diversity. However, there is no reason to suspect that 
the outcome could be any different. 
Extending this discussion beyond the consideration of species, 
ecosystems and biodiversity, it is apparent that anything that increases the 
overall flourishing of living organisms can be said to give rise to an 
increase in intrinsic value. Consequently, while biodiversity might have 
potential intrinsic value, decline in biodiversity might be offset by human 
actions that bring about an increase in the overall flourishing of living 
organisms. For example, this could be achieved in many instances by the 
addition of nutrients combined with regular small-scale disturbance to 
promote new growth and highly productive pioneer species. Such actions 
are likely to be incompatible with most biodiversity conservation and 
restoration projects. Proponents of the latter might argue that, in the long 
term, the flourishing of individual organisms in a given area, and the 
maximising of potential future intrinsic value, requires the conservation of 
biodiversity. Yet, while this might be the case for areas where intensive 
management would be impractical, it is not necessarily the case where a 
concerted effort can be made to artificially intensify flourishing, such as by 
adding nutrients or water to parched, infertile land. 
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The prospect that intrinsic value might be more readily increased 
through actions that are incompatible with the conservation of biodiversity 
raises the issue of the importance of 'naturalness' for claims that 
biodiversity has intrinsic value. Introduced species and artificial genetic 
material are rarely considered to be components of biodiversity that 
warrant conservation. As observed by Paul Angermeier, although 
conservation biologists: 
believe that biotic diversity, ecological complexity, and evolution 
are intrinsically good... [it] is not diversity, complexity, and 
evolution, per se, that warrant conservation, but natural components 
and levels of diversity and complexity and natural rates of 
evolution. The cornerstone value judgment of conservation is that 
naturally evolved biotic elements — genomes, communities, 
landscapes — are fundamentally more valuable than artificial ones. 22 
Without relating naturalness to the definition of biodiversity it is feasible 
that introduced species and genetically modified organisms could be 
assigned equal value to 'natural' species. 23 It has been suggested that this 
limitation of the concept of biodiversity justifies support for the rival 
22 Paul L. Angermeier, "The Natural Imperative for Biological Conservation," 
Conservation Biology 14 (2000): 377. 
23 The range of views on this issue are discussed by Julia Koricheva and Helena 
Siipi, "The Phenomenon of Biodiversity," in Philosophy and Biodiversity, ed. 
Marklcu Olcsanen and Juhani Pietarinen (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
2004), pp. 27-53. 
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concept of biological integrity. 24 Alan Holland employs a similar argument 
in favour of the related concept of ecological integrity, noting that "the 
special virtue of the principle of integrity, for an environmentalist, is that it 
clearly and unambiguously defends nature in its own right — the idea of 
nature going its own way. /125 It could be argued that, although the 
definition of biocliversity does not explicitly refer to naturalness, 
acknowledgement of its intrinsic value implies a focus on the 'natural', as 
it is within intact, remnant ecosystems that constituent species have the 
greatest chance of long-term survival. 26 But this claim is disputed by 
various authors. Kate Rawles, for example, suggests that even if non-native 
species could be shown to contribute positively to local biodiversity, 
conservationists would oppose their introduction: 22 Similarly, Mark Sagoff 
argues that there are many examples of introduced species that have not 
had a detrimental effect on native biodiversity, and that proponents of 
biodiversity conservation implicitly restrict the meaning of `biodiversity' to 
24 Paul L. Angermeier and James R. Karr, "Biological Integrity versus 
Biological Diversity as Policy Directives," BioScience 44 (1994): 692-94. 
25 Alan Holland, "Ecological Integrity and the Darwinian Paradigm," in 
Ecological Integrity: Integrating Environment, Conservation, and Health, ed. 
David Pimentel, Laura Westra and Reed F. Noss, (Washington, DC: Island Press, 
2000), p. 56. 
26 Ian R. Swingland, "Biodiversity, Definition Of," in Encyclopedia of 
Biodiversity, volume one, ed. Simon Asher Levin (San Diego: Academic Press, 
2001), pp. 385-86. 
27 Kate Rawles, "Biological Diversity and Conservation Policy," in Philosophy 
and Biodiversity, ed. Marldcu Olcsanen and Johani Pietarinen (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2004), pp. 205-8. 
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what they consider to be 'natural' for unstated, subjective reasons. 28 In this 
regard `biodiversity' is no different from other ecological concepts, such as 
'ecosystem health' and 'stability', whose definition and usage is greatly 
influenced by the unstated values of those employing them. 29 Daniel 
Simberloff counters Sagoff's primary argument with evidence that 
introduced species do lead to local extinctions of native species, although 
he does not dispute the notion that ecologists bring to their work a 
subjective concern for naturalness." The significance of the value of 
naturalness is discussed in the next chapter. 
Proceeding from the basis that intrinsic value can be located in nature, 
this investigation has found that biodiversity can only be said to have 
potential intrinsic value, derived from its contribution to the flourishing of 
individual organisms. It is only within individuals that intrinsic value can 
28  Mark Sagoff, "Do Non-Native Species Threaten the Natural Environment?" 
Journal of Agricultural and Environmental Ethics 18 (2005): 228-30. 
29 See, for example, K.S. Shrader-Frechette and Earl D. McCoy, "How the Tail 
Wags the Dog: How Value Judgments Determine Ecological Science," 
Environmental Values 3 (1994): 107-20; J. Baird Callicott, "The Value of 
Ecosystem Health," Environmental Values 4 (1995): 345-61; R. Bruce Hull, David 
Richert, Erin Seelcamp, David Robertson and Gregory J. Buhyoff, 
"Understandings of Environmental Quality: Ambiguities and Values Held by 
Environmental Professionals," Environmental Management 31(2003): 1-13; 
Morgan M. Robertson, "The Nature That Capital Can See: Science, State, and 
Market in the Commodification of Ecosystem Services," Environment and 
Planning D: Society and Space 24 (2006): 367-87; Ben Ridder, "The Naturalness 
versus Wildness Debate: Ambiguity, Inconsistency, and Unattainable Objectivity," 
Restoration Ecology 15 (2007): in press. 
3° Daniel Simberloff, "Non-Native Species Do Threaten the Natural 
Environment," Journal of Agricultural and Environmental Ethics 18(2005): 595- 
607. 
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be said to lodge. The argument that biodiversity be conserved because of 
its (potential) intrinsic value should not be presented without 
acknowledging that other actions might also contribute to the flourishing of 
individual organisms. These include actions that are incompatible with the 
conservation of biodiversity, which renders the intrinsic value argument 
problematic for those who would promote it. However, this was already the 
case given that 'objective value independent of human valuation' should be 
derived from individual organisms; a view that conflicts with the tendency 
for advocates of biodiversity conservation to value biodiversity, and 
collective entities such as species and ecosystems, more highly than 
individual organisms (as discussed in chapter ten). 
III. THE INTRINSIC VALUE OF NONHUMAN LIFE 
It is a possibility worth considering that when it is claimed that biodiversity 
has intrinsic value, the actual target of concern is something else for which 
`biodiversity' is a convenient label. Two possibilities are discussed here.. 
The first is that rare species and ecosystems are of primary concern, and 
the second is that tiodiversity' is employed to refer to nonhuman life in 
general. 
Given the central place that species extinctions occupy within the 
environmental conscience, it is quite probable that for many people the 
value of biodiversity closely relates to the value of preventing species 
extinctions, in which case the intrinsic value of biodiversity actually refers 
to the intrinsic value of species. Similarly, many people express concern 
regarding the loss of particular ecosystems, the intrinsic value of which 
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was recently examined. Genetic diversity is not so readily associated with 
intrinsic values. However, its decline continues to generate concern 
because it is indicative of population decline, and increases the likelihood 
that a particular species will succumb to disease or other pressure. 
In concluding that ecosystems have intrinsic value, O'Neill suggests that 
other collective entities, such as species, also hold intrinsic value.31 
However, his difficulties in justifying the intrinsic value of ecosystems also 
undermine his argument for the intrinsic value of species. In seeking to 
ground the intrinsic value of species, Agar argues that the intrinsic value of 
individuals extends to species because in the absence of other members of 
its own species, an individual organism cannot fulfill one of its most deep-
seated life-goals, that being to mate and produce offspring. 32 This argument 
is unsatisfactory because Agar fails to fully appreciate the implications of 
the distinction between species and species populations. As Christopher 
Belshaw observes, a 'species' is an abstract thing and has no bearing on the 
progress of nonhuman lives, unlike the species population. 33 With this in 
mind, Agar's argument imparts value not just to the populations of 
endangered species, but to all species populations that are low, including 
the populations of common species that happen to be suffering a 
momentary and localised decline. 
In general terms we can say that the intrinsic value of a species 
population relates both to its systemic value — its value for other species 
31 O'Neill, "The Varieties of Intrinsic Value," p. 130. 
32 Agar, Life's Intrinsic Value, pp. 148-49. 
33 Christopher Belshaw, Environmental Philosophy: Reason, Nature and 
Human Concern, (Chesham: Acumen, 2001), pp. 161-64. 
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populations and their constituent individuals — and to its contribution to the 
quality of life of the members of the population. The same arguments apply 
to species populations that have been presented in relation to species 
diversity. In consequence, it can be concluded that the intrinsic value of a 
species population will depend on the extent of its contribution to the 
overall flourishing of life in the area of its influence, and that a decline in 
the flourishing of a species population does not necessarily result in an 
overall decline in intrinsic value. 
It is also possible that when people claim biodiversity has intrinsic value 
they do not necessarily mean 'species', nor are they especially concerned 
with diversity. They are rather referring to the full spectrum of life that can 
be misleadingly described by the term `biodiversity'. This interpretation of 
the meaning of `biodiversity' shifts our enquiry from 'the intrinsic value of 
biodiversity' to 'the intrinsic value of nonhuman life'. A strong case can be 
made for the intrinsic value of 'nonhuman life' in relation to each of the 
three forms of intrinsic value identified by O'Neill. With regard to the first, 
it is apparent that there are many aspects of nonhuman life that people 
might value 'for themselves', while recognizing that this value is 
fundamentally subjective. For example, many spiritual values that are 
associated with nature fit this category, 34 although Allen Putney brings in a 
variety of other sources of such value, including recreational activity, 
34 See, for example, Darrell A. Posey (ed.), Cultural and Spiritual Values of 
Biodiversity, (Nairobi: United Nations Environment Program, 1999). 
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cultural tradition and psychological health. 35 As is discussed in chapter 
seven, perhaps the strongest claim for the intrinsic value of nature relates to 
the first interpretation. Another significant source of value is the scientific 
curiosity that can be stimulated by nature, to be discussed below. With 
regard to the second form of intrinsic value, and as noted above, Fox 
identifies a number of qualities intrinsic to nonhuman life, such as 
sentience and autopoiesis, that are said to confer intrinsic value in this 
sense. With regard to the third form, both O'Neill and Rolston argue that 
nonhuman life has value that is independent of human valuing on the basis 
of the interests, or 'goods', that each organism strives for in its struggle to 
survive and reproduce.36 
Given that a much stronger case exists for the intrinsic value of 
nonhuman life (which is frequently but erroneously taken to be the same 
thing as `biodiversity'), it seems likely that when people refer to the 
intrinsic value of biodiversity they are actually making a statement about 
the intrinsic value of nonhuman life in general. MarIcku Oksanen reaches a 
similar conclusion in his review of 'the moral value of biodiversity': 
[For both anthropocentric and ecocentric philosophers] it is not the 
thing `biodiversity' that is of ultimate moral value, but its various 
constituents. The variety is significant for them because they are 
sentient, conscious or conative beings who are affected by the 
35 Allen D. Putney, "Introduction: Perspectives on the Values of Protected 
Areas," in The Full Value of Parks: From Economics to the Intangible, ed. David 
Harmon and Allen D. Putney (Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield, 2003), pp. 3-11. 
36 O'Neill, "The Varieties of Intrinsic Value," pp. 128-31; Rolston, Conserving 
Natural Value, pp. 171-75. 
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existence or nonexistence of other species. For them biodiversity is 
• an abstraction, deprived of all the organic features that make 
discussions about their well-being intelligible. 37 
In light of this discussion, it appears that those who claim that the value 
of biodiversity is independent of human valuation are mistaken. It is more 
likely that they are either making a broader statement about the intrinsic 
value of nonhuman life in general, employing a more inclusive 
interpretation of `biodiversity' in the process, or they are actually referring 
to intrinsic value in its subjective form. The most likely source of 
subjective intrinsic value for biologists is the scientific interest that 
biodiversity can inspire. 
IV SCIENTIFIC INTEREST IN BIODIVERSITY 
One of the most vocal proponents of the conservation of biodiversity, on 
the basis of the contribution of species richness to ecosystem functioning, 
has expressed the opinion that "no single feature of the earth's biota is 
more captivating than its extraordinary taxonomic diversity." 38 This 
appears to reflect a passion, common to many people who study nature, 
generated by curiosity and interest in the variety of life. Acknowledging 
this, the term 'scientific interest' is not meant to suggest an absence of 
emotion, but instead to clarify that such interest in biodiversity is mediated 
to a large extent by knowledge. 
37 Marldcu Olcsanen, "The Moral Value of Biodiversity," Ambio 26(1997): 545. 
38 Shahid Naeem, "Ecosystem Consequences of Biodiversity Loss: The 
Evolution of a Paradigm," Ecology 83 (2002): 1537. 
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Scientific interest in diversity — the full spectrum of a type of thing, 
rather than things in isolation — manifests most commonly in the practice of 
classification. Scientific interest in biological diversity provides an 
important motivation for the study of natural history, and particularly 
systematics, which attends to the classification of different kinds of 
organisms. 39 Of a less academic nature are hobbies like collecting shells, 
eggs, or orchids,4° and pursuits including botanizing and birdwatching. The 
latter appears to attract the greatest number of participants, variously 
known as `birdwatchers', 'birders' or `twitchers'. 41 
Many authors emphasize this particular value. Talcacs, for example, 
observes that an important motivation for biologists to become actively 
involved in conservation activities is their own curiosity. He cites Peter 
Brussard: "suppose you were into collecting antique automobiles. You 
wouldn't sort of stand by passively while these all went off to the car 
39 Discussion of the underlying motivations for scientific interest in natural 
history and systematics is provided by Scott Atran, Cognitive Foundations of 
Natural History: Towards an Anthropology of Science, (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1990). 
40  Popular during the late-nineteenth and early-twentieth centuries, egg 
collecting (oology) has since fallen into disrepute because of increasing concern 
for the welfare of wild birds. However, shell collecting, and the growing of rare 
orchids, remain popular pursuits. See, for example, the websites of such 
organizations as the Conchologists of America 
(http://www.conchologistsofamerica.org) and the British Shell Collectors' Club 
(http://www.britislishellclub.org.uk ). See also Eric Hansen, Orchid Fever: A 
Horticultural Tale of Love, Lust, and Lunacy, (London: Methuen, 2000). 
41 William E. Oddie, Bill Oddie's Little Black Bird Book, (London: Robson, 
1980); Mark Cocker, Birders: Tales of a Tribe, (London: Vintage, 2002); Tim 
Gallagher, The Grail Bird: Hot on the Trail of the Ivory-Billed Woodpecker, (New 
York: Houghton Mifflin, 2005). 
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crusher."42 Similarly Thomas Lovejoy states that "it's no different than 
when Florence was flooded in the late 1960s and all the art lovers in the 
world got all upset. It's no different from that at all!" 43 In another forum, 
Hugh Iltis admits that "like most taxonomists, I am by nature a born 
collector, first of stamps, then of plants — a botanical adventurer excited by 
the prospects of finding species no one has ever seen before"." Dan Janzen 
suggests that wild biodiversity is essential for raising "the intellectual 
quality of life" of those who live in rural areas dominated by crop 
monocultures. 45 Stephen Jay Gould notes that "like all evolutionary 
biologists, I treasure nature's bounteous diversity of species (the thought of 
half a million described species of beetles — and many more yet 
undescribed — fills me with an awe that can only be called reverent)." 46 
Jamie Lorimer describes an interview with an entomologist who explains 
his desire to investigate obscure species: 
Going out and looking at birds, what is the chance of you finding a 
new bird for Britain? Or discovering some new bit of bird behaviour 
that nobody has ever identified before? Where is the exhilaration and 
the fascination? Get stuck into woodlice or some group of beetles 
42 Talcacs, The Idea of Biodiversity, p. 135. 
43 Ibid., p. 137. 
44 Hugh H. Iltis, "Serendipity in the Exploration of Biodiversity," in 
Biodiversity, ed. Edward 0. Wilson (Washington, DC: National Academy Press, 
1988), p. 99. 
45 Daniel H. Janzen, "The Future of Tropical Ecology," Annual Review of 
Ecology and Systematics 17(1986): 322. 
46 Stephen Jay Gould, "An Evolutionary Perspective on Strengths, Fallacies, 
and Confusions in the Concept of Native Plants," Anwldia 58 (1998): 18. 
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and you are making world discoveries. That is much more 
interesting. 47 
Nigel Cooper suggests that the intensive management of biodiversity 
reserves in Britain, which is justified by the need to promote particular 
desired species over others, is inspired to a large degree by the human 
desire to classify and collect." Steven Trudgill and Emily Brady emphasise 
a similar point in observing that part of the attraction of biodiversity is that 
people prefer diversity to monotony." 
Scientific interest in diversity constitutes an aesthetic that is independent 
of beauty. The development of this aesthetic through the nineteenth century 
is briefly described by Eugene Hargove. 5° In their classic text, Extinction, 
Paul and Anne Ehrlich note that species have "a second kind of beauty, a 
beauty of interest, which, even more than conventional beauty, develops in 
the eye of the beholder."" Callicott has compiled Aldo Leopold's thoughts 
regarding what he called the 'land aesthetic', which was similarly 
47 Jamie Lorimer, 'What About the Nematodes? Taxonomic Partialities in the 
Scope of UK Biodiversity Conservation," Social & Cultural Geography 7 (2006): 
553. 
48 Nigel S. Cooper "How Natural is a Nature Reserve?: An Ideological Study of 
British Nature Conservation Landscapes," Biodiversity and Conservation 9 
(2000):1134-38. 
49 Steven Trudgill, The Terrestrial Biosphere: Environmental Change, 
Ecosystem Science, Attitudes and Values, (Harlow: Pearson Education, 2001), p. 
129; Emily Brady, "Aesthetics in Practice: Valuing the Natural World," 
Environmental Values 15 (2006): 285. 
5° Hargrove, Foundations of Environmental Ethics, pp. 88-94. 
51 Paul R. Ehrlich and Anne H. Ehrlich, Extinction: The Causes and 
Consequences of the Disappearance of Species, (London: Victor Gollancz, 1982), 
p. 38. 
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grounded in scientific and historical knowledge rather than 'merely' 
beauty. 53 Takacs also points out the connection with aesthetics: 
"Difference, variety, complexity, heterogeneity, intricacy of individual 
organisms, organismal interactions, ecological and evolutionary processes: 
from these spring the enormous aesthetic value biologists derive from 
biodiversity."53 However, diversity alone is not of particular value, at least 
in most contexts. Dan Perlman and Glenn Adelson note that "of the 
features that we pay attention to, there are many whose diversity we value 
and others whose diversity we actively disvalue. The choice of which 
features to pay attention to and which diversities to value is one that 
derives from the values and goals of individuals."54 Gordon Orians 
suggests something similar in his comments regarding the aesthetics of 
biodiversity, and also reiterates the particular aesthetic sensibilities of 
scientists: 
Although people are strongly attracted to living organisms, it is less 
clear that the attractiveness of an environment is consistently 
positively correlated with the number of species in it. On the one 
hand, for example, the most highly evolved garden traditions — 
European formal gardens and Japanese gardens — are based on just a 
few species of woody plants. Landscape designers generally do not 
52 Hargrove, Foundations of Environmental Ethics, pp. 88-94; J. Baird Callicott, 
"The Land Aesthetic," Environmental Review 7 (1983): 345-358. 
53 Talcacs, The Idea of Biodiversity, p. 275. 
54 Dan L. Perlman and Glenn Adelson, Biodiversity: Exploring Values and 
Priorities in Conservation, (Cambridge: Blackwell Science, 1997), p. 56. 
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like the gardens of botanists because they are cluttered up with too 
many species! 55 
The greatest shortcoming of this value of biodiversity is its limited 
appeal. Intellectual interest in any form of diversity, be it cars, stamps, 
vinyl records, or orchids, although passionate and widespread, is not 
exactly mainstream. Few would agree with Naeem's comment, referred to 
above, that the most 'captivating' aspect of life on earth is its diversity. On 
the basis of numerous attitudinal surveys, Stephen Kellert concludes that: 
...most Americans remain fixed on a narrow segment of the biotic 
community — largely vertebrate animals, particularly creatures of 
special historical, cultural, and aesthetic significance... A person's 
willingness to grant species ethical standing or other positive values 
appears to depend on the presumption of the species' sentience, 
intelligence, and behavioral features reminiscent of human 
experience.56 
While most people would find species diversity interesting when visiting a 
zoo or watching a nature documentary, it seems probable that the level of 
interest in diversity is low in comparison with the interest in particular 
species. Although greater knowledge about less well known and 
appreciated species can increase the interest of the average person in such 
55 Gordon H. Orians, "Aesthetic Factors," in Encyclopedia of Biodiversity, 
Volume One, ed. Simon Asher Levin (San Diego: Academic Press, 2001), p. 53. 
56 Stephen R. Kellert, The Value of Life: Biological Diversity and Human 
Society, (Washington, DC: Shearwater, 1996), p. 62; see also Takacs, The Idea of 
Biodiversity, pp. 62-64. 
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species, the actual desire to seek out this Imowledge, in the absence of 
practical benefit, is not mainstream. Harrison, Limb and Burgess suggest 
that popular fascination with nature tends to focus on species that are 
'conspicuous' rather than rare, and that systems for selecting sites for 
conservation ought to reflect this.87 Allan Greenbaum suggests that interest 
in -diversity is indicative of an aesthetic of 'disinterested interest', which 
must be cultivated, and is generally prevalent only among middle-class 
intellectuals. 58 
Because of the great competition for public attention and government 
resources in contemporary society, arguments in favor of the conservation 
of biodiversity must assemble the broadest range of values possible. In the 
same way that continued funding of railways must be justified by reasons 
other than the enjoyment of train-spotters, those who would conserve 
biodiversity must look further than the arousal of their own curiosity. 
Fortunately, instrumental reasons for protecting biodiversity are also 
available, although, as noted in chapter two, the disingenuous promotion of 
such reasons over those that they actually hold dear raises questions about 
the honesty of scientists making such claims. 
57 Carolyn Harrison, Melanie Limb and Jacqueline Burgess, "Nature in the City 
— Popular Values for a Living World," Journal o f Environmental Management 25 
(1987): 360-61. 
58 Allan Greenbaum, "Nature Connoisseurship," Environmental Values 14 
(2005): 389-407. 
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V. CONCLUSION 
It is apparent that the non-instrumental values of biodiversity, as with the 
instrumental values, have a range of shortcomings that hinder arguments 
for the conservation of biodiversity. With all intrinsic value sourced back 
to the well-being of- actual living organisms rather than abstract entities, it 
must be acknowledged that the value of biodiversity can be independent of 
human valuing only to the extent that, in any given area, the conservation 
of diversity benefits more organisms than could be sustained by any other 
means. This is rarely so, if only because human intervention in natural 
processes can potentially benefit more organisms, albeit with considerable 
expenditure of energy and resources. 
It is more likely that, when referring to the 'intrinsic value of 
biodiversity', biologists are actually referring to the subjective feeling that 
biodiversity is valued for itself, which can be easily confused with 
objective intrinsic values. This subjective feeling can be traced to a variety 
of sources, but for biologists the most likely source is the intellectual 
curiosity that is stimulated by diversity in nature. This is a minority value, 
and gives rise to the dilemma whereby scientists must promote 
instrumental reasons for the conservation of biodiversity rather than 
publicise their own personal motivations. The confusion surrounding the 
meaning of biodiversity is exacerbated by this tendency to expediency, as 
greater understanding of the true scope of the values of biodiversity is 
likely to jeopardise the case that can be made for its protection. Yet it 
should be recognised that the value of biodiversity is buttressed by the 
strength of concern that people feel for nonhuman life and nature generally. 
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Articulating these values occupies Part C of this dissertation, comprising 
the next four chapters, and commencing with consideration of the values of 
naturalness and wildness, which are central to the value of nature. 
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PART C 
WHAT ARE THE VALUES 
ASSOCIATED WITH 
NATURE? 
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Chapter Six 
THE VALUES OF NATURALNESS 
I would say that the thing about beaches that makes them so important to 
me is their naturalness. They are places that literally have a life of their 
own, where rhythms of tides and seasons set an agenda that seems to stand 
outside human time. Events like storms or falls of migrants come at times 
not of human choosing. Beaches are places where the human frame is 
dwarfed and where human technology and power are themselves framed. 
On beaches it seems as if nature has power, and the human capacity to 
direct is set in context. 
W.M. Adams (1996)' 
I. INTRODUCTION 2 
To determine whether the conservation of biodiversity is compatible 
with protecting the values associated with nature requires that we now turn 
our attention to the latter. As is apparent from preceding discussion, the 
values associated with biodiversity are to some degree dependent on the 
values associated with nature. In the following chapters, an axiology will 
1 William M. Adams, Future Nature: A Vision for Conservation, (London: 
Earthscan Publications, 1996), p. 3. 
2 Much of the material presented in this chapter can be found in two articles that 
have been accepted for publication. See Ben Ridder, "The Naturalness versus 
Wildness Debate: Ambiguity, Inconsistency, and Unattainable Objectivity," 
Restoration Ecology 15 (2007): 8-12; Ben Ridder, "An Exploration of the Value of 
Naturalness and Wild Nature," Journal of Agricultural and Environmental Ethics: 
in press. 
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be presented that conceptualises the various non-instrumental values of 
nature and biodiversity in such a way as to highlight this point. However, 
first it is necessary to consider the quality of 'naturalness', and the related 
concepts 'wildness', 'freedom' and 'autonomy', each of which have 
considerable bearing on our understanding of the value of nature. 
'Naturalness' is examined first, and receives a disproportionate share of 
attention as there are two conflicting interpretations in circulation. 
II. THE NATURALNESS OF ELEMENTS OF • 
BIODIVERSITY 
In conservation biology, the naturalness of species and ecosystems is 
assessed relative to historical benchmarks. Living entities whose existence 
within a particular region was well-established prior to the benchmark date 
are generally referred to as 'natural', 'native', or 'indigenous'. Species 
whose existence within a particular region is the result of human actions 
that were subsequent to this date are generally described as 'unnatural', 
'exotic', or Introduced' .3 However, despite the strong association between 
naturalness and the absence of human intervention, these historical 
benchmarks generally post-date the first wave of human settlement. Brian 
Czech suggests that such benchmarks represent a compromise between the 
3 It should be noted that, contrary to popular perceptions, most ecosystems are 
inherently unstable and difficult to define, thereby rendering assessment of their 
'naturalness' a problematic exercise. See Mark Sagoff, "Muddle or Muddle 
Through? Takings Jurisprudence Meets the Endangered Species Act," William and 
Mary Law Review 38 (1997): 825-993. However, for most people, species 
naturalness is generally assessed at a regional scale, which allows for considerable 
ecosystem flexibility without an accompanying change in naturalness. 
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view that naturalness precludes all human intervention and the 
counterargument that all human actions are themselves natura1. 4 
The selection of benchmark dates is an exercise that has important 
implications for setting conservation priorities. Yet such dates are 
potentially arbitrary,  particularly in places such as Europe where the 
impact of society on nature has been relatively gradual. The difficulties 
involved are made clear by George Peterken: 
Take for example the alder, elm-hornbeam and beech woods around 
the Schleinsee, Germany, which are the legacy of 6500 years of 
complex interactions between the native vegetation, natural 
processes and local people... What is the natural woodland of this 
region? Is it the mixed woodland of hazel, elm, lime, oak and ash 
trees which prevailed before people started to influence the structure 
and composition of the forest, or is it the hypothetical woodland 
which would develop if the whole catchment were set aside as a 
non-intervention reserve?' 
As explained by Czech, the advent on industrialisation is generally deemed 
to be more significant than other potential benchmark dates: 
All preceding human economy paled in sdale and ecological 
significance... to that engendered by industrial technology in the 
4 Brian Czech, "A Chronological Frame of Reference for Ecological Integrity 
and Natural Conditions," Natural Resources Journal 44 (2004): 1122. 
5 George F. Peterken, Natural Woodland: Ecology and Conservation in 
Northern Temperate Regions, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), 
pp. 12-13. 
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eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. Industrialization was 
characterized by a rapid increase in economic production and 
consumption to a level several orders of magnitude higher than pre-
industrial levels. This economic transformation constitutes a non-
arbitrary, fundamental shift in the relationship of humans to their 
environment and is therefore a logical selection for an endpoint of 
natural conditions.6 
However, despite Czech's confident assertion, there does not seem to be 
any objective reason for choosing industrialisation over other significant 
breaks in ecological history. Although the ecological impact of industrial 
technology has been considerable, it has not always been unprecedented; 
for many species and ecosystems the influence of earlier episodes of 
human activity was more influential.' 
This is apparent in Australia, where the generally accepted date against 
which the naturalness of vegetation condition is assessed is 1750. 8 
Although the profound impact of human activities on nature after 1750 is 
undeniable, there is general consensus that Aboriginal hunting and use of 
fire also gave rise to considerable change in the Australian environment, 
6 Czech, "A Chronological Frame of Reference," pp. 1123-24. 
7 Malcolm Hunter, "Benchmarks for Managing Ecosystems: Are Human 
Activities Natural?" Conservation Biology 10 (1996): 695-97; Charles E. Kay and 
Randy T. Simmons (eds.), Wilderness and Political Ecology: Aboriginal 
Influences and the Original State of Nature, (Salt Lake City: University of Utah 
Press, 2002). 
8 Ian Oliver, Peter L. Smith, Ian Lunt and David Parkes, "Pre-1750 Vegetation, 
Naturalness and Vegetation Condition: What Are the Implications for Biodiversity 
Conservation?" Ecological Management and Restoration 3 (2002): 176-78. 
119 
commencing with their arrival about 56,000 years ago. In addition, the 
introduction of dogs to the continent 4 — 5,000 years ago, most likely by 
fishermen from the north-east of Australia, led to numerous extinctions, 
including Thylacinus cynocephalus (Tasmanian tiger) and Sarcophilus 
harrisii (Tasmanian devil). At the time of European settlement these two 
species were both found only in Tasmania, which was isolated from the 
Australian mainland by rising sea levels 8 — 10,000 years ago. 9 Tim 
Flannery has controversially suggested that some of the ecological 
elements that should be restored are those that existed not 250 years ago 
but 60,000 years ago, prior to the arrival of the ancestors of the Aborigines. 
His proposals include the reintroduction of the Tasmanian devil to 
mainland Australia, and the introduction of the Komodo dragon (Varanus 
komodoensis) to tropical areas in northern Australia. This large lizard (up 
to 90 kilograms in weight for males), currently found only on a number of 
small islands in Indonesia is, "in ecological terms, the closest living species 
to any of Australia's lost reptilian carnivores." 19 The conclusion must be 
that Czech's choice of industrialisation as the 'endpoint of natural 
conditions' is far from 'non-arbitrary'. In fact, it represents the privileging 
of one historic picture of biodiversity over another. 
Eric Higgs suggests that the desire of restorationists to recreate historic 
ecosystems is motivated by nostalgia, the preservation of narrative 
9 Don Garden, Australia, New Zealand, and the Pacific: An Environmental 
History, (Santa Barbara: ABC-CLIO, 2005), pp. 12-23. 
I° Tim Fridtjof Flannery, The Future Eaters: An Ecological History of the 
Australasian Lands and People, (Chatswood: Reed Books, 1994), P.  385. 
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continuity, and sense of place!' However, he overlooks a more significant 
reason, being that the companion goal of 'ecological integrity' will not, by 
itself, necessarily require the protection of all species. Without historical 
benchmarks, or with the selection of benchmarks that pre-date the first 
wave of human migration, conservation strategies would not necessarily 
consider the fate of species that had adapted to the practices of pre-
industrial humans, nor to those ecosystems that reflected this influence!' 
This suggests that the selection of industrialisation as the 'endpoint of 
natural conditions' primarily reflects the desire to protect biodiversity, 
which is, after all, the foundation objective of conservation biology. In an 
influential paper on the role of naturalness in conservation, Paul 
Angermeier states that "naturalness provides an objective standard by 
which to judge the permissibility of ecosystem alteration and the 
appropriateness of conservation efforts." 13 Yet from this discussion it is 
apparent that, although naturalness defined relative to historical 
benchmarks is quantifiable, it is certainly not objective. 
III. THE NATURALNESS OF PROCESSES 
Naturalness as a description of processes is quite dissimilar to 
naturalness assessed relative to historical biodiversity, particularly as it 
allows many human artifacts, activities, and attributes to be considered 
Eric Higgs, Nature By Design: People, Natural Process, and Ecological 
Restoration, (Cambridge: The MIT Press, 2003), pp. 131-49. 
12 Patrick J. Comer, "A 'Natural' Benchmark For Ecosystem Function," 
Conservation Biology 11 (1997): 301-303. 
13  Paul L. Angermeier, "The Natural Imperative for Biological Conservation," 
Conservation Biology 14 (2000): 379. 
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natural, or relatively so, without any reference to nature whatsoever. 
Naturalness of this kind can encompass natural foods and medicines, the 
natural birth of children, and natural mental or physical abilities, and is 
highly valued within contemporary Western societies: 4 
There are two main reasons why such things might be described as 
'natural'. One is that they are more in harmony with nature than their less-
natural counterparts. This factor, for example, was found by Verhoog et al. 
to inform people's perceptions of the naturalness of organic farming: 5 
Similarly, it appears to reflect the criteria suggested by Tybirk et a/. for 
assessing 'nature quality' on organic farms. 16 Rozin et a/. also suggest that 
the preference for natural foods is partly determined by the belief that their 
production is less damaging to nature. 17 However, this approach to 
naturalness is quite restricted in scope. Harmony with nature derives its 
significance from the value attached to nature, which is not relevant in all 
situations to which the term 'naturalness' can be applied. The naturalness 
14 See, for example, Paul Rozin, et al., "Natural Preference: Instrumental and 
Ideational/ Moral Motivation, and the Contrast Between Foods and Medicines," 
Appetite 43 (2004): 147-54. Jennifer Price, "Looking for Nature at the Mall: A 
Field Guide to the Nature Company," in Uncommon Ground: Rethinking the 
Human Place in Nature, paperback edition, ed. William Cronon (New York: 
W.W. Norton, 1996), pp. 186-203. 
15 Henk Verhoog, Mirjam Matze, Edith Lammerts Van Beuren and Ton Baars, 
"The Role of the Concept of the Natural (Naturalness) in Organic Farming," 
Journal of Agricultural and Environmental Ethics 16(2003): 29-49. 
16 These criteria include 'biodiversity', 'habitat diversity, extent and structure' 
and 'functional integrity of agro-ecosystems'. See Knud Tybirk, Hugo F. Alroe 
and Pia Frederilcsen, "Nature Quality in Organic Fanning: A Conceptual Analysis 
of Considerations and Criteria in a European Context," Journal of Agricultural 
and Environmental Ethics 17 (2004): 249-74. 
17 Rozin, et al., "Natural Preference," pp. 147-54. 
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of 'natural' birth, for example, does not relate to its lower impact on nature, 
and few would consider the artificial production of vegetable protein in a 
laboratory to be more natural than organically-gown vegetables simply 
because it had less impact on nature. 
In a review of the meaning of 'naturalness', Mark Woods concluded that 
"we can understand naturalness to be a relational property that refers to a 
causal history characterized by nonintentional, ateleological physical, 
chemical, biological, and evolutionary forces"." To these properties we 
can add 'abstraction', as employed by Freya Mathews when defining 
nature with reference to: 
the distinction between what happens when things are allowed to 
unfold in their own way, or run their own course, and what happens 
when, under the direction of abstract thought, agents intentionally 
intervene in a course of events to superimpose on it a set of 
abstractly conceived ends of their own." 
As these authors suggest, it is not merely the physical effect of intervention 
that characterises a decline in naturalness, as many of the effects of human 
actions can also be generated by processes that are not anthropogenic. It is 
the 'character' of the intervention that is significant, and the key factor that 
causes the 'naturalness character' to be diminished is deliberate human 
intervention. 
18 Mark Woods, "Ecological Restoration and the Renewal of Wildness and 
Freedom," in Recognizing the Autonomy of Nature: Theory and Practice, ed. 
Thom Heyd (New York: Columbia University Press, 2005), p. 173. 
19 Freya Mathews, Reinha biting Reality: Towards a Recovery of Culture, 
(Sydney: University of New South Wales Press, 2005), p. 27. 
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That naturalness is diminished solely by human actions reflects a 
fundamental distinction between human and nonhuman consciousness, 
explained by Peter Carruthers' definition of a 'rational agent', which must: 
be capable of representing in thought a variety of long-term futures, 
and of making rational choices between those futures. So to count as 
a rational agent, an animal must not only be capable of acting to 
satisfy its immediate desires, but also of constructing and following 
a long term plan... It might be said, then, that plenty of animals 
should be counted as rational agents. Think of squirrels who store 
nuts in the autumn, birds who migrate south for the winter or build 
elaborate nests for the protection of their young... Surely these are 
all cases of long-term planning? But in fact, to say that an animal 
engages in behaviour adapted to meet a predictable future 
eventuality is not to say that the animal has itself predicted that 
future, or arrived at its behaviour as a result of a plan... For it is left 
open that the behaviour in question may be merely an acquired habit, 
or that it may be innately determined. 2° 
Carruthers concludes that humans are unique in their capacity to be rational 
agents, conceding only that although some apes (chimpanzees) are capable 
of "second-order beliefs about the beliefs and desires of others... this is 
only a necessary condition of rational agency. It is by no means 
sufficient."2I Carruthers' view encapsulates the dualist perspective that 
20 Peter Carruthers, The Animals Issue: Moral Theory in Practice, (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1992), pp. 133-34. 
21  Ibid., p . 139. 
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humans are fundamentally distinct from Other life. This perspective has 
been associated with the belief that humans are the only entities deserving 
of ethical consideration, and is frequently challenged on this and other 
grounds.22 However, despite these challenges, it seems reasonable to 
suggest that most people would identify their own capacity for rational 
thought to be of a different order to that apparent in other life forms. This 
point is reinforced rather than threatened by studies that identify in certain 
animals some potential for the type of instrumental behaviour normally 
associated with humans. 23 Further, as explained by Holmes Rolston, 
recognition of this difference does not preclude ethical consideration of 
nature.24 This is reminiscent of Peter Reed's position that "it is our very 
separateness from the Earth, the gulf between the human and the natural, 
that makes us want to do right by the Earth." 25 
The naturalness of processes is defined along a continuum; not all 
processes influenced by humans are unnatural to the same extent. While 
this continuum might be defined relative to the degree to which the 
processes are in harmony with nature, a 'non-physical' continuum can be 
defined relative to the relationship between the individual and society. This 
22 Kate Soper, What is Nature? Culture, Politics and the Non-Human, (Oxford: 
Blackwell, 1995) 
23 For example, experiments on capuchin and tamaiin monkeys have indicated a 
capacity to use money. See F.B.M. de Waal and J.M. Davis, "Capuchin Cognitive 
Ecology: Cooperation Based on Projected Returns," Neuropsychologia 41(2003): 
221-28. 
24  Holmes Rolston, "The Wilderness Idea Reaffirmed, " Environmental 
Professional 13 (1991): 370-77. 
25  Peter Reed, "Man Apart: An Alternative to the Self-Realization Approach," 
Environmental Ethics 11(1989): 56. 
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is apparent in the suggestion that the actions of an individual rational agent 
• in relative isolation from society are more natural than the actions of 
collective entities. Clearing all the trees on a block of land in order to 
create a paddock is not a natural process because it is a product of human 
intention, yet the naturalness of this process can be seen to vary depending 
on the provenance of the intentions. In one case, the individual felling the 
trees intends to work the land himself. In another case, the same actions are 
carried out by an employee of a multinational meat production firm. 
Although the ecological impact of both might be the same, it is possible to 
characterise the latter as less-natural. Just as the rational agency exhibited 
by the average human is of a different order to that apparent in 
chimpanzees, so is the rational agency exhibited by collective entities such 
as corporations and government bureaucracies of a different order to that 
apparent in an individual. The naturalness of technology can be considered 
in much the same way, with those devices that enable the individual to 
function relatively autonomously from contemporary society perceived as 
more natural than those that require the individual to remain highly 
integrated into society. As observed by Piers Stephens, we perceive 
naturalness to be diminished by "abstract instrumentalisation". 
`Artifacticity' increases as the processes governing the state of a thing or 
entity incorporate levels of human design and organisation, motivated by 
the achievement of particular instrumental ends, which are abstracted from 
direct experience.26 
26 Piers H.G. Stephens, "Nature, Purity, Ontology," Environmental Values 9 
(2000): 284. This observation emerges from a complex analogy between the 
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C.S. Lewis observes that naturalness can be explained by the contrast 
between "what a man wants simply in virtue of being the kind of organism 
he is — and what this or that man learns to want by being luxurious, 
fanciful, or fashionable."27 The latter describes a person whose wants have 
been conditioned to a greater extent by the influence of society. The 
former, who is considered more natural, retains a greater degree of 
autonomy from the influence of society. As noted by Richard Lindley. 
Autonomy requires not just that people rationally pursue their not-
irrational goals as best they can, but that they actually not be deluded 
about the nature of their goals, and the consequences of their 
actions... those in positions of power have strong other-than-truth-
centred motives for promoting conformity... There is thus a danger 
that people will adopt life styles not because they represent truly 
their best options, but because they have not properly considered 
alternatives, and are carried along by the force of public opinion, or 
at least the opinions of influential individuals or groups. 28 
Again, abstract instrumentalism plays a significant role in undermining the 
autonomy of the individual. The influence of abstract instrumentalism on 
contemporary life is ubiquitous, through such features of society as 
centralised decision-making, corporate dominance, ease of information 
naturalness of external nature and the degree to which human perception is 
mediated by external influences. 
27 C.S. Lewis, Studies in Words, Second Edition, (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1967), P.  48. 
28 Richard Lindley, Autonomy, (Houndmills: Macmillan Education, 1986), p. 
50. 
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processing, the mass media, and so on. By undermining the autonomy of 
the individual, these processes all appear highly unnatural. 
The significance of individual autonomy recalls the Aristotelian notion 
of telos, which describes the fundamental nature of a thing. As suggested 
by Burgess and Walsh, "we act unnaturally if we violate the telos of 
animals and plants of other species. We violate their natures." 29 However, 
it must be recognised that awareness of abstract instrumentalism and telos 
violation is an unavoidably anthropocentric process. The processes used to 
manufacture a particular brand of breakfast cereal, for example, are not 
considered 'unnatural' because of a belief that they violate the telos of the 
wheat that comprises the cereal. The process can be considered unnatural, 
independent of its effect on the wheat, because it is characterised by such 
things as mass production, advanced technologies, non-local trading 
networks, corporate efficiency, sophisticated marketing, and the use of the 
mass media. These instrumental processes are deemed unnatural because 
they are perceived to violate our own telos. 
That the naturalness of processes can be considered independent of their 
physical effects helps to explain why some things can be considered 
natural without reference to their effect on external nature. For example, 
the naturalness of 'natural' birth has nothing to do with impacts on nature 
and everything to do with the relative autonomy of the pregnant woman, 
29 J.A. Burgess and Adrian J. Walsh, "Is Genetic Engineering Wrong, Per Se?" 
The Journal of Value Inquiry 32 (1998): 400. 
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and the newborn baby, from doctors, invasive surgery, industrially-
manufactured pharmaceuticals, and other mediations of industrial society. 3° 
This also helps to explain the tendency to view human lifestyles as 
having been more natural in previous eras, and in other less-developed 
contemporary societies, for these seem to be less subject to the abstract 
instrumentalism that prevails in our own society. This is, of course, a 
highly idealised view insofar as the autonomy of individuals in these other 
societies is, in most cases, likely to be far less than that experienced by 
ourselves. However, an important distinction is that a greater proportion of 
the forces serving to undermine their autonomy will be natural or 
accidental, and consequently 'naturalness' is less likely to be valued. 
The naturalness of human actions bears some relation to the notion of 
'basic needs'. However, this relationship is not as straightforward as one 
might think. For example, actions taken to satisfy so-called basic needs 
cannot simply be described as 'natural'. Contemporary needs theory 
identifies a distinction between 'needs' and `satisfiers', 31 and it is apparent 
that the naturalness of the action taken to satisfy a basic need will depend 
to a great extent on how the need is satisfied. For example, in satisfying the 
need to sustain her newborn child, a woman might choose between breast 
feeding and infant milk formula. The former is obviously the 'natural' 
choice, despite the cultural pressure exerted by the breast feeding advocacy 
3° Andrew Brennan, Thinking About Nature: An Investigation of Nature, Value 
and Ecology, (London: Routledge, 1988), p. 91. 
31 Tim Jackson, Wander Jager and Sigrid Stagl, "Beyond Insatiability: Needs 
Theory, Consumption and Sustainability," in The Ecological Economics of 
Consumption, ed. Lucia A. Reisch and Inge Repke (Cheltenham: Edward Eiger, 
2004), pp. 79-107. 
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movement, the assistance provided by highly trained lactation consultants, 
and the associated use of nipple soothing creams, breast pumps and feeding 
bras. Here the assessment of naturalness is influenced by the understanding 
that women are biologically endowed for breast feeding, and that such 
practices pre-date the influence of industrial societies. 
Another example is that of food consumption. Eating responds to a basic 
need for sustenance, but also satisfies various psychological needs. 32 
Assessments of the naturalness of eating are influenced by what is eaten 
and how much is eaten, with 'unnatural' behaviour generally considered to 
include the over-consumption of food, the consumption of highly 
processed foods, and various eating disorders, such as anorexia and 
bulimia. In this context, 'naturalness' refers not to our evolved preference 
for foods that are high in fat and sugar, but relates to factors that encourage 
the economical consumption of food. In Western societies, such habits 
were more prevalent prior to industrialisation, and during times of scarcity, 
such as the Great Depression, when most people were less affluent than at 
present, and food availability was more seasonal. Again, it is apparent that 
the meaning of naturalness is linked to human autonomy from broader 
society, and is not diminished by the threats to human autonomy from 
natural forces. 
32 Ben Fine and Ellen Leopold, The World of Consumption, (London: 
Routledge, 1993) 
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IV. CLASH OF INTERPRETATIONS 
The two interpretations of naturalness described above can both 
complement and conflict with each other. A complementary relationship is 
seen in the influence that perception of natural processes has on the 
definition of historical benchmarks for assessing the naturalness of 
biodiversity. For example, contrary to Czech, the choice of industrialisation 
as the benchmark for naturalness might not reflect an objective assessment 
of the increased ecological impact of industrial societies, but instead the 
perception that human lifestyles were more natural prior to the 
Enlightenment. Here, the naturalness of external nature is linked to 
consideration of factors that conflict with our own inner nature, or telos. 
Complementary interaction between the two interpretations is also seen 
in the belief that the most appropriate strategies for managing native 
biodiversity are those that.encourage natural processes. This belief is even 
expressed by William Jordan, a prominent advocate of human intervention 
in natural processes to restore historic ecosystems. He notes that the intent 
of restorationists is "to do what has — has — to be done to ensure the 
survival and well-being of the system, while at the same time not 
controlling it, not violating its autonomy, but rather turning it back into 
itself, into its 'original' freedom and wildness."33 
The interpretations come into conflict when the conservation of native 
biodiversity is prioritised over protecting the autonomy of nature from 
societal forces; in other words, when the naturalness of the biota is 
33 William R. Jordan, "Autonomy, Restoration, and the Law of Nature," in 
Recognizing the Autonomy of Nature, ed. Heyd, p. 203. 
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protected through unnatural means. One example is the use of genetically 
modified organisms for conservation purposes. As related by Jack Turner, 
"some conservation groups, conservation biologists, and government 
bureaucracies are already considering, or actively pursuing, cloning and 
gene transfer, believing them to be necessary to achieve conservation 
goals."34 He cites the director of the Yellowstone Center for Resources 
who stated in 2001 that "there is no doubt in my mind that in the next ten 
to twenty years we will have genetically modified organisms that we can 
use as tools against non-native species." 35 
Ecological restoration provides another example of the protection of 
naturalness by unnatural means. Those who advocate restoration have 
attracted considerable criticism on this basis. 36 In this vein, Rolston 
suggests that an ecological restoration "is an artifact at the moment that it 
is deliberately arranged, but it gradually ceases to be so as spontaneous 
nature returns — but if, and only if, humans back off and let nature take its 
course."37 Similarly, Mathews states that "to 'return to nature' is not to 
restore a set of lost things or attributes, but rather to allow a certain process 
to begin anew. This is the process that takes over when we step back, when 
34 Jack Turner, "The Wild and its New Enemies," in Return of the Wild: The 
Future of Our National Lands, ed. Ted Kerasote (Washington; DC: Island Press, 
2001), p. 121. 
33 Ibid., p. 122. 
36 See, for example, Jack Turner, The Abstract Wild, (Tucson: The University of 
Arizona Press, 1996); James M. Glover, "Soul of the Wilderness: Can We Stop 
Trying to Control Nature?" International Journal of Wilderness 6 (2000): 4-8; 
David N. Cole, "Symbolic Values: The Overlooked Values That Make Wilderness 
Unique," International Journal of Wilderness 11 (2005): 10, 23-27. 
37 Holmes Rolston, Conserving Natural Value, (New York: Columbia 
University Press, 1994), p. 92. 
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we cease intervening and making things over in accordance with our 
own... designs."'" 
A degree of compromisehetween the two positions can be seen in the 
opinion of some authors that 'good' ecological restorations are those that 
have been organised and carried out by the local community for the benefit 
of nature rather than by corporations seeking trade-offs for securing 
development approval." Because they attempt to diminish the influence of 
abstract instrumentalism, such 'grass roots' restoration activities can be 
viewed as less-unnatural than the corporate alternative. However, even for 
community restoration projects, the guiding objective of the exercise is the 
conservation of global biodiversity, which carries with it an inherently high 
degree of abstraction and instrumental direction. ° 
Some conservation biologists suggest that the conflict between the 
interpretations is a product of the ecologically outmoded view that humans 
and nature are separate. Redefining naturalness to include human actions 
can give rise to the view, expressed by Povilitis, that "areas with human 
influence merit the label 'natural' when people do the right things in terms 
of biodiversity, ecological health, and environmental sustainability." 4I 
Other conservation biologists acknowledge the connection between 
naturalness and human action, but then continue to define naturalness with 
respect to historical benchmarks. Yet, by reinterpreting the process- 
38  Mathews, Reinhabiting Reality, p. 31. 
39 Andrew Light and Eric S. Higgs, "The Politics of Ecological Restoration," 
Environmental Ethics 18 (1996): 241-47. 
49 Turner, The Abstract Wild, pp. 107-25. 
41 Tony Povilitis, "What is a Natural Area?" Natural Areas Journal 22 (2002): 
71. 
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oriented view of naturalness as a quality defined by physical criteria, 
human actions compatible with these criteria can themselves be viewed as 
natural, no matter the degree to which they embody abstract 
instrumentalism. 
Angermeier is one such author who takes this approach. He proposes 
four criteria for distinguishing between natural and anthropogenic changes 
to ecosystems, as follows: "(1) degree of change, (2) degree of sustained 
control, (3) spatial extent of change, and (4) abruptness of change; each 
criterion is inversely related to naturalness." 42 The absence of explicit 
reference to human intentions implies that natural and andropogenic 
changes can be distinguished solely on the basis of ecological effect rather 
than the degree of human intention. Czech's choice of industrialization as 
the 'endpoint of natural conditions' reflects the same reasoning. Yet, 
although human intentions can give rise to impacts on nature that could not 
have been generated by natural processes, this is not the case in all 
instances and in all locations. Even those impacts that can be linked to 
industrialisation are not necessarily any more damaging to local 
biodiversity than those that might have occurred in an earlier age, or even 
naturafiy. 43 As Elliot Sober points out: "to the degree that 'natural' means 
anything biologically, it means very little ethically. And, conversely, to the 
degree that 'natural' is understood as a normative concept, it has very little 
42 Angermeier, "The Natural Imperative for Biological Conservation," p. 375. 
43 Yrja Balla, "A 'Natural' Benchmark For Ecosystem Function," Conservation 
Biology 11 (1997): 300-301. 
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to do with biology."'" The logical outcome of the reasoning employed by 
Angermeier and Czech is that human impacts are somehow unique, in the 
same way that the human capacity for rational agency is unique. As Mark 
Sagoff explains, this notion is deeply flawed: 
The idea that Nature possesses intrinsic ordering principles that 
human beings can disrupt, moreover, deeply divides ecology from 
other natural sciences. By analogy, imagine that certain Newtonian_ 
laws of motion held only to the extent to which a system had not 
been impacted by human beings. Suppose, for example, that the 
gravitational constant applied in pristine places but not to sites 
debauched by multinational corporations. Suppose raindrops obeyed 
the Poisson distribution when they fell into naturally occurring 
cisterns but not into humanmade buckets. We might then speak 
meaningfully of integrative patterns and principles that account for 
the direction or tendencies of motion, say, in pristine forests but not 
in factory farms. In effect, this is how theoretical ecology asks us to 
think about the biological world. 45 
" Elliot Sober, "Philosophical Problems for Environmentalism," in The 
Preservation of Species: The Value of Biological Diversity, ed. Bryan G. Norton 
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1986), p. 180. 
45 Mark Sagoff, "Ecosystem Design in Historical and Philosophical Context," in 
Ecological Integrity: Integrating Environment, Conservation, and Health, ed. 
David Pimentel, Laura Westra and Reed F. Noss, (Washington, DC: Island Press, 
2000), p. 74. 
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For these reasons it is not surprising that Angermeier's criteria face 
difficulties in distinguishing between natural and anthropogenic change. ° 
Although he admits that "no single criterion is infallible" as a means of 
distinguishing between the two, he wrongly implies that the satisfaction of 
two or more of his criteria would be sufficient to do so. As an example, he 
explains why the effect of tidal waves would not be classed as an 
anthropogenic change: "tidal waves can cause large-scale, sudden, and 
dramatic ecological changes, but they exercise no sustained control over 
the changes."47 This claim hinges on the phrase 'sustained control', which 
appears in his second criteria. 'Control' could be taken to imply human 
intention, yet he makes it clear that this criterion can include the effects of 
"dams, introduced species, and severe pollution", which are generally not 
intentional. Hence he implies that some natural processes can be construed 
as exercising 'sustained control', and while this might not include tidal 
waves, it could include such 'large-scale, sudden, and dramatic' natural 
processes as volcanic eruptions and meteor impacts that can cause changes 
in climate for thousands of years. 
The inconsistencies associated with Angermeier's criteria could have 
been avoided if his stated goal was not to distinguish natural from 
anthropogenic change, but to identify changes likely to be detrimental to 
the survival of native species and historic ecosystems. That he has 
suggested a flawed approach to assessing naturalness reflects a desire to 
46 The inability of different conceptions of naturalness to distinguish between 
the effects of conservation management strategies of varying intrusiveness is 
discussed by Helena Siipi, "Naturalness in Biological Conservation," Journal of 
Agricultural and Environmental Ethics 17 (2004): 457-77. 
47 Angermeier, "The Natural Imperative for Biological Conservation," p. 375. 
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support both interpretations simultaneously without acknowledging the 
inevitable conflicts that will arise from attempting to reinterpret the 
process-oriented view of naturalness as a quality defined by physical 
criteria. Another author who succumbs to this tendency is Andre Clewell, 
who conveys the impression of rejecting historical references while at the 
same time stressing that indigenous species be promoted. He suggests that 
an ecological restoration that does not aim for historical accuracy can be 
"naturally authentic" because "it self-organizes through natural processes" 
after restoration activities have ceased.48 Yet he skirts around the problem 
that without some measure of attention to history, the restoration of 
indigenous species might not be emphasised. While Clewell acknowledges 
that "if one were to create a healthy ecosystem that was entirely lacking in 
historical authenticity, it could not be designated as restoration",49 he fails 
to see how this undermines the whole argument that restoration can be 
consistent with 'natural' processes. Restricting restoration to indigenous 
species requires that a particular historic period be accorded priority. This 
in turn will demand particular ongoing management actions, the need for 
which is inconsistent with 'natural authenticity'. The latter can be achieved 
if management activities cease once the site has been restored. However, 
the sensibilities of most conservation biologists are likely to be challenged 
by subsequent invasions of non-indigenous species, and declining 
populations of those native species that require the continuation of 
particular disturbance regimes. 
48 Andre F. Clewell, "Restoring For Natural Authenticity," Ecological 
Restoration 18 (2000): 216. 
49 /bid., p. 217. 
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Arising from this discussion is the question of why those who seek to 
conserve species and ecosystems that are consistent with historical 
benchmarks should continue to describe their goals in terms of naturalness. 
Perhaps the most plausible reason is that, because knowledge of the 
ecological impact of indigenous societies is relatively recent, it has been 
traditional for species and ecosystems not intentionally influenced by 
industrialised societies to be described as 'natural'. This tradition has been 
established, and is reinforced, by the fact that their behaviour is not 
dictated by human intention, but is self-directed and autonomous. It 
therefore seems counterintuitive to describe these 'natural' species as 
'unnatural' simply because their survival requires some occasional human 
intervention. Nonetheless, it is misleading for conservation biologists to 
refer to 'naturalness' in this context given the potential for inconsistency 
with the mainstream understanding of naturalness as a quality that cannot 
be enhanced by human intervention. 
This discussion of the clash between the two interpretations of 
naturalness supports the earlier claim that the historical benchmarks 
interpretation of naturalness reflects prioritisation of the value of 
biodiversity. It also suggests that the process-oriented interpretation 
provides the foundation for our understanding of naturalness, while the 
historical benchmarks interpretation is subsidiary, being grounded in the 
perception that human influences on nature were more natural in past ages. 
With these two interpretations of naturalness disentangled to some degree, 
we must now consider the related concepts 'wildness', 'freedom' and 
'autonomy', before moving on to the broader question of the value of 
nature. 
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V. WILDNESS 
Some of the confusion that surrounds the meaning of 'naturalness' is 
also apparent when we consider 'wildness'. This term describes behaviour 
that is instinctive and spontaneous." It is, then, a quality that is diminished 
by behaviour that reflects the deliberate influence of rational agency, such 
as when plants are cultivated, or animals are domesticated. A wild animal 
remains wild even if caged, yet diminishes in wildness when, as a result of 
being caged, it becomes placid. The meaning shifts slightly in the case of 
humans. A person's wildness relates to whether or not they are thinking 
rationally about the results of their actions. Unlike an animal, a crazed and 
uncontrollable person would not be considered any less wild if their 
condition was actually caused by having been deliberately poisoned. 
This interpretation is contradicted by those who insist that wildness is 
diminished by the ecological changes resulting from human action. Yet 
such a perspective confuses wildness with naturalness. This is 
demonstrated by Gary Snyder's incorrect description of 'wild land' as "a 
place where the original and potential vegetation and fauna are intact and 
in full interaction and the landforms are entirely the result of nonhuman 
forces. Pristine."" Such a definition wrongly implies that an area disturbed 
and then abandoned by humans can never be considered 'wild' unless the 
species composition and landforms have remained unaltered throughout. 
50 Woods, "Ecological Restoration," pp. 176-78. 
51 Gary Snyder, The Practice of the Wild, (New York: North Point Press, 1990), 
pp. 9-10. 
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Snyder is actually describing 'natural' rather than wild land. 52 Much of the 
ambiguity surrounding wildness emerges when it is used to describe the 
condition of an area rather than behaviour. An area is wild if the behaviour 
of the nonhuman inhabitants is wild, in that it does not reflect deliberate 
human influence. This definition suggests the possibility that many places 
of high wildness will also have a high degree of naturalness (and vice-
versa) and it is this potential for overlap that leads to the mistaken view 
that the terms are synonymous. 
The distinction between wildness and naturalness, as these terms apply 
to the description of land, hinges on the fact that many human impacts do 
not cause nonhuman behaviour to become any less spontaneous, 55 and in 
consequence the land is no less wild. It is his lack of awareness of this 
point that leads David Graber to insist that any distinction between 
wildness and naturalness has been rendered moot "by the pervasive and 
insidious magnitude of human activity."54 Although unintended 
anthropogenic processes such as the greenhouse effect will lead to changes 
in nature, they do not necessarily diminish wildness. Graber clarifies his 
statement by noting that the risk is to the appearance of wildness, which 
"is in the eye of the beholder: An ecologist or scientifically educated 
naturalist sees anthropogenic alteration where someone not so schooled 
52 Snyder avoids using the term 'natural' as he believes it to be imprecise. 
53 Yeuk-Sze Lo, "Natural and Artifactual: Restored Nature As Subject," 
Environmental Ethics 21(1999): 255-56. 
54 David M. Graber, "Ecological Restoration in Wilderness: Natural Versus 
Wild in National Park Service Wilderness," The George Wright Forum 20(2003): 
38. 
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does not.”55 But Graber's comments make more sense in relation to the 
appearance of naturalness. Because wildness is about behaviour, it will 
generally be difficult to claim that an animal that remains in the wild has 
somehow become less wild. Naturalness, on the other hand, refers to the 
extent of human intervention, which will be perceived as more pervasive 
by the ecologically-aware observer compared with most people. 56 
The view that the loss of large predators in itself causes wildness to 
diminish can also be explained by the distinction between wildness and the 
appearance of wildness. As described by Turner: "to come upon a grizzly 
track is to experience the wild in a most intimate, carnal way... you feel 
yourself as part of the biological order known as the food chain, perhaps 
even as part of a meal." 57 This would seem to imply a link between 
wildness and species loss. However, such a link exists only in relation to 
the human experience of wildness. Considered purely on the basis of their 
respective behavioural spontaneity, a grizzly bear is no more wild than a 
dandelion. Yet in the bear this quality is emphasised by its capacity to 
attract human attention. Not only does it have a much greater scope for 
action than the dandelion, but, as Turner acknowledges, it also poses a very 
real threat to the safety of people who venture into 'bear country'. 
Although the human experience of wildness — which is closely related to 
55 Ibid. 
56 This distinction between naturalness, wildness, and the appearance of 
wildness, might help clarify Rolston's vacillation on this issue in relation to the 
effect of exotic plants on the wildness of Yellowstone National Park. See Holmes 
Rolston, "Natural and Unnatural: Wild and Cultural," Western North American 
Naturalist 61(2001): 269-70. 
57 Turner, The Abstract Wild, p. 85. 
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the experience of the sublime — is enhanced by the presence of large 
predators, it remains that a landscape without large predators can be just as 
wild. 
Another example of the limitations of 'wildness' is in descriptions of the 
human realm. This is apparent in the following passage from Ned Hettinger 
and Bill Throop: 
Numerous examples from ordinary life suggest that people do value 
wildness in a variety of contexts. For instance, admiration of a 
person's attractive features is likely to diminish when it is learned 
that they were produced by elective plastic surgery. People prefer 
the birth of a child without the use of drugs or a Caesarean section, 
and they do so not just because the former may be more conducive 
to health. Picking raspberries discovered in a local ravine is 
preferable to procuring the store-bought commercial variety (and not 
just because of the beauty of the setting). 58 
It is clear that Hettinger and Throop are not describing wildness, as all the 
behaviour referred to is deliberate rather than spontaneous. They are 
instead describing naturalness, as defined by a lack of abstract 
instrumentalism. When people discuss the merits of beauty without plastic 
surgery, or childbirth without medical intervention, the term 'natural' 
would normally be used; prospective mothers would rarely look forward to 
the prospect of a 'wild' birthing process. 
58 Ned Hettinger and Bill Throop, "Refocusing Ecocentrism: De-emphasizing 
Stability and Defending Wildness," Environmental Ethics 21(1999): 12. 
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Another misleading perspective on wildness is provided by Neil 
Evemden, who suggests that to acknowledge something as truly wild 
requires that we must first free ourselves from our preconceptions and 
abstractions regarding what is natura1. 59 In contrast with the meaning 
outlined above, Evemden considers wildness to be an essential quality of 
living things that is diminished by human interpretation. The notion that 
wildness is rarely experienced by adults, and most frequently by small . 
children who have not yet internalised the cultural meanings attached to 
nature, is not supported by general understanding of the meaning of 'wild'. 
Although both definitions hold wildness to be an inherent quality of things 
in nature this is where their similarity ends. More appropriate terms for 
Evemden include 'otherness' and 'wild otherness', both of which he 
sometimes uses in the place of 'wildness'. 
Barry et al., in their discussion of a wildness mapping exercise, point out 
that wildness was only chosen over naturalness "to circumvent the 
problems inherent in the idea of naturalness." 69 Yet it should now be clear 
that while the use of wildness in place of naturalness might avoid some of 
the cultural baggage of the latter, making this substitution cannot alleviate 
all conceptual difficulties. To employ 'wildness' in a logically consistent 
way requires a thorough understanding of the complexities and values 
surrounding both terms. 
59 Neil Evemden, The Social Creation of Nature, (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins 
University Press, 1992), pp. 107-15. 
60 Glen R. Barry, Thomas P. Rooney, Stephen J. Ventura and Donald M. 
Waller, "Evaluation of Biodiversity Value Based on Wildness: A Study of the 
Western Northwoods, Upper Great Lakes, USA," Natural Areas Journal 21 
(2001): 230. 
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VI. AUTONOMY AND FREEDOM 
Another term used to describe naturalness is 'autonomy'. This has 
recently gained prominence through the publication of a collection of 
papers, edited by Thomas Heyd, entitled Recognizing the Autonomy of 
Nature. ° In this book the most prevalent interpretation of 'autonomy' as it 
applies to nature is that it describes the independence of nature from human 
abstractions and expectations. This is expressed in most detail by Keekok 
Lee: 
what has come into existence, continues to exist, and finally, 
disintegrates/decays, thereby going out of existence, in principle, 
entirely independent of human volition or intentionality, of human 
control, manipulation, or intervention. Its existence is independent 
not only of humankind but also of gods/supernatural entities. It is 
self-sustaining and self-generating.62 
Hettinger softens the emphasis on independence in his contribution, noting 
that "autonomy is a form of independence that is distinct from absolute 
independence... Respecting the autonomy of others does not mean 
avoiding interaction or influence on them. What respect for autonomy 
requires is that one not dominate or control the other."63 Although Woods 
61 A review of this book by the author will soon be published in the journal 
Environmental Ethics. 
62 Keekok Lee, "Is Nature Autonomous?" in Recognizing the Autonomy of 
Nature, ed. Heyd, p. 59. 
63 Ned Hettinger, "Respecting Nature's Autonomy in Relationship with 
Humanity," in Recognizing the Autonomy of Nature, ed. Heyd, p. 89. 
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suggests that the autonomy of nature is essentially the same as 'wildness'," 
it is possible to discern a difference in emphasis between the two. In 
relation to nature, wildness and autonomy are both the product of an 
absence of rational agency, but whereas 'wildness' places emphasis on the 
spontaneity of nonhuman intentions, 'autonomy' emphasises the degree to 
which nonhuman entities are unable to internalise human intentions, 
thereby explicitly distinguishing human and nonhuman consciousness. 
Another interpretation of 'the autonomy of nature' presented in Heyd's 
edited collection is that it describes the capacity of things in nature to 
persist through time. This capacity for persistence is not specifically tied to 
human influence, which allows William Throop and Beth Vickers to 
observe that the autonomy of ecosystems can be undermined by natural 
processes, such as volcanoes. 65 A similar conception of autonomy as it 
applies to nature leads William Jordan to comment that "the best way to 
respect the autonomy of a tallgrass prairie is to burn it at irregular 
intervals..."66 While such authors are at their liberty to interpret 
'autonomy' in this way there are two arguments against it. The first is that 
it is counter-intuitive that 'autonomy' as it applies to nature should not 
emphasise such themes as self-rule and independence from external 
influences. Jordan justifies his shift away from these themes by explaining 
64 Woods, "Ecological Restoration," p. 177. William Cronon makes a similar 
point, noting that the autonomy of nature is "an autonomy our culture has taught us 
to label with the word `wild'." See William Cronon, "The Trouble With 
Wilderness," in Uncommon Ground, ed. Cronon, p. 89. 
65 William Throop and Beth Vickers, "Autonomy and Agriculture," in 
Recognizing the Autonomy of Nature, ed. Heyd, p. 106. 
66 William R. Jordan, "Autonomy, Restoration, and the Law of Nature," in 
Recognizing the Autonomy of Nature, ed. Heyd, p. 199. 
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that nothing in nature, including humans, can be truly autonomous, because 
we are all ecologically interdependent. ° Yet this is misleading. While all 
life on the planet may be, to varying degrees, interdependent, it is still the 
case that nature is, in a very important sense, independent from the 
influence of human intentions. Although Jordan does acknowledge this 
independence, he considers it to be of secondary importance at best, with 
his principal concerns being species preservation and the survival of 
historic ecosystems. 68 The second argument against reinterpreting 
autonomy in this way is that the term 'ecological integrity' is already in use 
to describe the capacity of things in nature to persist through time. Such 
concepts take into account ecological interdependence and allow for 
human intervention in cases where species and ecosystems are unable to 
persist through time naturally; exactly the meaning Jordan was seeking in 
his manipulation of 'autonomy'. 
Another term sometimes employed to describe nature is 'free'. Ame 
Naess, for example, in one of the core texts of deep ecology, frequently 
refers to 'free nature', by which he appears to mean something similar to 
'wild nature' or 'autonomous nature'. 68 However, Woods disputes this 
interpretation: 
Although a number of people describe wildness as a form of 
freedom... freedom importantly is distinct from wildness... what is 
wild becomes civilized to the degree that it internalizes civilized and 
67 Ibid., p. 198. 
68 Thid., pp.  193-94. 
69 Arne Naess (translated by David Rothenberg), Ecology, Community and 
Lifestyle, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989). 
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other-willed forces, and what is free becomes confined or 
imprisoned to the degree that external constraints force it to conform 
to prescribed limits. '° 
This distinction is apparent in the example of the caged, wild animal 
provided earlier. Although this animal can still be considered wild, Woods 
suggests that it cannot be said to be free. 
In light of this review of the terms 'naturalness', 'wildness', 'autonomy' 
and 'freedom', it is apparent that all refer to behaviour that is self-directed 
rather than having been influenced by abstract intentions. In the following 
section a number of explanations are reviewed for why the 'self-
directedness' of nature is of such value in contemporary western society. 
WI. THE VALUE OF NATURAL PROCESSES 
Many authors have suggested reasons for the reverence accorded to 
autonomous nature. A great many more have acknowledged the value of 
the spontaneity and autonomy of nature but have not extended themselves 
to explaining why. The struggle to grasp the sourae of this value is 
apparent in Simon Hailwood's otherwise comprehensive enquiry into 
'nature's otherness'. He acknowledges his shortcoming to some extent, 
conceding that he could be called to account with the comment that "at 
least he [Robert Goodin] tries to explain why naturalness confers value, 
which is more than you do for nature's otherness!" 71 His response is "to 
treat as a given that nature is valuable in virtue of its otherness: a given to 
7° Woods, "Ecological Restoration," pp. 177-78. 
71 Goodin's position is clarified below. 
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be clarified and its affinity with liberal political philosophy to be 
established."72 Yet as it turns out, clarification does not actually include 
explanation for why he does treat this value as a given. 
One approach taken in explaining this source of value is to hold that 
humans should respect the autonomy of nature as a moral imperative, much 
as they should respect the autonomy of other humans. This is exemplified 
by Eric Katz, who states that the loss of value resulting from human 
intervention in nature results from denial of "the autonomy, the self-
realization, of natural nonhuman entities"; freedoms they deserve on the 
basis of their intrinsic moral considerability. 73 Similar ideas are expressed 
by Thomas Heyd, who claims that "when we do hold something as 
valuable for itself, and consequently as a candidate for moral consideration, 
we are doing it, among other things, in virtue of our recognition of its 
autonomy. 9574 It can be inferred from such a perspective that an absence of 
human intervention has value as an expression of the appropriate human 
relationship with nature. Without denying the moral considerability of 
nature, explaining the value of naturalness in this way seems unsatisfactory 
as it precludes consideration of human motivations and requires that the 
explanation be founded instead on values independent of human feelings. 
Further, it is of little help in explaining the naturalness of things, such as 
natural childbirth and medicines, that bear no relation to external nature. 
72 Simon Hailwood, How To Be a Green Liberal: Nature, Value and Liberal 
Philosophy, (Chesham: Acumen, 2004), P.  28. 
73 Eric Katz, Nature as Subject: Human Obligation and the Natural Community, 
(Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield, 1997), p. 115. 
74 Thomas Heyd, "Introduction," in Recognizing the Autonomy of Nature, ed. 
Heyd, pp. 5-6. 
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Of those who do consider human motivations, the dominant approach 
has been to associate the value of nature with its encapsulation of some 
larger-than-human context. Within the Enlightenment tradition, an early 
articulation of this view was expressed by the nineteenth century 
philosopher, John Stuart Mill, who described a feeling of: 
astonishment, rising into awe, which is inspired.., by any of the 
greater natural phenomena. A hurricane; a mountain precipice; the 
desert; the ocean, either agitated or at rest; the solar system, and the 
great cosmic forces which hold it together; the boundless firmament, 
and to an educated mind any single star; excite feelings which make 
all human enterprises and powers appear so insignificant... 75 
More recently, in one of the early issues of Environmental Ethics, Kenneth 
Simonsen posed the question: "What is inherently valuable about wild 
nature? Why should wildness elicit delight, astonishment, and awe?" 76 His 
answer was directed specifically to the atheist/non-believer, who 
is confronted with a natural world which has come into existence on 
its own, and not in accordance with the design of an intelligent 
creature. He cannot enter into this world, as he can the world of 
human fabrication. There is, therefore, something astonishing in this 
75 However, Mill dismisses this feeling as just that. He believes it to be a purely 
emotive response and therefore has no bearing on the consideration of morality. 
See John Stuart Mill, Three Essays on Religion: Nature, The Utility of Religion, 
and Theism, (Westmead: Gregg International Publishers, 1969), P.  26. Mill's essay 
on nature was written some time during the 1850s. 
76  Kenneth H. Simonsen, "The Value of Wildness," Environmental Ethics 3 
(1981): 259. 
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world which has been brought into being by obscure if not blind 
forces. 77 
Similarly, both Eugene Hargrove and Robert Elliot assert that humans have 
a duty to preserve nature, by which they mean the autonomy of nature, 
because of its aesthetic value. This value they justify on the basis of 
'positive aesthetics'; the notion that all natural objects have aesthetic value 
by virtue of having been created by forces independent of human 
intention. 78 Hargrove observes that in the Western tradition, the love of 
nature was historically associated with love for God, and suggests that 
current attitudes toward the aesthetic value of nature are grounded in these 
theistic roots.79 Elliot notes that: 
Humans create artefacts and create their value, and the value of 
those artefacts disappears when humans disappear. This is not so, 
however, with nature's aesthetic value. And that it is enduring 
provides the differentiation that allows us to say that natural 
aesthetic value is a basis for intrinsic moral value, whereas the 
aesthetic value of artefacts is not. 8° 
For each author it is apparent that the autonomy of nature confers value 
because it represents something that is above and beyond the human realm, 
something more ancient and more enduring. This explanation for the value 
77 Mid., pp. 262-63. 
78 Eugene C. Hargrove, Foundations ofEnvironmental Ethics, (Englewood 
Cliffs: Prentice Hall, 1989), pp. 177-204; Robert Elliot, Faking Nature: The Ethics 
of Environmental Restoration, (London: Routledge, 1997), pp. 60-73. 
79 Hargrove, Foundations of Environmental Ethics, pp. 182-84, 201-202. 
8° Elliot, Faking Nature, p. 68. 
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of autonomous nature is consistent with the 'green theory of value' 
proposed by Goodin. His explanation is as follows: 
1)People want to see some sense and pattern to their lives. 
2) That requires, in turn, that their lives be set in some larger context. 
3) The products of natural processes, untouched as they are by 
human hands, provide precisely that desired context. 8I 
Rolston also emphasises a human need "to see their, lives in a larger 
context, as embedded in, surrounded by, evolved out of a sphere of natural 
creativity that is bigger than we are."82 
That nature has inherent value because of our respect for the larger 
context can be disputed on a number of fronts. It seems unlikely that all 
those who value 'naturalness' — whether it surfaces in their opinions on 
forest practices, breast size, medical treatments, or food additives — are the 
sort of people who seek a larger context for their lives in order to generate 
the sort of meaning once provided by God. For those whose lives are 
already sufficiently meaningful, other explanations for naturalness are 
required. It is also unclear why 'nature' should be chosen over other things 
capable of providing a larger context or evidence of God's creation. As 
noted by Hailwood, Goodin does not explain: 
why naturalness in particular should confer important value. If a 
'larger context' is necessary for the meaningfulness of human life, it 
does not have to be an independent nature. It could be a landscape 
81 Robert E. Goodin, Green Political Theory, (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1992), 
p. 37. 
82 Rolston, "Natural and Unnatural: Wild and Cultural," p. 275. 
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(nature-culture hybrid), or a state, or an economic class... Such 
'larger contexts' could involve damaging disregard of independent 
nature. 83 
Perhaps more importantly, Goodin does not explain why people would 
choose independent nature over theology, which has provided humans with 
a larger context throughout much of our existence. In support of Goodin, it 
could be argued that theology has been rendered irrelevant for many people 
by the insights of science, and further, that the alternatives to independent 
nature suggested by Hailwood, and science also, are all tainted by human 
influence. Yet it remains to be explained why people would seek a larger 
context that was somehow independent of human influence. Such influence 
is, after all, an important component of the larger context. 
A different explanation for the value of autonomous nature is provided 
by Bernard Williams, who suggests that it is grounded in fear. 
Human beings have two basic kinds of emotional relations to nature: 
gratitude and a sense of peace, on the one hand, terror and 
stimulation on the other... The two kinds of feelings famously find 
their place in art, in the form of its concern with the beautiful and 
with the sublime." 
In relation to the sublime he goes on to suggest that: 
83 Hailwood, How To Be a Green Liberal, p. 26. It is interesting that in 
overlooking this counterargument, Goodin leaves himself open to the same 
criticism that he levels at Roland Inglehart's theory of postmaterialism. See 
Goodin, Green Political Theory, pp. 55-57. 
" Bernard Williams, Making Sense of Humanity and Other Philosophical 
Papers 1982-1993, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995), p. 238. 
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An artistic reaffirmation of the separateness and fearfulness of 
nature became appropriate at the point at which for the first time the 
prospect of an ever-increasing technical control of it became 
obvious. If.we think in these terms, our sense of restraint in the face 
of nature, a sense very basic to conservation concerns, will be 
grounded in a form of fear: a fear not just of the power of nature 
itself, but what might be called Promethean fear, a fear of taking too 
lightly or inconsiderately our relations to nature... [This fear is 
based] on a sense of opposition between ourselves and nature, as an 
old, unbounded and potentially dangerous enemy, which requires 
respect." 
Here Williams seems to be describing a sense of respect for nature. While 
this could derive from some sort of genetic predisposition, it is more likely 
that he is describing an evolved cultural response, noting that "a self-
conscious concern for preserving nature is not itself a piece of nature: it is 
an expression of culture."86 Although it is likely that such sentiments do 
contribute to contemporary attitudes toward nature, it seems unlikely that 
this is a central motive for conservationists. 
Despite the degree of support for the notion that the autonomy of nature 
is valued because it is indicative of forces larger than humanity, as an all-
encompassing explanation it seems insufficient. Nonetheless, it is no doubt 
significant for a proportion of the people who value naturalness and, by 
extension, nature. An alternative explanation is that this value is related in 
85 Ibid., p. 239. 
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some way to a desire for autonomy from abstract instrumentalism. These, 
and other, sources of the value of nature will be explored in following 
chapters. 
VIII. CONCLUSION 
The meaning of each of the terms examined above — naturalness, 
wildness, autonomy and freedom — relates in some way to the absence of 
conscious human control. Each of these qualities, although principally 
naturalness and wildness, has been used to describe processes that lack 
human control, and the condition of living entities and things in nature that 
have not been influenced by human control. These interpretations can 
conflict with one another; an issue that is discussed further in chapter 
eleven. Existing accounts of the value of these qualities tend to be 
unsatisfactory, generally ascribing it to raw emotion, the intrinsic value of 
nature, or a yearning for the meaning provided by a larger context for our 
lives. 
In the next chapter this investigation of the value of naturalness, 
wildness, and the autonomy of nature will be extended to include 
consideration of the value of nonhuman life and nature more generally. 
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Chapter Seven 
INHERENT VALUES IN NATURE 
Values form a system, perhaps even a 'wild' system, and the task of 
environmental ethics is to learn our way around the system: precisely to 
explore and rediscover the connections, the layered contexts from personal 
to geological, that the traditional search for 'intrinsic values' disconnects. 
Anthony Weston (1992) 1 
I. INTRODUCTION 
An important continuity among the explanations provided in the 
previous chapter for the value of naturalness is that they do not relate to 
values that are purely instrumental, and thus derived through consideration 
of self-benefit. Instrumental explanations tell us more about the value of 
things that are sought through the exploitation of naturalness than about the 
value of naturalness itself. For example, naturalness can provide tourism 
operators with customers for guided excursions through wildlife reserves, 
or scientists with baseline conditions for studying the effects of pollution. 
In these cases, the value of naturalness, and nature, is contingent upon the 
value of other ends, such as the tourist dollar and scientific knowledge. To 
examine the question "is the conservation of biodiversity compatible with 
protecting the values associated with nature?" requires that we identify 
values associated with nature that are more deeply ingrained within 
Anthony Weston, Toward Better Problems: New Perspectives on Abortion, 
Animal Rights, the Environment, and Justice (Philadelphia: Temple University 
Press, 1992), p. 117. 
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contemporary Western culture than the purely instrumental. In this and the 
succeeding chapters we will focus on a category of non-instrumental value 
known as 'inherent' value. 
This chapter is organised into four sections. The first describes what is 
meant by 'inherent value'. The second discusses in greater depth the 
prospect that subjective explanations might be provided for inherent 
values. The third presents several reasons for why the identification of such 
motives is a worthy objective. Finally, a review of various value 
classifications proposed by environmental philosophers, sociologists and 
psychologists is described in the fourth section in order to identify those 
values that qualify as inherent 
II. INHERENT VALUE 
The sensation of valuing something for itself, while recognising that this 
value is not independent of the process of valuation, is traditionally 
described by the category of 'inherent' value. Such values are non-
instrumental and subjective, in that the sensation of value has not been 
generated by consideration of instrumental utility, and that it can be 
explained with reference to the preferences, conscious or unconscious, of 
the human valuer. As discussed in chapter five, John O'Neill identifies 
three types of intrinsic value, of which the first is as a synonym for 'non-
instrumental value'. The other two are that intrinsic values are associated 
with the intrinsic qualities of that which is valued, and that intrinsic values 
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are 'objective', in so far as they are independent of human valuations. 2 It is 
the first category that is of interest here. One prominent author to employ 
this interpretation is Eugene Hargrove, who refers to values that, while 
being anthropocentric, are also intrinsic, in that they encompass things that 
are "valuable without regard to [their] use." 3 However, the convention 
among environmental philosophers is to reserve the term 'intrinsic' for 
values that conform with O'Neill's second and third categories. 
'Inherent value' is the term most commonly used to denote values that 
are subjective and non-instrumental, although there are some who have 
applied a different interpretation. The standard definition dates from 1945, 
when C.I. Lewis suggested that intrinsic value was limited to human 
experiences. Objects could only be valued extrinsically; that is, their value 
was determined by their relationship to some other thing. However, he 
acknowledged that some objects "are good in a manner which does not 
depend upon their being instrumental to any other object... though it does 
depend on a relation, or at least possible relation, of this object to some 
subject."4 The value of such objects he termed 'inherent' value. Among 
those who have considered inherent values in relation to nature, some, such 
as Robin Attfield and Paul Taylor, have endorsed Lewis' interpretation.' 
2 John O'Neill, "The Varieties of Intrinsic Value," The Monist 75 (1992): 119- 
20. 
3 Eugene C. Hargrove, Foundations of Environmental Ethics, (Englewood 
Cliffs: Prentice Hall, 1989), p. 124. 
4 C.I. Lewis, An Analysis of Knowledge and Valuation, (LaSalle: Open Court, 
• 1946), p. 390. 
5 Robin Attfield, The Ethics of Environmental Concern, second edition, 
(Athens: University of Georgia Press, 1991), pp. 151-53; Paul W. Taylor, Respect 
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Tom Regan diverges from Lewis with his contention that all ' subjects-of-a-
life' have inherent value, thereby dismissing the subjective valuer from the 
equation. 6 
J. Baird Callicott also employs 'inherent value' in a manner similar to 
that intended by Lewis. However, he greatly constrains its scope by 
arguing that the inherent value of nature is derived from the sense of 
oneness with nature that he believes humans are predisposed to feel by 
virtue of natural selection, and which is reinforced by an understanding of 
our ecological interactions with nonhuman nature.' In common with 
Edward Wilson, 8 Callicott tentatively describes this as `biophilia'. 9 He 
further believes that other motives for valuing nature, which Lewis would 
associate with inherent value, actually give rise to instrumental values. He 
states that natural entities have inherent value only when they "are valued 
for themselves, quite independently from the satisfying aesthetic, religious, 
or epistemic experiences they may occasion in nature aesthetes, nature 
worshipers, or natural scientists." 1° Although his 'land ethic' is grounded in 
the self-interest intrinsic to natural selection, Callicott appears to believe 
for Nature: A Theory of Environmental Ethics, (Princeton: Princeton University 
Press, 1986), pp. 73-74. 
6 Tom Regan, The Case for Animal Rights, (London: Routledge, 1988), pp. 235- 
48. 
7 J. Baird Callicott, "Intrinsic Value, Quantum Theory, and Environmental 
Ethics," Environmental Ethics 7 (1985): 262-66. 
8 Edward 0. Wilson, Biophilia: The Human Bond with Other Species, 
(Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1984). 
9 J. Baird Callicott, "Non-Anthropocentric Value Theory and Environmental 
Ethics," American Philosophy Quarterly 21(1984): 299-307. 
I° Callicott, "Intrinsic Value, Quantum Theory, and Environmental Ethics," p. 
264. 
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that this has evolved into an entirely altruistic source of motivation, such 
that when we experience a sense of kinship with nature, this sense is not 
consciously associated with the possible benefits of such an attitude." He 
does not acknowledge that 'satisfying aesthetic, religious, or epistemic 
experiences' might also be unaccompanied by conscious appreciation of 
self-benefit, and might, therefore, also deserve the label of 'inherent value'. 
As Simon Blackburn observes, the desires that comprise our interests are 
often not our primary objects of concern. Dispassionate consideration of 
whether an action will be to our advantage, "is in fact often notably absent 
from our deliberations". 12 Although it will usually be possible to identify 
some emotional benefit to the valuer resulting from their experience of 
something valued 'for itself', the sensation of value has not emerged from 
the conscious consideration of this benefit. ° It is therefore misleading to 
describe such a value as 'instrumental' and lump it into the same category 
that includes the sort of utility calculation that results in one's old, faithful, 
yet no longer productive horse being sent to the glue factory. As O'Neill 
" J. Baird Callicott, "Animal Liberation: A Triangular Affair," Environmental 
Ethics 2 (1980): 325. 
12 Simon Blackburn, Ruling Passions: A Theory of Practical Reasoning, 
(Oxford: Clarendon Press,.1998), p. 142. 
13 Similar points are made by a number of authors. See, for example, Hargrove, 
Foundations of Environmental Ethics, pp. 126-27; Bernard Williams, Making 
Sense of Humanity and Other Philosophical Papers 1982-1993, (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1995), p. 236; Simon Hailwood, How To Be a Green 
Liberal: Nature, Value and Liberal Philosophy, (Chesham: Acumen, 2004), pp. 
132-34. 
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points out, "the assumption that a subjectivist meta-ethics commits one to 
the view that non-humanslave only instrumental value is false." 14 
Akin to 'inherent value' is the notion of 'personal value', as described 
by Christopher Belshaw. The term was originally coined by Ronald 
Dworkin to refer specifically to "the subjective value a life has for the 
person whose life it is"." Belshaw extends its meaning to encompass all 
things valued for their own sake: "I value a walk in the hills while you 
value an afternoon on the beach; Uncle Tom values military marches while 
Aunt Hefty values Liberace; and so on." I6 It appears that the scope of 
'personal values' is much broader than for inherent values, as the former 
might well include some that the valuer acknowledges to be derived from 
the satisfaction of their own preferences. Belshaw notes that there is an 
important subset of personal values that can be distinguished from the great 
multitude of 'merely' personal values: "there are reasons for wanting a 
richer vocabulary when something is valued by many, or when what is 
valued is not to the person's benefit, or, and especially, when what is 
valued is, arguably, something that ought to be valued." 17 Perhaps a better 
way of capturing this distinction is to say that the important subset of 
personal values includes those things that the individual values for reasons 
that seem to go deeper than their own personal preferences; they seem 
objective despite being subjective. It is possible that this appearance of 
14 O'Neill, "The Varieties of Intrinsic Value," p. 121. 
15 Ronald Dworkin, Life's Dominion: An Argument About Abortion and 
Euthanasia, (London: HarperCollins, 1993), p. 73. 
16 Christopher Belshaw, Environmental Philosophy: Reason, Nature and 
Human Concern, (Chesham: Acumen, 2001), p. 207. 
17 Ibid., p. 208. 
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depth arises because the individual cannot explain why they value a 
particular thing, which may lead them to conclude that its value is 
somehow independent from their own experience of value. As discussed 
below, this is consistent with inherent value. Another term that has been 
suggested for subjective, non-instrumental values is Ingredience value', 
which is defined by its originator, R.T. Allen, as "the value of something to 
which we attend for the sake of attending to it — as enjoyable, likeable, 
interesting, or aesthetically or intellectually satisfying."" 
Despite the various terms that are available to describe the sensation of 
subjectively valuing something in nature 'for itself', 'inherent value' has 
been chosen in preference. Although some, such as Hargrove, have 
employed 'intrinsic value' in this capacity, the dominant interpretation is at 
odds with this meaning. 'Personal values' are obviously unsuitable given 
that they encompass values that are too closely tied to individual 
preferences, while Allen's term `ingredience value' has not been adopted 
because it, and his explanation, do not fit that well in the context of 
discussions about nature. 
III THE UNDERLYING MOTIVATIONS OF 
INHERENT VALUE 
Sensations of inherent value are grounded in experiences of nature in 
which conscious assessment of utility is largely absent. This is consistent 
with the perspective of numerous authors who view human concern for 
18 R.T. Allen, The Structure of Value, (Aldershot: Avebury, 1993), p. 26. 
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nature as being "unconscious", "intuitive", "innate", or "pre-rational". 19 It 
is reflected in the following passage by Thomas Dunlap: 
people don't risk fines or jail or their lives because something might 
evolve in the next few million years or because wild land forms our 
nation's character. Julia Butterfly Hill, for instance, sat 180 feet up 
in a redwood tree for 738 days, and neither common sense nor her 
testimony suggested economic or utilitarian motives or even a 
particularly well-developed intellectual defense of nature or 
wilderness." 
However, despite arising through a largely subconscious process, 
sensations of inherent value are not random and baseless; there often exists 
some underlying motivating factor, or factors, that has caused a particular 
set of circumstances to be valued over another. Nicholas Rescher usefully 
distinguishes between the 'locus' of value, which in the above example is 
the redwood tree, and the 'underlying' or 'abstract' value, which is the 
subconscious, or at least unstated, motivations for why Ms. Hill subjected 
herself to numerous privations in defence of the redwood tree. 21 This is not 
to say that all sensations of value respond to an underlying motivation. For 
example, a person might value something because they have been 
culturally habituated to do so, or because they are hedonistically 
19 Peter Hay, Main Currents in Western Environmental Thought, (Sydney: 
University of New South Wales Press, 2002), pp. 2-3. 
20 Thomas R. Dunlap, Faith in Nature: Environmentalism as Religious Quest, 
(Seattle: University of Washington Press, 2004), p. 86. 
21 Nicholas Rescher, Introduction to Value Theory, (Englewood Cliffs: 
Prentice-Hall, 1969), P.  8. 
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• responding to a 'sensory delight'. 22 However, it is possible that plausible 
underlying motivations can be identified despite the existence of a motive 
not having been consciously apprehended by the valuer. It is the possible 
existence of these underlying motivations that renders the category of 
inherent values of nature worthy of further exploration. 
Because inherent values relate to the sensation that something is valued 
for itself, and that this sensation is dependent, at least in part, on the valuer 
not having engaged in a conscious assessment of utility, it might seem that 
if one becomes aware of the underlying motivations then the value can no 
longer be considered inherent, as the focus of value may have shifted from 
the thing being valued to satisfaction of the newly discovered underlying 
motivation. Any attempt to reflect on the experience of value in order to 
explain the underlying motivations could thereby be deemed an exercise in 
impoverishment, both for oneself and for any others who are corrupted by 
such knowledge. This is not a wholly unfounded fear in the event that 
sensations of inherent value are usurped by a cynical drive to maximise the 
sensation of value. Yet we are not slaves to instrumentalism. In affluent 
societies particularly there is no need to reconceive every aspect of life in 
terms of maximising self benefit. It seems that we are capable, although 
some more than others, of allowing greater understanding of underlying 
motivations to enrich our experience of value rather than reduce it to a 
conscious evaluation of utility. 
The possibility that a person might value something for itself on the 
basis of an underlying motivation of which they are not fully aware has a 
22 Gerald F. Gaus, Value and Justification: The Foundations of Liberal Theory, 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990), p. 218. 
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profound implication for the category of intrinsic value. The identification 
of inherent values does not preclude the existence of objective, intrinsic 
values in nature that exist independently of human valuation. 23 However, it 
could be argued that the identification of inirinsic value is dependent on 
sensations of inherent value as it is unlikely that some aspect of nature 
would be considered to have intrinsic value if it was not already valued 
inherently. 24 There is also the probability that inherent values can be 
mistaken for intrinsic values in the event that the valuer is unaware of any 
underlying explanation that would tie the sensation of value back to their 
own preferences. In the absence of such an explanation it would be 
difficult to distinguish the two categories of value. It could be argued that 
these observations undermine the existence of intrinsic values in nature, 
which are necessarily independent of human valuing. However, an assured 
judgment on this issue is beyond the scope of this dissertation. 
IV. REASONS FOR IDENTIFYING UNDERLYING 
MOTIVATIONS 
In addition to the enrichment of experience through greater awareness of 
the motivations underlying values, and the insights made available into the 
nature of intrinsic value, there are a number of other reasons to pursue 
23 A similar point is made by Hargrove, Foundations of Environmental Ethics, 
p. 126. 
24 1's is reflected in Musschenga's recognition that 'identity-constitutive' 
reasons provide more powerful motives for action than 'identity-neutral' ones. See 
Albert W. Musschenga, "Identity-Neutral and Identity-Constitutive Reasons for 
Preserving Nature," Journal of Applied Philosophy 21 (2004): 85. 
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explanations for our intuitions concerning value. Hargrove points out that 
such an explanation: 
(1) Is likely to be more convincing and effective than more radical 
positions, and 
(2) even if it is not, it is good sense to determine the justification for 
our actual intuitions and practices before trying to change them. 25 
With regards to the first point Robert Elliot concurs, suggesting that, within 
a liberal political system, if one desires the protection of "species, 
ecosystems and the biosphere" it is important that others be convinced of 
its value; a project that requires one "to articulate what it is about wild 
nature that underpins its intrinsic value." 26 
On Hargrove's second point it can be seen that the search for underlying 
motivations is 'good sense' for a number of reasons. To start with, exerting 
an influence on popular beliefs is easier if their basis is well understood. A 
breadth of understanding is also helpful in avoiding the possibility that 
some aspects of what is to be changed are actually beneficial to one's 
cause. As Alan Greenbaum observes: 
We have often been told that the current environmental crisis 
demands that the West overturn aspects of its attitude toward the 
nonhuman and to resacralise its relationship with nature... Yet... 
'nature is already sacred' in Western culture... Indeed, it is precisely 
25 Hargrove, Foundations of Environmental Ethics, p. 167. 
26 Robert Elliot, "Ecology and the Ethics of Environmental Restoration," in 
Philosophy and the Natural Environment, ed. Robin Attfield and Andrew Belsey 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994), P.  35. 
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because nature is sacred in modem Western culture that bearers of 
modern Western 'high culture' have been especially appalled at the 
consequences of modern technological and economic dynamics for 
wild biodiversity, and have in some cases set themselves (at least 
rhetorically) against Western modemity.27 
Belshaw makes the similar point that: 
Our recent times are remarkable for our concern with preserving the 
past and resisting change, and with an increasing worry over the 
balance between our material and spiritual concerns. Rather than an 
occasion for gloom, the current widespread concern about the 
environment should be cause for cautious optimism. -28 
By this reading, radical ecologists would be wise to enquire deeply into the 
motivations underlying concern for nature lest they be unknowingly 
undermined during the process of resituating the moral foundations of 
society. 
Two more reasons for the clear articulation of underlying values are 
provided by Lynn Maguire in relation to the Wildlands Project, which 
envisages returning a substantial proportion of the area of the United States 
to natural uses: 
First, to be acceptable, proposed actions must support (at least to some 
extent) these values. Those who aren't clear about what their fundamental 
27 Allan Greenbaum, "Nature Connoisseurship," Environmental Values 14 
(2005): 402. 
28 Belshaw, Environmental Philosophy, p. 26. 
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values are have a hard time making consistent judgments about what 
actions are desirable and an even harder time explaining why they prefer 
some actions to other alternatives... 
A second reason... is that to have any chance of implementing significant 
portions of The Wildlands Project, individuals and organizations with 
•disparate goals will have to work together to find actions that all can 
endorse... Even among proponents of The Wildlands Project, there are 
differences in values and priorities, with some emphasizing spiritual values 
and ethical obligations and others emphasizing ecosystem services and 
sustainable human use. 29 
One final point is that ordinary citizens are justified in demanding a full 
explanation for why drastic changes in the structure and organisation of 
western societies are sought by environmental activists. Overarching plans 
for change on this scale are worryingly reminiscent of those prepared by 
totalitarian governments bent on molding human populations to conform 
with abstract visions of the ideal society. In light of the tragic history of 
such activities, the general public have a right to be informed of the full 
range of values being expressed. 30  The following analysis of inherent 
29 Lynn A. Maguire, "Science, Values, and Uncertainty: A Critique of the 
Wildlands Project," in Environmental Policy and Biodiversity, ed. R. Edward 
Gnunbine (Washington, DC: Island Press, 1994), p. 268. 
30 For discussion of a number of disturbing examples of state-sponsored societal 
manipulation see James C. Scott, Seeing Like a State: How Certain Schemes to 
Improve the Human Condition Have Failed, (New Haven: Yale University Press, 
1998). Discussion of the illiberal tendencies of radical environmental groups, 
including Earth First!, who are closely tied to the establishment of the Wildlands 
Project, is found in Richard J. Ellis, The Dark Side of the Left: Illiberal 
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values takes place in the hope that it may lead both to greater support for 
the protection of wild nature, and a tempering of the more undemocratic 
proposals of some environmental activists. 
V. IDENTIFYING INHERENT VALUES 
The usefulness of inherent values in contributing to our understanding of 
why we value nature depends on the plausibility of the explanations that 
can be suggested for why such values manifest. This involves not venturing 
down the path of simply asserting that no explanation is required because 
the values are unconscious, innate, intrinsic or `spiritual'. 31 The possibility 
that more satisfying explanations are available is explored here by way of a 
review of some existing attempts to identify and explain values in nature. 
Many lists of natural values and arguments in support of nature 
preservation are to be found in the literature. Some values are common to 
all such lists, particularly the distinction between intrinsic value and values 
variously described as utilitarian, economic, or instrumental. Some authors 
adopt the terminology developed by economists, referring to existence, 
bequest and commodity values, among others. Several approaches relevant 
to consideration of inherent values are described below, followed by 
discussion of their capacity to explain what it is about nature that satisfies 
our underlying propensities for attributing value. 
In 1995 Warwick Fox presented an environmental axiology that adopts 
earlier schemes suggested by William Godfrey-Smith in 1979 and John 
Egalitarianism in America, (Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 1998), pp. 
228-270. 
31 See quote by Weston at the beginning of this chapter. 
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Rodman in 1983. 32 It also benefited from a related project undertaken by 
George Sessions published in 1992. Fox describes both instrumental and 
intrinsic approaches to the value of nature, with the former including nine 
arguments for 'resource preservation'. 33 Another influential taxonomy of 
values is that proposed by the sociologist Stephen Kellert. His list of nine 
basic values was developed in conjunction with a large number of 
attitudinal surveys conducted since 1985 in a variety of countries. 34 Outside 
of environmental sociology, Kellert's work is known primarily through its 
association with the biophilia hypothesis.35 In 1998 Michael Nelson 
compiled various classification schemes to present twenty-nine arguments 
for wilderness preservation. 36 Allen Putney briefly describes eleven 
'intangible' or 'non-material' values of nature reserves identified by the 
World Commission on Protected Areas in his introduction to a book on the 
32 See William Godfrey-Smith, "The Value of Wilderness," Environmental 
Ethics 1(1979): 309-19; John Rodman, "Four Forms of Ecological Consciousness 
Reconsidered," in Ethics and the Environment, ed. Donald Scherer and Thomas 
Attig (Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall, 1983), pp. 82-92. 
33 Warwick Fox, Toward a Transpersonal Ecology: Developing New 
Foundations for Environmentalism, (Foxhole: Resurgence, 1995); pp. 149-61; 
George Sessions, "Ecocentrism, Wilderness, and Global Protection," in The 
Wilderness Condition: Essays on Environment and Civilization, ed. Max 
Oelschlaeger (Washington, DC: Island Press, 1992), pp. 96-100. 
34 Stephen R. Kellert, The Value of Life: Biological Diversity and Human 
Society, (Washington, DC: Shearwater, 1996), pp. 3-26. 
35 Stephen R. Kellert and Edward 0. Wilson (eds.), The Biophilia Hypothesis, 
(Washington, DC: Island Press, 1993). 
36 Michael P. Nelson, "An Amalgamation of Wilderness Preservation 
Arguments," in The Great New Wilderness Debate, ed. J. Baird Callicott and 
Michael P. Nelson (Athens: University of Georgia Press, 1998), pp. 154-98. 
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topic published in 2003." A useful discussion of such values is presented 
by Richard Knopf in the Handbook of Environmental Psychology, 
originally published in 1987.38 
All of the classification schemes mentioned, except for the contribution 
by Knopf, feature combinations of purely utilitarian values or arguments, 
values that blend instrumental and non-instrumental elements, and values 
that might properly be considered 'inherent'. Some categories are explicitly 
identified as utilitarian, or are obviously so, like the 'silo' argument 
identified by Godfrey-Smith, Sessions and Fox, and the 'pharmacopoeia' 
and 'storage silo' arguments identified by Nelson, which describe the 
potential value of the genetic diversity found in wilderness areas. Even the 
typology of intangible values suggested by Putney, which is more 
explicitly tailored to non-instrumental values, contains two that are 
distinctly utilitarian: the value of protected areas for 'research and 
monitoring', and for encouraging international cooperation. While 
utilitarian arguments and values are easily dismissed from consideration of 
inherent values, this is not the case for arguments that reflect a mixture of 
instrumental and non-instrumental elements. Some common examples are 
the scientific, recreational, and symbolic value of nature, each of which are 
discussed below. 
37 Allen D. Putney, "Introduction: Perspectives on the Values of Protected 
Areas," in The Full Value of Parks: From Economics to the Intangible, ed. David 
Harmon and Allen D. Putney (Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield, 2003), pp. 3-11. 
38 Richard C. Knopf, "Human Behavior, Cognition, and Affect in the Natural 
Environment," in Handbook of Environmental Psychology, Volume One, ed. 
Daniel Stokols and Irwin Altman (Malabar Krieger, 1991), pp. 783-825. 
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The 'laboratory' argument (identified by Godfrey-Smith, Sessions, Fox 
and Nelson), the `ecologistic-scientific' value (Keller°, and the 'research 
and monitoring' value (Putney), describe the value of nature for scientific 
research. While such research has obvious practical benefits, it also 
provides many people with a valued intellectual experience, which is 
acknowledged by Knopf s category of 'nature as diversion'. The value 
associated with this experience is non-instrumental and fits within the 
category of inherent value. 
The 'gymnasium' argument (Godfrey-Smith, Sessions and Fox), the 
'physical therapy' and 'arena' arguments (Nelson), the 'naturalistic' value 
(Keller°, and 'recreational values' (Putney) describe the value of nature for 
recreation. Some of these authors emphasise the purely physical benefits of 
exercising in nature, in which case the value concerned is instrumental as 
nature is valued only as a location for exercise. Others draw attention to 
recreation activities that include emotional engagement with nature as an 
integral part of the experience. Such activities suggest the presence of 
inherent values. 
The 'monument' argument (Sessions and Fox), the 'inspiration', 
'national character', `mythopoetic' arguments (Nelson), 'symbolic' value 
(Kellert and Knopf), and 'artistic' and 'cultural values' (Putney) describe 
the value of nature for providing us with culturally significant symbols and 
metaphors. These are instrumental values in so far as the aspect of nature 
that constitutes the symbol is valued because the referent is valued. 
However, this transferral of value will not necessarily be conscious; we 
may, for example, feel a particular animal to be especially important 
without acknowledging that this importance stems from it being the 
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national mascot. As discussed in chapter nine, the capacity of nature to 
symbolise human freedom, emphasised by both Sessions and Fox, is 
particularly important. 
Other identified values comprising both instrumental and non-
instrumental aspects include the value of nature for education, the aesthetic 
and spiritual value of nature, and the psychological benefits of engaging 
with nature. Such values may be considered either instrumental or inherent 
depending not only on which aspect of the value is considered, but also 
under what circumstances it is experienced. For example, someone might 
value a certain vista instrumentally in their capacity as a tour group 
operator, yet inherently, as an aesthetic value, on those occasions after 
work when they can relax." Making definitive statements about the nature 
of a value is further complicated by the likelihood that multiple, interacting 
values may be active in any given situation. These complexities must be 
recognised in any attempt to describe the motivations underlying 
sensations of inherent value. 
39 William Cronon hi 	 blights similar distinctions in his identification of the 
'uncommon ground' that separates our perceptions of nature from those held by 
others. See Cronon, "Introduction: In Search of Nature," in Uncommon Ground: 
Rethinking the Human Place in Nature, paperback edition, ed. William Cronon 
(New York: W.W. Norton, 1996), pp. 23-56. 
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VI. CONCLUSION 
This chapter has taken the question of why we value nature and 
presented a theoretical framework within which to answer it. The 
framework is comprised of what have been termed 'inherent values', which 
are non-instrumental, non-intrinsic values whereby nature is valued for 
what it is in itself, rather than how it may be used to express or further 
some other value. A review of several existing studies of environmental 
values has identified a number of sources of value that qualify as 
'inherent', such as the intellectual experience associated with scientific 
inquiry, the emotional engagement with nature arising from wilderness 
recreation, and the capacity of nature to symbolise human freedom. In the 
next chapter, these are incorporated into an 'axiology of inherent value' 
that will be used to explore the values associated with nature. 
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Chapter Eight 
THE AXIOLOGY OF INHERENT VALUE 
I do, in fact, believe that some sense can and should be made of the idea of 
direct ethical obligations to a wide range of nonhuman natural entities. But 
I also think that these obligations are extremely hard to articulate, 
particularly within what might loosely be called a 'rationalist' ethical 
framework, that is, one which takes itself to appeal only to reason and 
which eschews appeal to emotion. Arguably, it is a re-evaluation of these 
kinds of frameworks that is called for here, rather than a limiting of our 
ethical obligations. 
Kate Rawles (2004) i 
I. INTRODUCTION 
An axiology, or theory of value, is proposed in this chapter that describes 
four motives underlying the subjective, non-instrumental, and inherent 
values associated with nature. This is followed by discussion of the first 
three motives, with the fourth considered in chapter nine. The value-
oriented decisions arising from these motives can then be compared with 
the values protected by the conservation of biodiversity to determine the 
potential for conflict. 
Kate Rawles, "Biological Diversity and Conservation Policy," in Philosophy 
and Biodiversity, ed. Marldcu Olcsanen and Juhani Pietarinen (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2004), p. 204. 
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II. THE AXIOLOGY OF INHERENT VALUE 
It is argued here that in contemporary western societies the non-
instrumental subjective values experienced in nature can be associated with 
the following underlying motivations: 
MOTIVE ONE 	The experience of connection with nonhuman 
life. 
MOTIVE TWO 	Intellectual interest in nature. 
MOTIVE THREE 	Respect for the larger context. 
MOTIVE FOUR 	Dissatisfaction with the abstractions of 
modern society. 
Each of these motives can help to explain the feeling that something in 
nature, or 'nature' as a whole, is valued `for itself. They have been chosen 
for their capacity to explain the non-instrumental, non-intrinsic values that 
were identified through review of existing classification systems. However, 
'it must be acknowledged that their explanatory potential can only be 
realised in combination with each other and the variety of other influences 
that generate sensations of value. As Anthony Weston explains: 
The idea is to trace the relations of values as a system, thus inter-
weaving a complex and varied set of values into a loose pattern, 
intricate and indeed still in conflict as it may be. Thus we might do 
for values themselves what the science of ecology does for the 
multiple forms of life: uncover their organic places within larger 
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wholes. Indeed, I propose to call such a project an 'ecology of 
values.' 2 
Similarly, Kay Milton suggests that: 
The ways in which nature and natural things are valued depend on 
their emotional impacts, on what they make people feel. And these 
impacts arise out of a complex developmental process which is 
unique to every individual and which is constituted partly through 
social experiences, but also through diverse other experiences of 
perceptual engagement with nature and natural things. 3 
Although a particular motive might be identified as exerting overwhelming 
influence on a particular value-orientation, this motive will not be acting 
alone. Sensations of inherent value in nature might well be influenced by 
the usefulness of some aspect of nature, and the values associated with 
various personal meanings and cultural traditions that are bound up with 
nature. Inherent values in turn support the identification of certain intrinsic 
values that are ascribed to nature, and belief in these intrinsic values can 
then have ramifications for attitudes about other aspects of nature and the 
human relationship with nature. 
The pluralism of this approach helps to defuse criticism that can be 
leveled at universal theories of value of the type proposed by Robert 
2 Anthony Weston, Toward Better Problems: New Perspectives on Abortion, 
Animal Rights, the Environment, and Justice (Philadelphia: Temple University 
Press, 1992), p. 115. 
3 Kay Milton, Loving Nature: Towards an Ecology of Emotion, (London: 
Routledge, 2002), p. 111. 
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Goodin.4 His 'green theory of value' is founded on the notion that 
'naturalness' is desired because it infuses our lives with meaning and 
purpose. The theory suffers from attempting to explain too much with too 
little. Despite his frequent assertion that it satisfactorily accounts for all 
truly green behaviour, there are too many instances where it obviously does 
not. Goodin explains the discrepancy by suggesting that there are many 
preferences, exhibited by people who identify themselves as 'green', that 
are not integral to the green perspective: 
You cannot consistently be a principled green in your personal 
lifestyle without being a principled green in your policy 
recommendations. But you can consistently be a principled green in 
your policy recommendations, grounding them in a properly green 
theory of value, without necessarily adopting on principle a green 
personal lifestyle. 5 
This is spurious. Goodin is defining 'a principled green' to be one that 
conforms to his green theory of value, which renders his argument entirely 
circular. A more plausible explanation is that Goodin's theory is not 
comprehensive enough to account for why some environmentalists adopt 
certain lifestyle habits while others do not. Another example of the 
limitations of his theory is that Goodin is forced to introduce an 
accompanying 'green theory of agency' to account for the tendency of 
4 See, for example, Kate Soper, What is Nature? Culture, Politics and the Non-
Human, (Oxford: Blackwell, 1995), p. 273. 
5 Robert E. Goodin, Green Political Theory, (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1992), p. 
80. 
.177 
environmentalists to advocate egalitarian, decentralised political 
structures. 6 As his theory of value is unable to account for political 
preference, which constitutes an important component of a person's value-
orientation, his claim that all green values can be explained by a single 
theory would seem to be undermined. By proposing a variety of motives, 
and acknowledging the degree of influence from other sources, the 
axiology of inherent value is better placed to provide the comprehensive 
explanation for 'green preferences' that Goodin was seeking. 
It may be that other authors emphasise motives not included within this 
axiology, or feel that this simple list is so far removed from the complex 
reality of human psychology as to be useless. In response to the former I 
would suggest that this axiology be considered provisional and tentative. It 
is the product of a single person's attempt to make sense of why the people 
around him value nature, and is inevitably derived from his own 
understanding. Others might suggest alternative motives that are just as 
valid as the four provided here. In response to the latter, I repeat that this is 
a theoretical exercise and not an empirical one. Its usefulness arises 
precisely because the distracting complexities that surround real feelings 
about nature have been generalised to a considerable degree, thereby 
revealing a small number of key motives associated with sensations of 
inherent value. During the course of the following chapters it will become 
apparent that the explanation provided by these four motives, and the 
axiology as a whole, is a rational one, and appears to account for some of 
the major fault lines within environmental ethics. 
6 /bid., pp. 113-15. 
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The first three of these motives are discussed in this chapter, and the 
fourth reserved for the following chapter. However, before we can 
commence describing the four motives it is necessary to first consider the 
contribution of unreflective emotion to the generation of sensations of 
inherent value in nature. This gives rise to an important insight into the 
relationship between motives and cultural influences. 
III. THE EMOTIONAL CONTRIBUTION TO 
INHERENT VALUE 
As discussed in the previous chapter, inherent values in nature have been 
described by various authors as fundamentally emotive. I have argued that 
despite this, it is possible to identify subconscious motives that give rise to 
these emotional sensations of value. However, this is not to say that 
inherent values are entirely the result of subconscious motives; it remains 
that they are partly informed by purely emotive and sensual responses to 
nature. For example, things in nature that command our attention are more 
likely to be the subject of inherent values than those that do not. Consider 
the feelings that would be generated by a boulder the size of a house 
compared with one only as large as a person. The former overwhelms us 
and is more likely to generate sensations of value simply by virtue of its 
size. Similarly, creatures or landscapes that are visually stimulating are 
more likely to attract attention, and sensations of value, than those that are 
relatively dull. Jamie Lorimer describes these characteristics as related to 
the 'nonhuman charisma' and `detectability' of a species, with the latter 
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describing "how easy a species is for a surveyor to encounter, identify, 
differentiate and record."' 
The distinction between these emotional stimuli and the motives that 
comprise the axiology is reflected in the distinction between primordial and 
elaborated emotion described by Dacher Keltner and Jonathan Haidt: 
Primordial emotion refers to the relatively hard-wired pre-cultural 
sets of responses that were shaped by evolution and built into the 
central and peripheral nervous systems of the human species. 
Elaborated emotion refers to the full set of culture-specific norms, 
meanings, and practices that cultures build up around primordial 
emotions. Primordial disgust, for example, refers to the emotional 
rejection of foods that either smell like decay or that are known to 
have come into contact with excrement or other disgust elicitors. 
Elaborated disgust for modern Americans, however, is a much richer 
emotion involving the emotional rejection of things based more on 
ideation than on perceptual qualities (e.g., racists, cheap wine, and 
political corruption). 8 
7 Jamie Lorimer, "What About the Nematodes? Taxonomic Partialities in the 
Scope of UK Biodiversity Conservation," Social & Cultural Geography 7 (2006): 
549. 
8 Dacher Keltner and Jonathan Haidt, "Approaching Awe, a Moral, Spiritual, 
and Aesthetic Emotion," Cognition and Emotion 17 (2003): 306. See also Dacher 
Keltner and Jonathan Haidt, "Social Functions of Emotions," in Emotions: Current 
Issues and Future Directions, ed. Tracy J. Mayne and George A. Bonamio (New 
York: Guilford Press, 2001), pp. 192-213. 
180 
The significance of culture is also apparent in Neil Evemden's explanation 
for why children are more able to experience something akin to 'primordial 
emotion': 
Childhood is the one period in life when one is able to experience a 
world nonculturally, or at least only semiculturally, before the 
interpretations of society and the craving to belong to that society 
foreclose such options. It is a 'window of opportunity' that exists 
before the small human becomes forever a creature of culture and 
must dwell in the domain of abstractions and representations. 9 
From these descriptions it is apparent that the motives comprising the 
axiology are rooted in culture. That the motives are subconscious reflects 
the extent to which culture infuses our lives with meaning. It becomes 
possible to identify similarities between inherent values in nature, and the 
reverence of many people for art, religion, celebrities, and so on. In each 
case, the individual's emotional response when confronted by these 
phenomena is largely 'elaborated emotion', mediated to a considerable 
degree by cultural knowledge. However, some components of the 
experience will have a deeper source. They would appeal on some level to 
the culturally uninitiated, and in this regard 'primordial emotion' is in play. 
This perspective is consistent with Allan Greenbaum's theory of 'nature 
connoiseurship', whereby the tendency to identify intrinsic values in nature 
is a product of cultural learning. In keeping with the description here of 
9 Neil Evemden, The Social Creation of Nature, (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins 
University Press, 1992), pp. 113-14. 
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motives for inherent values that are subconscious and non-instrumental, 
Greenbaum observes that: 
The love of nature does not appear as a fruit of artificial discipline 
from within the system of conditionings which gives rise to it. Quite 
the contrary. The taste for wild nature is an accomplishment, but, as 
an accomplishment of the habitus it is 'second nature' and perceived 
as natural. ° 
Some explanation is required for why theories that provide evolutionary 
or genetic explanations for the human value of nature are not represented 
within the axiology. Three of these theories in particular might be thought 
worthy of inclusion given that they describe subconscious motives for 
valuing nature. One is prospect-refuge theory, which holds that human 
landscape preferences are partly a product of evolution, with open views 
(prospect) and opportunities for protection (refuge) having aesthetic value 
because they enhanced the survival of our distant ancestors." The second 
is the idea that people such as mountaineers engage in dangerous activities 
because of a genetic predisposition to demonstrate their fitness and 
desirability as sexual partners. 12 Because risk increases with distance from 
the security of society, it is likely that such predispositions encourage the 
I° Allan Greenbaum, "Nature Connoisseurship," Environmental Values 14 
(2005): 401. 
" Jay Appleton, The Experience of Landscape, (London: Wiley, 1975) 
12 Geoffrey Miller, The Mating Mind: How Sexual Choice Shaped the Evolution 
of Human Nature, (London: Vintage, 2001), p. 255; Matt Ridley, Nature Via 
Nurture: Genes, Experience and What Makes Us Human, (London: Fourth Estate, 
2003), pp. 239-40. 
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finding of inherent values in nature. The third is the biophilia hypothesis, 
which suggests that the human attraction to nonhuman life and biodiversity 
is an evolved preference resulting from the competitive advantage this 
would have conferred on prehistoric humans. I3 There are two reasons why 
these influences on human values have not been included within the 
axiology. First, they are often applicable to only a narrow range of values 
in nature. Prospect-refuge theory, for example, is limited to explaining the 
value of particular landscape elements. Second, they are open to 
considerable dispute as to whether they actually constitute real influences 
on behaviour, being difficult to conclusively distinguish from cultural 
norms and traditions. In contrast, the motives described below can each be 
linked to a wide range of values in nature, and no claim is made to 
distinguish them from cultural influence. 
IV. MOTIVE ONE - CONNECTION WITH 
NONHUMAN LIFE 
The human experience of connection with nonhuman life is a powerful 
motivation underlying the sensation that aspects of nature are valued for 
themselves. This connection is grounded in our capacity to empathise with 
nonhuman life on the basis of shared experience. Our experience of pain, 
for example, can lead us to condemn cruelty to animals, just as the 
13 J. Baird Callicott, "Non-Anthropocentric Value Theory and Environmental 
Ethics," American Philosophy Quarterly 21(1984): 299-307; Edward 0. Wilson, 
Biophilia: The Human Bond with Other Species, (Cambridge: Harvard University 
Press, 1984); Stephen R. Kellert and Edward 0. Wilson (eds.), The Biophilia 
Hypothesis, (Washington, DC: Island Press, 1993). 
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experience of crying children might cause us to feel sympathy for a magpie 
being pursued relentlessly by her squawking offspring. The experience of 
connection will tend to be felt more strongly for organisms that have 
physical and behavioural characteristics not dissimilar to our own, as is 
apparent from the comparatively greater interest in 'charismatic 
megafauna'. 14 Again, Lorimer's notion of 'nonhuman charisma' is relevant 
here. Gordon Burghardt and Harold Herzog provide an extensive list of 
animal characteristics that elicit favourable responses in humans. In 
addition to human-like features and behaviour they include juvenile 
features and behaviour (cuteness), large size, old age, rarity, intelligence, 
behavioural variability between individuals (personality), and the capacity 
to bond with humans (zoomorphism). 15 
This metaphorical connection is commonly referred to as 
anthropomorphism, which entails the projection of human qualities onto 
nonhuman entities. 16 It could reasonably be argued that the idea of animal 
rights - the formal extension of moral considerability to animals — has its 
basis in anthropomorphism, particularly with regard to the shared 
experience of pain. 17 This is certainly the impression conveyed in Peter 
14 Stephen R. Kellert, The Value of Life: Biological Diversity and Human 
Society, (Washington, DC: Shearwater, 1996), pp. 62, 102, 127-128. 
15 Gordon M. Burghardt and Harold A. Herzog, "Animals, Evolution, and 
Ethics," in Perceptions of Animals in American Culture, ed. R.J. Hoage 
(Washington, DC: Smithsonian Institution Press, 1989), pp. 129-51. 
16 David B. Morton, Gordon M. Burghardt and Jane A. Smith, "Critical 
Anthropomorphism, Animal Suffering, and the Ecological Context," The Hastings 
Center Report 20(1990): 13-19. 
17 This is obversely equivalent to Lawrence C. Becker's observation that 
`speciesism' results in part from the greater 'social distance' that exists between 
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Singer's review of the more sympathetic attitudes toward animals that 
began to manifest during the eighteenth century. Singer himself is 
dismissive of the notion that moral considerability should be grounded in 
sentiment and emotion," yet this perspective denies the influence of 
emotional response on moral decisions. As observed by Kate Rawles: 
Very many people, on learning that nesting ducks are shot at their 
most vulnerable, or that the drays of grey squirrels are smashed and 
their kittens stamped on, and that these actions are performed, not by 
vandals but conservationists, experience a range of emotions, often 
powerful ones. Acknowledging and reflecting on these emotions 
seems to me to constitute a key part of developing an ethical 
response to such actions. ° 
As explained by James Serpell, "anthropomorphism appears to have its 
roots in the human capacity for so-called 'reflexive consciousness' — that 
is, the ability to use self-knowledge, knowledge of what it is like to be a 
person, to understanding and anticipate the behavior of others." 2° Being 
grounded in human experience, anthropomorphism is therefore an 
unsatisfactory foundation for those who identify values in nature that are 
entirely independent of human valuers, or which are apparent only to those 
ourselves and most nonhuman organisms: See Becker, "The Priority of Human 
Interests," in Ethics and Animals, ed. Harlan B. Miller and William H. Williams 
(Clifton: Humana Press, 1983), pp. 225-242. 
18 Peter Singer, Animal Liberation, second edition, (London: Pimlico, 1995), p. 
243. 
19 Rawles, "Biological Diversity," p. 203. 
2° James A. Serpell, "Anthropomorphism and Anthropomorphic Selection: 
Beyond the 'Cute Response'," Society and Animals 11 (2003): 84. 
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with sufficient scientific Imowledge. 21 However, expanded notions of 
human connection with nature have proved influential within 
environmental ethics. Deep ecology (and its more recent formulation as 
transpersonal ecology) describes an ethic of respect for nature that arises as 
a consequence of an expanded human capacity for identification with 
others to encompass all life. 22 Leopold and Callicott's land ethic arises 
from the recognition of our dependency on the integrity of natural 
ecosystems. Callicott maintains that "a universal ecological literacy would 
trigger sympathy and fellow-feeling for fellow-members of the biotic 
community and feelings of loyalty and patriotic regard for the community 
as a whole..."23 Deep ecology and the land ethic move beyond 
anthropomorphism to sources of connection with nature that are less 
anthropocentric, although whether they can be deemed entirely non-
anthropocentric seems unlikely. 
Randall Lockwood distinguishes five categories of anthropomorphism 
that include a clear distinction between the first four, which reflect a 
human-centred perspective, and include such things as the dressing of 
animals in human clothes and the allegorical use of animals in films such 
21 Rawles, "Biological Diversity," pp. 210-13. 
22 e Naess (translated by David Rothenberg), Ecology, Community and 
Lifestyle, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989), pp. 171-76; Warwick 
Fox, Toward a Transpersonal Ecology: Developing New Foundations for 
Environmentalism, (Foxhole: Resurgence, 1995), pp. 249-52; Roderick Nash, The 
Rights of Nature: A History of Environmental Ethics, (Madison: University of 
Wisconsin Press, 1989), pp. 63-74. 
23 j Baird Callicott, "Introduction," in Environmental Philosophy: From 
Animal Rights to Radical Ecology, second edition, ed. Michael E. Zimmerman 
(Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall, 1998), p. 14. 
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as Animal Farm, and the fifth, which describes a more concerted effort to 
understand the nonhuman experience. This last category he describes as 
'applied anthropomorphism', which is: 
the use of our own personal perspective on what it's like to be a 
living being to suggest ideas about what it is like to be some other 
being of either our own or some other species. This process is a form 
of projection, and it is a process that makes our life on earth as social 
beings possible... the essence of consciousness is using self-
knowledge to predict the behavior of others. 24 
Using a different approach, the psychologist Peter Kahn has identified two 
perspectives that he maintains are distinct from anthropomorphism in being 
fundamentally biocentric in outlook: isomorphism and transmorphism. 
Whereas anthropomorphism projects human qualities directly onto nature, 
"in isomorphic reasoning a moral feature (such as freedom) is deemed 
important to both nature and humans, and on that basis a moral principle 
(such as protecting freedom) is applied equally to both nature and 
humans "25 Transmorphism involves sympathising with nonhuman 
organisms on the basis of a shared need that does not manifest as a shared 
physical characteristic, an example being the need we share with fish to 
breathe oxygen, despite the manner in which we do so being quite 
24  Randall Lockwood, "Anthropomorphism Is Not a Four-Letter Word," in 
Perceptions of Animals in American Culture, ed. R.J. Hoage (Washington, DC: 
Smithsonian Institution Press, 1989), p. 49. 
25 p H. Kahn, "The Development of Environmental Moral Identity," in 
Identity and the Natural Environment: The Psychological Significance of Nature, 
ed. Susan Clayton and Susan Opotow (Cambri dge: The MIT Press, 2003), p. 118. 
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different Kahn describes these perspectives as biocentric because, in 
response to survey questions, instances of isomorphic and transmorphic 
identification appear to hold human and nonhuman needs as morally 
equivalent.26 
Kahn makes it clear that feelings of identification with nature are not 
limited to organisms that are similar in appearance and behaviour to 
humans, but can extend to fish and other things with which we share 
'functional properties'. Gebhard, Nevers and Billmann-Mahecha highlight 
the importance of scientific knowledge in informing transmorphic 
reasoning: 
there are many natural objects that do not lend themselves well to 
anthropomorphic interpretation — grass, fish, sand dunes, and 
complex and more abstract objects such as ecosystems and 
species... These objects cannot be readily grasped by simple 
analogies to human experience.., objective knowledge based on 
information from other sources and intersubjectivity are required for 
a more thorough understanding of otherness. 27 
By enabling identification to be founded on shared qualities that are 
• relatively abstract, it becomes possible that any quality shared by living 
organisms might provide a basis for identification. It seems that the 
principal limiting factors are that the quality be deemed significant for 
26 m •a p . Ibid. , 	 117. 
27 Ulrich Gebhard, Patricia Nevers and Elfriede Billmann-Mahecha, 
"Moralizing Trees: Anthropomorphism and Identity in Children's Relationships to 
Nature," in Identity and the Natural Environment, ed. Clayton and Opotow, p. 106. 
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some reason, and that the subject (or object) of identification be considered 
in a positive light. 
Other grounds for feelings of connection with nature are provided by 
Fox, who describes three 'bases of identification', being personal, 
ontological and cosmological. He suggests that personally based 
identification is the most common form, and arises through personal 
involvement with other entities, from family members to football clubs. As 
with the 'personal values' mentioned in the previous chapter, this source of 
identification cannot be easily generalised beyond the individual. 
Ontologically based identification arises from the profound realisation of 
the existence of other entities, while cosmologically based identification 
arises from a similarly profound realisation that all entities, including 
ourselves, form part of a greater unity. 28 The latter two bases of 
identification are more easily generalised to the whole of nature, and Fox 
notes that they are 'more transpersonal' than personally based 
identification.29 Milton suggests that "Fox's analysis of identification is 
illuminating but incomplete", and she suggests two additional bases of 
identification: identity-based identification, and person-based 
identification. The former is derived from "the understanding that we and 
the other entity are of the same substance and can be transformed into one 
another", while the latter is grounded in "a sense of similarity with 
something", particularly a shared sense of `personhood'." As for 
anthropomorphism and transmorphism, these various bases of 
pp. 249-58. 
29 Ibid., p. 250. 
3° Milton, Loving Nature, p. 79. 
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identification are derived from the identification of shared qualities. For the 
task at hand, the categories described by Fox and Milton are more 
informative than the categories of Kahn, but in some respects provide too 
much detail. The ontological, cosmological, and identity bases of 
identification are extremely similar in being grounded in the common 
essence of all things. In this regard they are more akin to transmorphism 
than anthropomorphism. 
For environmentalism, one of the most influential shared qualities of 
recent decades is that of ecological interdependence. As noted above, the 
land ethic holds this quality to provide the foundation for human 
identification with nature, and much the same can be said for deep 
ecology. 31 The primary reason why this quality should be considered 
significant is that it emphasises the dependence of species and ecosystems, 
including humans, on other life forms. Not only does this provide an 
important source of feelings of connection, but it links to instrumental 
reasons for valuing nature. 32 An important consequence of the key role 
played by ecological knowledge is that it shifts the focus of identification 
from individual organisms to categories of organism (species), and 
collective entities (ecosystems). The exception is in cases where a species 
has declined to the point where each breeding individual has significance, 
31 Peter Hay, Main Currents in Western Environmental Thought, (Sydney: 
UNSW Press, 2002), pp. 47-48. 
32 However, it should be noted that there do exist ecosystems that essentially 
share no ecological connection with humans, such as the `chemosynthetic' 
organisms that cluster around deep-sea volcanic vents in the Arctic Ocean. In such 
cases, this source of value is irrelevant. See C.L. Van Dover, C.R. German, K.G. 
Speer, L.M. Parson and R.C. Vrijenhoek, "Evolution and Biogeography of Deep-
Sea Vent and Seep Invertebrates," Science 295 (2002): 1253-57. 
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although even here the welfare of the individual may be compromised by 
attempts to have them breed in captivity. 33 The ecological emphasis also 
shifts the focus of identification from all organisms to those species 
necessary for the maintenance of ecosystem functioning. For example, the 
anticipated impacts on ecosystem functioning of non-native species 
introductions, and native species extinctions, encourage a tendency for 
feelings of identification to favour native species, particularly rare native 
species, over exotic species. This tendency is exemplified by the 
suggestion that surfaced in the popular magazine, Nature Australia, that 
each child be assigned a `biodiversity identity' at birth, consisting of three 
native species, to increase the depth of personal connection felt for native 
flora and fauna. 34 In contrast, non-native species are excoriated as 
'invaders' and `enemies'. 35 The focus on species and ecosystems, the 
resulting ambivalence regarding the fate of individuals (at least in the 
wild), particularly those individuals that Comprise a threatening species, 
has led to conflict with those whose emphasis is on other forms of 
identification that remain focused on the individual. Such conflict is 
33 See Robert Vrijenhoek, "Natural Processes, Individuals, and Units of 
Conservation," in Ethics on the Ark: Zoos, Animal Welfare, and Wildlife 
Conservation, ed. Bryan G. Norton, Michael Hutchins, Elizabeth F. Stevens and 
Terry L. Maple (Washington, DC: Smithsonian Institution Press, 1995), pp. 88-89. 
34 Sarah Ryan, "What's Your Biodiversity Identity?" Nature Australia, Autumn 
2004: 84. 
35 Matthew K. Chew and Manfred D. Laubiclaler, "Natural Enemies — Metaphor 
or Misconception?" Science 301 (2003): 52-53; Brendon M.H. Larson, "The War 
of the Roses: Demilitarizing Invasion Biology," Frontiers in Ecology and the 
Environment 3 (2005): 495-500. An Australian government initiative launched in 
2005 was entitled the 'Defeating the Weed Menace Programme'. 
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characterised by the debate between animal rights advocates and ecocentric 
philosophers, discussed in chapter ten. 
Other abstract qualities shared with natural entities that provide 
important targets for human feelings of identification include autonomy, or 
freedom, and sharing a common origin or 'creator'. The former can result 
in our identification with nonhuman life on the basis of shared autonomy 
and wildness, while the latter might cause us to identify with all aspects of 
the universe, and the universe itself, as embodiments of divine creation. 
The significance of these shared qualities will become clear during the 
discussion of motives three and four below. Although this first motive 
overlaps with the other motives when particular shared qualities are 
considered, it needs to be emphasised that the first motive is most 
particularly associated with the shared experience of pleasure, pain, and the 
condition of being alive, these being the least abstract of the shared 
qualities. 
A final issue to consider here is the degree to which we are actually 
capable of identifying with nonhuman life. The experience of connection 
or identification with nature is essentially one-sided, especially when the. 
targets of our feelings are not living, or are collective entities, such as 
species and ecosystems, rather than individual organisms. The possibility 
therefore arises that projections from our own experience may be 
misguided, in so far as we do not have an accurate understanding of the 
desires of other life forms. 
There is debate among scientists as to the validity of looking to 
ourselves in order to understand animal behaviour and thought processes. 
Frans de Waal has coined the term `anthropodenial' to describe the 
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tendency among some researchers to overlook similarities for fear of 
anthropomorphising; a tendency he believes is limiting.36 Clive Wynne 
presents the opposing point of view; that anthropomorphism must be 
employed cautiously given the great differences that do exist between 
human and non-human consciousness. 37 Christopher Belshaw raises similar 
concerns: 
Even while not wanting to deny that fish feel pain, do we know how 
to begin comparing the pain of fish with that of birds? How is ten 
minutes of pain for a rabbit, which has a relatively short life, to be 
weighed against an equal pain of the same duration for a parrot or 
tortoise? What sorts of pleasures do swallows get from their low-
level aeronautics?... Animals are so very different from us as to 
make any deep or detailed understanding of their mental lives quite 
impossible. 38 
It seems wholly implausible to suppose that oysters, or hens, or fish 
have a sense of their own future, or an emotional life... Consider the 
sheep of the field. They can certainly seem to be distressed when 
their lambs are taken away. But nothing seems clearly to suggest that 
36 F 	B.M. de Waal, "Anthropomorphism and Anthropodenial: Consistency 
in our Thinking About Humans and Other Animals," Philosophical Topics 27 
(1999): 255-280. 
37 Clive D.L. Wynne, "The Perils of Anthropomorphism," Nature 428 (2004): 
606. 
38 Christopher Belshaw, Environmental Philosophy: Reason, Nature and 
Human Concern, (Chesham: Acumen, 2001), p. 98. 
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they have a sense of the future, memories of the past, or much that 
we might describe as an emotional life. 39 
But the critical question is, can we imagine what pain feels like to a 
creature that cannot know what it feels like to itself? Can we 
imagine pain in creatures that are not self-conscious?4° 
It emerges that many of the 'feelings' we attribute to nonhuman life might 
be purely metaphorical. However, it is questionable whether an observation 
like this, or scientific findings that suggest a creature's apparent feelings 
could differ considerably from their actual feelings, would greatly 
influence the sensations of value attributed to nature resulting from 
anthropomorphic identification. Our persistent capacity to attribute feelings 
even to non-sentient life suggests that the sensation of identification can 
persist even when we are aware of the metaphorical nature of the 
experience. The delusion that this entails is innocent enough in most 
instances, but must be considered with a more critical eye when major 
changes in public policy are suggested, such as the claim that non-human 
organisms or non-sentient matter should be provided with legal or 
democratic representation. 4I In such instances it seems that greater weight 
ought to be accorded to the actual experience of the non-human, where this 
39 Ibid., pp. 103-104. 
40 ibid.,  p. 111. 
41 For discussion of such suggestions see Roderick Nash, The Rights of Nature: 
A History of Environmental Ethics, (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 
1989), pp. 127-31; Christopher D. Stone, Should Trees Have Standing? And Other 
Essays on Law, Morals and the Environment, (Dobbs Ferry: Oceans Publications, 
1996), p. 165; Robyn Eckersley, The Green State: Rethinking Democracy and 
Sovereignty, (Cambridge: MIT Press, 2004), pp. 123-135. 
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can be reliably determined, rather than our understanding of this 
experience as informed by anthropomorphism and the values that exert 
their influence over our feelings of connection and identification. 
V. MOTIVE TWO - INTELLECTUAL INTEREST IN 
NATURE 
This motive describes the human capacity to be interested in nonhuman 
life, natural processes and nonliving things, and the resulting desire to 
protect these things. This interest includes the passive curiosity that might 
inspire someone to watch a nature documentary, but is largely concerned 
with the active desire to accumulate knowledge about nature. Many 
instrumental reasons are available for why such knowledge might be 
sought, including the economic benefits of scientific research, the prestige 
associated with making scientific discoveries, the social interaction that can 
come with such activities, and the hope that the work will contribute to our 
ability to manage nature, either for our own benefit or for the benefit of 
valued aspects of nature. However, it is apparent that the accumulation of 
knowledge about nature can also be valued as an end in itself. Nature, to 
those so inclined, is infinitely interesting. This point was considered in a 
slightly different context in chapter five, where the capacity of biodiversity 
to inspire intellectual interest was described as an important source of its 
value. It is apparent that the primary focus of this motive is actually 
knowledge about nature rather than nature itself. Yet because the former is 
difficult to extricate from the latter, it seems reasonable to describe 
intellectual interest in nature, and the associated desire to accumulate 
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knowledge about nature, as a significant underlying motive for identifying 
inherent value in nature. 
In chapter five a number of prominent conservation biologists were cited 
who likened their interest in nature to that associated with the practice of 
• collecting. While it is not suggested here that intellectual interest in nature 
•is motivated by the same psychological factors associated with the impulse 
to collect things, 42 intellectual interest in nature can give rise to a similar 
desire to preserve the subjects of interest, and in this regard the two are 
analogous. As these conservation biologists imply, an interest in anything, 
from antique automobiles to renaissance art, will give rise to a passionate 
desire to protect these things from destruction. The analogy is strained 
somewhat by the tendency of conservation biologists to express their 
concern not for the welfare of particular individual organisms, but for rare 
species and ecosystems. A better analogy is provided by endangered 
languages, which are those spoken only by a small and dwindling number 
of people. A portion of the concern expressed for this phenomenon is 
motivated by the loss of the language itself, rather than by the well-being 
of the people who speak it. 43 
Another manifestation of this motive as it applies to nature is the 
intellectual interest in rocks, landforms, tectonic processes, and other 
geological phenomena. It has been widely claimed that `geodiversity' has a 
42 See, for example, William D. McIntosh and Brandon Schmeichel, "Collectors 
and Collecting: A Social Psychological Perspective," Leisure Sciences 26 (2004): 
85-97. 
43 See the website of the UNESCO Endangered Languages Programme 
(http://www.unesco.org/culture/en/endangerecllanguages).  
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subjective 'existence' or 'intrinsic' value." Charles Richardson makes the 
provocative suggestion that because life without consciousness is merely a 
'complex physical process', then complex, non-biological processes are as 
deserving of value as non-conscious life. If speciation has intrinsic value 
then why not erosion?'" Although thought provoking, this rhetorical 
question fails to acknowledge the additional complexity, and resulting 
potential to inspire our interest, of living systems, not to mention the 
increased likelihood that we will identify with, and feel a sense of moral 
responsibility for living rather than nonliving nature. In any event, it 
remains entirely possible that nonliving natural processes and entities, from 
global weather systems to other planets, can be found to have inherent 
value as a result of the intellectual interest they inspire. 
In the previous section it was suggested that we have a tendency to 
experience a sense of connection with other living things on the basis of 
shared qualities that are for some reason deemed significant. Of the three 
examples of shared qualities, ecological interdependence is particularly 
relevant for the motive of intellectual interest. Because this motive gives 
rise to a deep concern for the maintenance of biocliversity, ecological 
interdependence is imbued with significance as it emphasises the 
44 Murray Gray, Geodiversity: Valuing and Conserving Abiotic Nature, 
(Chichester John Wiley & Sons, 2004), pp. 68 -69; Kevin Kiernan, Conserving 
Geodiversity and Geoheritage: The Conservation of Glacial Landforms, (Hobart: 
Forest Practices Unit, 1996), pp. 14-15. See also the website of The 
GeoConservalion Commission of the Geological Society of London 
(http://www.geoconservation.com). 
45 Charles Richardson, "Some Philosophical Aspects of Biodiversity," in The 
Price of Preservation, ed. Andrew Chisholm and Alan Moran (Melbourne: 
Tasman Institute, 1993), p. 70. 
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dependence of rare species and ecosystems on other life forms, including 
ourselves. However, this is not the only source of connection relevant to 
the motive of intellectual interest. As observed by the conservation 
biologist, Michael Soule, "most biologists love plants or animals — they 
love different ones. Some like lizards, some like grasses. But there's a 
certain affinity we have and even identification we have with the objects of 
our study". 46 This suggests that simply acquiring knowledge about an 
aspect of nature can inspire feelings of connection. Fred Koontz also 
conveys the impression that these feelings of connection go hand-in-hand 
with intellectual interest: 
Many zoo biologists become interested in animals at a young age, 
and this early avocation often fosters a naturalistic attitude toward 
animals. The primary characteristic of this point of view is a strong 
interest and affection for the outdoors and wildlife... Observation 
and personal involvement with wildlife are also the key to the 
naturalistic perspective. For many of these future zoo biologists, 
animals become living objects to identify, compare, and catalog. 
Often their curiosity leads them to collect live specimens to bring 
home for closer study, frequently to the dismay of their parents. 47 
46 David Talcacs, The Idea of Biodiversity: Philosophies of Paradise, 
.(Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1996), p. 139. 
47 Fred Koontz, "Wild Animal Acquisition Ethics for Zoo Biologists," in Ethics 
on the Ark: Zoos, Animal Welfare, and Wildlife Conservation, ed. Bryan G. 
Norton, Michael Hutchins, Elizabeth F. Stevens and Terry L. Maple (Washington, 
DC: Smithsonian Institution Press, 1995), p. 129. 
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However, it remains apparent that such feelings of connection are of a 
different order to those associated with motive one. Whereas the latter 
relate to the shared experience of pleasure, pain, and the condition of being 
alive, the former are firmly grounded in knowledge and less likely to 
inspire concern for individual organisms. 
VI. MOTIVE THREE - RESPECT FOR THE LARGER 
CONTEXT 
The review of the value of naturalness presented in chapter six indicated 
that a number of authors, notably Goodin, have linked this value with a 
human tendency to seek some larger context within which our lives are 
embedded. In this way, the larger context provides meaning and purpose to 
life. In Western societies, the larger context has for many centuries been 
provided by various interpretations of the Christian religion, with God the 
ultimate source of earthly meaning. However, it has been suggested that 
nature is also capable of providing this larger context. Nature can be seen 
to encompass humanity in every way. The history of civilisation represents 
a small blip compared with the age of the universe or the time since life 
first appeared on Earth. The human race will almost certainly disappear 
long before life is finally extinguished. Despite our technological advances, 
humans are still subject to the laws of nature and regularly assailed by 
natural phenomena. Nature is also indifferent to human goals, being 
incapable of abstract reasoning and aloof to human concems. 48 
48 Paul Wapner, "The Sovereignty of Nature? Environmental Protection in a 
Postmodern Age," International Studies Quarterly 46(2002): 171. 
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One path to conceptualising nature as representing the larger context is 
to equate nature with God. Max Oelschlaeger observes that the all-
encompassing influence of nature has long been associated with human 
spirituality, having been a continuous feature of civilisation from the Great 
Mother (Magna Mater) of the Paleolithic age to post-Enlightenment 
resistance to mechanistic metaphors for nature.' As noted by Roderick 
Nash, for John Muir and Henry Thoreau, "the basis of respect for nature 
was to recognize it as part of the created community to which humans also 
belonged. God permeated Muir's environment. Not only animals, but 
plants... and even rocks and water were 'sparks of the divine soul' ." 5° 
Warwick Fox notes that such reverence is compatible with the attribution 
of intrinsic value to nature on the basis of 'cosmic purpose': 
some or all nonhuman entities are considered to be morally 
considerable by virtue of the fact that they in some sense embody or 
are expressive of some kind of cosmic interest. These approaches 
generally rely upon views about the ultimate ends of evolution or the 
nature of God or God's purposes.5I 
Bill McKibben, in his controversial book The End of Nature, also considers 
God to be relevant to the value of nature as a manifestation of forces larger 
than humanity. He suggests that "by domesticating the earth, even though 
we've done it badly, we've domesticated all that lives on it... And there is 
49 Max Oelschlaeger, The Idea of Wilderness: From Prehistory to the Age of 
Ecology, (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1991). 
5° Roderick Nash, The Rights ofNature: A History of Environmental Ethics, 
(Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1989), p. 39. 
51 Fox, Toward a Transpersonal Ecology, p. 179. 
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nobody above us. God, who may or may not be acting in many other ways, 
is not controlling the earth."52 This is a problem, he explains, because "we 
are used to the idea that something larger than us and not of our own 
making surrounds us, that there is a world of man and a world of nature. 
And we cling to that idea in part because it makes that world of men easier 
to deal with."53 This he later associates with a profound feeling of 
loneliness.54 
However, it is not necessary that nature's capacity to provide a larger 
context for human lives be tied to the existence of divine powers. As 
observed by Ronald Dworkin: 
some conservationists who do not think of themselves as religious 
may nevertheless hold a powerful, intuitive conviction that nature is 
itself alive, a mysterious, inexorable force unifying all life in Life 
itself... People with either of these views — the conventionally 
religious one or some version of the idea that nature itself is 
purposive — believe that destroying a species is wrong because it 
wastes an important and creative achievement of God or the 
procreant world. They mean that we should regret the loss of a 
species just as — though to a much greater degree than — we would 
52 Bill McKibben, The End of Nature, (Landon: Viking, 1990), P.  78. 
53 Ibid., p. 79. 
54 Ibid., p. 83. 
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regret the foundering of some project on which we or others had 
long labored. 55 
Goodin seeks to distance his green theory of value from its theological 
potential because of the limitations it might impose on the theory, such as 
being too closely associated with New-Age spirituality. 56 Simon Hailwood 
is wary of such connections because it implies that the ultimate source of 
the value of otherness is God, which is an unsuitable basis for value in so 
far as it suggests that non-believers cannot value this quality in nature. 57 
This motive may also give rise to a sense of connection with nature on 
the basis of shared membership of a larger context. However, as suggested 
by the ontological, cosmological, and identity bases of identification 
mentioned above, this sense of connection can take a variety of forms. If 
the larger context is believed to be defined by ecological relationships, then 
this will provide the basis for identification, encouraging a focus on native 
species and ecosystems. If the larger context is believed to be defined 
ultimately by God or a more secular reverence for life in general, then the 
sense of connection with nature is likely to accord greater significance to 
individual organisms while remaining informed by an awareness of 
ecological relationships. If the larger context is defined by a view of nature 
as independent of humanity, as suggested by Goodin, then the autonomy 
and freedom of nature will provide the basis for identification. 
55 Ronald Dworkin, Life's Dominion: An Argument About Abortion and 
Euthanasia, (London: HarperCollins, 1993), p. 79. 
56 Goodin, Green Political Theory, pp. 39-40. 
57 Simon Hailwood, How To Be a Green Liberal: Nature, Value and Liberal 
Philosophy, (Chesham: Acumen, 2004), pp. 49-50. 
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Before proceeding it is worth commenting on the source of nature's 
spiritual significance. Despite the obvious spiritual implications of this 
third motive, the other motives can have similar implications. For example, 
Carolyn Merchant describes as 'spiritual ecology' the practice of 'the 
council of all beings', which is intended to "bring to consciousness the 
natural history of the planet and convey an authority to act on its behalf. 
Identification with the earth and its beings empowers each person and 
removes doubts and hesitations."58 Further, some people find nature 
intellectually interesting because they wish to explore the larger context, or 
what is perceived as the work of God. David Talcacs suggests that for some 
scientists "getting to know biodiversity better takes the place of getting to 
know God better."59 A similar cross-over can be found between respect for 
the larger context and the fourth motive, described in the next chapter. In 
these various interactions between motives it is impossible to say which is 
dominant or which precedes the other. Such diversity is reflected in the 
variety of views on spirituality recorded by Barbara McDonald during a 
study of environmental activitists.6° It becomes increasingly apparent that 
Weston's reference to an 'ecology of values' is particularly apt. 
38 Carolyn Merchant, Radical Ecology: The Search for a Livable World, 
(London: Routledge, 1992), p. 111. 
• 	59 David Takacs, The Idea of Biodiversity: Philosophies of Paradise, 
(Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1996), p. 270. See also Bron R. 
Taylor, "Conservation Biology," in The Encyclopedia of Religion and Nature, ed. 
Bron R. Taylor (London: Thoemmes Continuum, 2005). Available from the 
website of the International Society for the Study of Religion, Nature, and Culture 
(http://www.religionandnature.com/ern/sample.htm).  
6° Barbara McDonald, "The Soul of Environmental Activists," International 
Journal of Wilderness 9(2003): 14-17. 
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VII. CONCLUSION 
This chapter has described three of the four motives underlying our 
capacity to identify inherent values in nature. These motives have been 
identified as manifestations of cultural influence, which are found within 
our subconscious, interacting with each other, with our instrumental 
concerns, with our raw emotional responses to nature, and with values 
derived from other sources. Associated with each motive are feelings of 
identification with nature, and it is apparent that such feelings constitute 
one of the most significant positive emotional responses to nature. The next 
chapter is devoted to the fourth and final motivation associated with 
inherent value: dissatisfaction with the abstractions of modern society. 
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Chapter Nine 
DISSATISFACTION WITH THE 
ABSTRACTIONS OF MODERN SOCIETY 
The land has been hurt. Misuse is not to be excused, and its ill effects will 
long be felt. But nature will not be eliminated... Rain, moss, and time 
apply their healing bandage, and the injured land at last recovers. 
Robert Michael Pyle (1996) 1 
Any satisfactory philosophy of nature... must recognize: 1. That natural 
processes go on in their own way, in a manner indifferent to human 
interests and by no means incompatible with man's total disappearance 
from the face of the earth. 
John Passmore (1975)2 
Robert Michael Pyle, Wintergreen: Listening to the Land's Heart, (New York: 
Houghton Mifflin, 1996), p. 281. 
2 John Passmore, "Attitudes to Nature," in Nature and Conduct, ed. R.S. Peters 
(New York: St Martin's Press, 1975), p. 259. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 3 
This chapter considers the fourth motive for the inherent value of nature, 
being "dissatisfaction with the abstractions of modern society." While the 
other motives are also complex (particularly motive one), the relationship 
between them and the associated sensations of value are more 
straightforward. That these motives should provide a rationale for valuing 
nature was not in dispute. For motive four the situation is not so 
straightforward, and for this reason it has been assigned its own chapter. 
H. NATURALNESS REVISITED 
Toward the end of chapter six, the discussion turned to why natural 
processes are valued. A review of the literature on this question was 
conducted, with the most prevalent explanation being that the 
independence of nature is indicative of forces larger than humanity, which 
might include divine presence of some sort. Many authors believe that the 
value of wild nature is grounded in this symbolic quality. This explanation 
3 Some of the material included in this chapter was first aired in a paper 
delivered by the author to the Ecopolitics XVI conference, held at Griffith 
University in Brisbane, Australia, between July 4 and 6, 2005. The paper was 
subsequently published in the inaugural issue of the Griffith Journal of the 
Environment, some sections of which are revisited in a paper that has been 
accepted for publication in the Journal of Agricultural and Environmental Ethics. 
See Ben Ridder, "Reorienting Ecocentrism to Nature-Inspired-Autonomy," 
Griffith Journal of the Environment 1 (2005): 
http://www.gaedu.au/faculty/ens/gje; Ben Ridder, "An Exploration of the Value 
of Naturalness and Wild Nature," Journal of Agricultural and Environmental 
Ethics: in press. 
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is reflected in the third motive, 'respect for the larger context', described in 
the previous chapter. However, this motive does not constitute a complete 
explanation. As suggested in chapter six, it seems unlikely that all those 
who value naturalness are seeking to define their lives with respect to some 
larger context. Further, it is not clear why nature should be chosen over 
other things capable of providing a larger context. 
Another explanation for the value attributed to the autonomy of nature 
was that the appropriate moral stance toward nature demanded respect for 
its autonomy. This explanation is problematic because it requires that the 
moral considerability of nature be already established. The position taken 
here is that the tendency to attribute moral considerability to nonhuman life 
can be explained, at least in part, with reference to the four motives under 
investigation, rather than being entirely independent of human motivations. 
In the previous chapter, two motives additional to 'respect for the larger 
context' were identified that might be capable of explaining why natural 
processes are valued. Motive one, describing the experience of connection 
with nonhuman life, is capable of inspiring respect for the autonomy of 
nature, insofar as it might lead us to oppose actions that restrict the 
freedom of nonhuman entities. However, a critical inconsistency is 
apparent between this motive and the value of naturalness. By respecting 
nature's autonomy, one is opposed to intervening in natural processes, even 
if this lack of action is understood to result in loss of life. This is hardly the 
sort of behaviour that one would expect from those motivated by 
empathetic concern for the welfare of nonhuman entities. The second 
motive, describing intellectual interest in nature, might also be thought 
capable of inspiring respect for the autonomy of nature. However, this 
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motive gives rise to the same inconsistency arising from the first. People 
motivated primarily by their intellectual interest in nature would respond to 
threats to valued aspects of nature by seeking to eliminate the threats. 
Unless their particular interest was natural processes themselves it seems 
unlikely they would feel any qualms about intervening in such processes to 
achieve this protective end. Hence, any respect for nature's autonomy is 
usurped by concern for the welfare of nonhuman life or collective entities 
such as species and ecosystems. 
Given the unsatisfactory explanations for the value of naturalness 
provided by these two motives, and because motive three has already been 
identified as insufficient in this regard, it is left to the final motive to fill 
the gap. This last explanation for the inherent value of nature emerges from 
the connection, identified in chapter six, between naturalness and human 
autonomy. To recap, it was argued that our perception of naturalness in any 
given situation is strongly influenced by our perception of the influence of 
abstract instrumentalism. This insight gives rise to the possibility that 
naturalness is valued because the forces characteristic of abstract 
instrumentalism, and their threat to individual autonomy, are not valued. 
III. MOTIVE FOUR- DISSATISFACTION WITH 
THE ABSTRACTIONS OF MODERN SOCIETY 
A frequent topic of discussion within environmental texts are processes 
characteristic of contemporary society that alienate the individual. 
Frequently mentioned are such things as bureaucracy, modern technology, 
economically-oriented decision making, and corporate greed, all of which 
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reflect the application of what has been termed 'instrumentalism' or 
'instrumental rationality'. Instrumentalism entails activity directed toward 
maximising the achievement of precise goals in a mechanistic fashion. 
These goals invariably include economic return and productivity, and 
rarely include such human qualities as morality, understanding and 
creativity.4  For the individual, the priorities generated by these goals are 
likely to appear abstract relative to their own priorities, insofar as they 
reflect goals and values that are not one's own. The individual can be said 
to be autonomous provided that their decisions — to buy products, vote for 
politicians, or barrack for sporting teams, for example — are largely 
• directed by their own goals and values, rather than goals and values 
imposed on them by external influences. 
In contemporary western societies, the success of most organisations 
depends to some extent on providing products or services that people want, 
and in this regard they do not infiinge on the autonomy of the individual. 
However, because corporate and bureaucratic activities also reflect goals 
that are abstract from the perspective of the individual — including 
corporate profit, political ambition, and/or minimising legal liability — 
individual autonomy is to some extent undermined simply by living in a 
modern community. Some loss of autonomy is effectively unavoidable in 
any society that demonstrates a minimum degree of integration, as the 
decisions taken by the central authority, for example, or by companies 
seeking to maximise sales, will at best represent a distillation of the 
majority view, and at worst will reflect the interests of the privileged few. 
John Ralston Saul, On Equilibrium, (Camberwell: Penguin, 2002) 
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In either situation there will be many individuals for whom such decisions 
are abstract in their intents and effects. If these people are aware of the 
disparity between their own goals and those they implicitly support through 
participation in society, and if they place a high enough value on their own 
autonomy, they may subsequently desire some degree of societal change, a 
greater degree of independence from broader society, or both. 
There are many for whom instrumentalism poses no great concern. They 
are generally satisfied with the progress of their lives. But there remains a 
significant proportion of the population who believe that society would be 
improved if decision making better reflected the goals that they consider to 
be important. Given the difficulty the individual faces in bringing about 
such a change, a common response to such dissatisfaction is apathy. Others 
respond more actively, either through engagement with decision making 
processes in order to influence them, or by distancing themselves from 
those aspects of society they cannot countenance. Whichever of these three 
responses characterises an individual, the possibility exists that their 
dissatisfaction with society gives rise to a corresponding concern for nature 
on the basis of its autonomy. 
IV. NATURE AS A COUNTERPOINT TO SOCIETY 
That a desire for autonomy from the abstractions of contemporary 
society might form the basis of inherent values in nature requires that 
nature have qualities that resonate with and fulfill this desire. These 
qualities can be summed up by the statement that nature can function as a 
counterpoint to society. Although, as we will see, some argue that this 
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understanding of nature should be resisted, it remains one that is easily 
reached and, moreover, one that is a profound source of inherent value. 
The qualities of nature that encourage this view of nature include the 
following: 
1) By definition, 'natural' is distinct from 'artificial'. 
2) Nature provides an outlet for physical escape from society. 
3) Nature is symbolic of autonomy from society. 
4) Nature is a victim of society. 
As discussed in chapter six, 'naturalness' is defined by the absence of 
human intervention, and particularly those activities directed by abstract 
instrumentalism. Consequently, 'naturalness' is an antonym of 
'artificiality'. By extension, 'nature' describes things and places that are 
radically different from those over which humans exert considerable 
control. This difference relates primarily to organising processes rather 
than physical substance. For example, although an ecological restoration 
might be physically indistinguishable from a naturally evolved ecosystem, 
it does not follow, in such cases, that a meaningful distinction between 
'natural' and 'artificial' cannot be made. However, this point aside, it 
remains so that in most cases artificial products are easily distinguished 
from natural ones by virtue of their physical characteristics, and 
consequently they provide a straightforward counterpoint to society. 
'Nature' is also frequently used to describe locations where physical 
escape from society is possible. Whether it be seeking refuge in a city park 
during the lunch-hour, spending the annual family holiday camping in a 
211 
national park, or selling up and moving to a bush block in the country to 
practice a self-sufficient lifestyle, nature provides a setting where the 
stresses and alienating values of the modern world can be, to some extent, 
left behind. With this distance from society can come a greater awareness 
of the necessities of existence. These are concealed during the course of 
everyday life by the availability of devices, infrastructure, and 
manufactured foodstuffs that render our existence less inhibited by menial 
tasks. To the person dissatisfied with those apparently indefatigable forces 
within society that seem to hold such sway over their lifestyle choices, 
reconnecting with the basic necessities of existence is liberating when it 
serves to highlight the superfluousness of many aspects of modern life. 
The desire to escape the abstractions and demands of society is 
• embedded within definitions of wilderness. The United States Wilderness 
Act emphasises that these are areas "where man himself is a visitor who 
does not remain", which are "without permanent improvements or human 
habitation", and which have "outstanding opportunities for solitude or a 
primitive and unconfined type of recreation". 5 For Stephen Kaplan and 
Janet Talbot, the defining features of wilderness include a "relative absence 
of demands on one's behavior that are artificially generated or human 
imposed. A primary activity [in wilderness] is the meeting of one's vital 
needs."6 In a similar vein, Joseph Sax, drawing upon the thought of 
5 The Wilderness Act 1964 (United States), Section 2 (c). 
6 Stephen Kaplan and Janet F. Talbot, "Psychological Benefits of a Wilderness 
Experience," in Behavior and the Natural Environment, ed. Irwin Altman and 
Joachim F. Wohlwill (New York: Plenum Press, 1983), p. 199. 
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Frederick Law Olmsted, explains that nature recreation is important 
because it "provides a stimulus to engage the contemplative faculty": 
In most of our activities we are busily accomplishing things to 
satisfy the demands and expectations of other people, and dealing 
with petty details that are uninteresting in themselves and only 
engage our attention because they are a means to some other goal we 
are trying to reach. Olmsted does not suggest that gainful activity is 
a bad thing by any means; only that it offers no opportunity for the 
mind to disengage from getting tasks done, and to engage instead on 
thoughts removed from the confinement of duty and achievement. 
He calls this the invocation of the contemplative faculty.' 
The capacity of nature to provide opportunities for physical escape from 
society is acknowledged in all classifications of the value of nature, usually 
under the title of 'recreation'. Another perspective on this source of value 
is included within the lists of wilderness values prepared by Michael 
Nelson and George Sessions, both of whom describe the value of 
wilderness as a physical refuge from totalitarian governments. In doing so, 
Sessions makes reference to the role of wilderness in dystopian literature, 8 
7 Joseph L. Sax, Mountains Without Handrails: Reflections on the National 
Parks, (Ann Arbor: The University of Michigan Press, 1980), P.  20. 
8 George Sessions, "Ecocentrism, Wilderness, and Global Protection," in The 
Wilderness Condition: Essays on Environment and Civilization, ed. Max 
Oelschlaeger (Washington, DC: Island Press, 1992), p. 100. 
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while Nelson largely draws on ideas presented by Edward Abbey in Desert 
Solitaire. 9 
Another important quality of nature that enables it to function as a 
counterpoint to society is that nature itself is autonomous from society. The 
reason for why this should be so, as discussed in chapter six, relates to the 
lack of any capacity for rational agency (at least to that degree displayed by 
humans) on the part of nonhuman life and natural processes. The autonomy 
of nature can be viewed as a symbolic exemplar of autonomy from society 
by those who, being dissatisfied with the abstract forces of society, have 
reason to value its symbolic counterpoint. Support within the literature for 
this notion is presented in the following section. 
Finally, nature's status as a counterpoint to society is reinforced by the 
evident decline of nature in response to both the growth of the human 
population and expansion in the area of land developed to satisfy the 
collective needs of society. Although nonhuman life is not necessarily 
destroyed by all human activities, in practice the abstract forces of 
contemporary western society, or at least those that generate the sort of 
dissatisfaction described above, generally contribute to the loss of 
• undeveloped natural areas and associated death of wild organisms. 
Each of these qualities can resonate strongly for people who seek a 
measure of independence from societal forces. This in turn can result in a 
high value being placed on the autonomy of natural processes, encouraging 
9 Michael P. Nelson, "An Amalgamation of Wilderness Preservation 
Arguments," in The Great New Wilderness Debate, ed. J. Baird Callicott and 
Michael P. Nelson (Athens: University of Georgia Press, 1998), pp. 181-82; 
Edward Abbey, Desert Solitaire, (Tucson: University of Arizona Press, 1968). 
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a 'hands-off approach to managing natural areas, and faith in the 'balance 
of nature'. Human artifacts, attributes and abilities that are relatively free 
of rationally-planned intervention, and which might be termed 'natural', 
are not necessarily valued because of any link with nature, but because of 
the original motivating dissatisfaction with alienating societal forces. 
V. NATURE AS A SYMBOLIC EXAMPLAR OF 
AUTONOMY 
This quality of nature is deserving of particular attention, being less 
straightforward, and less frequently acknowledged, than those qualities 
described above. Some of the value classifications discussed in chapter 
seven allude to the capacity for nature to function as a symbolic 
counterpoint to contemporary western society, although it is not accorded 
any particular significance. Among their reasons for protecting wilderness 
both Sessions and Warwick Fox note the capacity of the nonhuman world 
to provide symbolic value, the principal example being as a symbol of 
human freedom.") Both deploy the following quote from Bryan Nortoti, 
found in an article printed in The Washington Post Magazine: "other 
species, which struggle to survive in living, unmanaged ecosystems [ought 
to be preserved.because they] are our most powerful symbols of human 
10 Sessions, "Ecocentrism, Wilderness, and Global Protection," pp. 97-98; 
Warwick Fox, Toward a Transpersonal Ecology: Developing New Foundations 
for Environmentalism, (Foxhole: Resurgence, 1995), p. 156. 
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freedom." 11 Mark Sagoff and Holmes Rolston similarly observe in nature a 
capacity to symbolise freedom. I2 
However, these authors do not see this symbolic value of nature as 
having any particular significance. Rolston mentions it only in relation to 
creatures that particularly evoke freedom, such as the bald eagle, rather 
than nature as a whole. Fox and Sagoff group all metaphorical uses of 
nature into a single undifferentiated category, and thereby overlook the 
important role of nature's autonomy in an information-driven, abstract-
goal-oriented, bureaucratic age. Although Sessions includes an additional 
category to emphasise the "importance of wilderness as a standard for 
freedom and autonomous behavior, and as a refuge from totalitarianism", 
in a separate piece he highlights the symbolic importance of nature for 
human freedom only with regard to freedom from anthropocentrism, rather 
than social constraint generally. I3 Even Norton, whose quotation suggests 
some awareness of this significance, fails to elaborate. Despite including 
much of the material contained in the Washington Post article in his book 
Toward Unity Among Environmentalists, no mention is made of species as 
'symbols of human freedom', even though such symbols may well 
"Bryan G. Norton, "Sand Dollar Psychology," The Washington Post 
Magazine, 1 June 1986, p. 13. 
'2 M Sagoff, "On Preserving the Natural Environment," Yale Law Journal 
84 (1974): 245-67; Holmes Rolston, Conserving Natural Value, (New York: 
Columbia University Press, 1994), pp. 130-31, 137. 
13 Sessions, "Ecocentrism, Wilderness, and Global Protection," pp. 97-98; 
George Sessions, "Appendix H: 1984", in Deep Ecology: Living as if Nature 
Mattered, ed. Bill Devall and George Sessions (Layton: Gibbs Smith, 1985), pp. 
254-256. 
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constitute a unifying source of value for otherwise disparate factions within 
the environment movement." 
A more developed understanding of the symbolic significance of the 
autonomy of nature within contemporary Western society surfaces rarely 
within the literature of environmental philosophy. Both Wayland Drew and 
Piers Stephens have made important contributions to the discourse linking 
human autonomy with the value of naturalness through their consideration 
of the role of nature in dystopian literature. Drew, writing in 1972, directs 
his attention to three novels, all written in the first half of the twentieth 
century: We, by Yevgeny Zamyatin, Brave New World, by Aldous Huxley, 
and 1984, by George Orwell. Stephens restricts his consideration to 1984. 
Drew observes that in each of these visions of highly organised, repressive 
future societies, nature is presented as being external to the reality imposed 
by authoritarian propaganda and control. Nature therefore has a subversive 
role, inspiring the downtrodden citizens to seek personal freedom. He 
proceeds to describe the relevance of nature for contemporary society: 
wilderness assumes an awesome importance, for it is the sole index 
by which we can measure the extent of our own subjugation to 
unnatural forces... Only in wilderness is it possible to escape this 
tyranny... In wilderness a man or woman has physically left behind 
the milieu of conditioning... He has bypassed the mass of 
alternatives posed by the assumptions of the technological society 
14 `Freedom' is discussed at length in the epilogue, but not `symbols of 
freedom'. See Bryan G. Norton, Toward Unity Among Environmentalists, (New 
York: Oxford University Press, 1991), pp. 244-55. 
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and glimpsed a possibility which his society will tell him is 
reactionary, archaic, and impossible, but which his body and his 
spirit tell him is absolutely correct. I5 
Stephens emphasises similar themes: 
Nature... experientially supports liberty as a counterpoint to the 
arbitrariness of human will, providing the vital context of 
spontaneous independence for loosening narrow dogmatism, 
enabling human faculties and prospects to be broadened beyond 
mere power hunger. 16 
Thomas Birch supports this view, although without literary reference, in 
his suggestion that "wilderness reservations are best viewed as holes and 
cracks... in the fabric of domination and self-deception that fuels and 
shapes our mainstream contemporary culture." I7 
Another author who deserves mention here — yet whose contribution to 
this discourse is largely unavailable to those who cannot read French — is 
Bernard Charbonneau. I8 Born in 1910, and strongly influenced by the First 
15 Wayland Drew, "Killing Wilderness," The Trumpeter 3 (1986): 20-21. This 
paper was originally published in the Ontario Naturalist, September 1972. 
16 	• Pliers H.G. Stephens, "Nature and Human Liberty," Organization & 
Environment 17 (2004): 94. 
17 Thomas Birch, "The Incarceration of Wildness: Wilderness Areas as 
Prisons," Environmental Ethics 12(1990): 25. 
18 Charbonneau is little known outside of Europe, and none of his many books 
have been translated into English. Even in France his work went largely 
unrecognised until the 1970s when it attracted the attention of the emerging French 
environment movement. 
218 
World War, Charbonneau viewed society as subject to abstract forces such 
as capitalism, bureaucracy and technology, whose progress was largely 
independent of human control. ° As related by Daniel Cerezuelle, it 
followed that: 
In a world that tends to become totally organized according to 
impersonal logics, the protection of nature is a vital necessity — not 
only for avoiding ecological disasters, but also for preserving 
freedom. It is one of the originalities of Charbonneau's thought that 
he reminds environmentalism of its duty to act in view of two 
values: Nature and Freedom. 2° 
In order to experience freedom, Charbonneau felt that humans could not 
live entirely in a social world: "They need to experience the otherness of 
nature in order to exert their freedom in a personal way..." 2 ' 
Within the conservation management literature, debate over the 
appropriateness of ecological restoration activities in wilderness areas has 
given rise to discussion of the values associated with not managing nature. 
This is another aspect of wilderness that receives particular mention within 
the United States Wilderness Act, which states that a wilderness is "an area 
19 John Clark, "Bernard Charbonneau: Regionalism and the Politics of 
Experience," Capitalism, Nature, Socialism 13 (2002): 42-44. 
20 	• Daniel Cere' zuelle, "Nature and Freedom: An Introduction to the 
Environmental Thought of Bernard Charbonneau," in Rethinking Nature: Essays 
in Environmental Philosophy, ed. Bruce V. Foltz and Robert Frodeman, 
(Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2004), p. 322. 
21 Ibid., p. 322. 
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where the earth and its community of life are untrammeled by man... ),22 
The term 'untrammeled' has particular significance. As intended by the 
person who drafted the legislation, Howard Zahniser, it does not explicitly 
refer to an absence of humans, or of human impacts, but freedom from 
human contro1. 23 David Cole has been prominent among those who have 
attempted to articulate why the quality of being 'untrammeled' might be 
valued. He suggests that: 
wilderness designation is a symbol of human restraint and humility. 
Wilderness lands are the only lands where humans refrain from 
saying that they know best... Wilderness can only be a contrast to 
the arrogance of modern society if we refrain from manipulating 
wilderness — even to enhance its.ecological or experiential values... 
The symbolic values of wilderness are the most radical elements of 
the wilderness idea. They are the values that contrast most with 
modern society — with its faith in scientific knowledge and reliance 
on technological solutions to problems. 24 
It is these same values that are the underlying theme of Jack Turner's 
collection of essays, The Abstract Wild. In the introduction he notes that 
"the antagonists in my story are not the usual fall guys — industrialists, 
ranchers, tourists, or loggers — though they personify the problem. No, my 
22 The Wilderness Act 1964 (United States), Section 2 (c). 
23 Douglas W. Scott, "Untrammeled', 'Wilderness Character,' and the 
Challenges of Wilderness Preservation," Wild Earth 11 (2001): 74. 
24 David N. Cole, "Symbolic Values: The Overlooked Values That Make 
Wilderness Unique," International Journal of Wilderness 11 (2005): 24-27. 
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enemies are abstractions..."28 Later he draws attention to the connection 
between the impositions of society, the autonomy of the individual, and the 
wildness of nature, observing that: 
control increases with civilization, and modern civilization, being 
largely out of control — an ideology of control projected onto the 
entire world — must control or deny wildness. This prospect is most 
clearly represented by the dystopian novels, beginning with 
Yevgeny Zamyatin's We... The important point is that whatever 
kind of autonomy is in question — human freedom, self-willed land, 
self-ordering systems, autopoiesis — all are incompatible with 
external contro1. 26 
There are many other authors who have briefly elaborated on these themes, 
often in the context of romanticism,27 and particularly when reflecting on 
the life and thought of the American author Henry David Thoreau.28 
25 Jack Turner, The Abstract Wild, (Tucson: The University of Arizona Press, 
1996), p. xiv. 
26 kid., pp.  112-13. 
27 See, for example, Georg Simmel (translated and edited by Kurt H. Wolff), 
The Sociology of Georg Simmel, (New York: The Free Press, 1967), pp. 64-65; 
Roderick Nash, Wilderness and the American Mind, (New Haven: Yale University 
Press, 1973), p. 157; Raymond Williams, The Country and the City, (London: 
Chatto & Windus, 1973); Kate Soper, What is Nature? Culture, Politics and the 
Non-Human, (Oxford: Blackwell, 1995), pp. 187-92. 
28 Stephen Budiansky, Nature's Keepers: The New Science of Nature 
Management, (New York: The Free Press, 1995), p. 37; Nichols Fox, Against the 
Machine: The Hidden Luddite Tradition in Literature, Art, and Individual Lives, 
(Washington, DC: Island Press, 2002), p. 123; Thomas R. Dunlap, Faith in 
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However, not all authors make the explicit connection between the value of 
wild nature and the capacity of nature to provide a symbolic counterpoint 
to contemporary society, and of those who do, none consider the link 
between respect for wild nature and the more general value attached to 
naturalness, and the significant implications of such connections for the 
study of environmental ethics?' 
Autonomy from the overwhelming forces of contemporary society is a 
recurring theme within all manner of 'environmental' debates, and serves 
as a powerful connection between environmental groups and others active 
within society. These include the anti-globalisation movement, the 
alternative communities movement, and the peace movement. For 
example, the defining goals of many alternative communities include 
achieving greater levels of individual freedom and establishing distance 
from the institutions of contemporary society. 3° Further, Meredith Veldman 
notes that the reaction in both the UK and the USA against nuclear 
weapons was strongly influenced by concern at the loss of individual 
autonomy and the triumph of technocracy. 31 J. Sanford Rikoon even 
Nature: Environmentalism as Religious Quest, (Seattle: University of Washington 
Press, 2004), pp. 42-52. 
29 It is not surprising that Georg Sirnmel failed to elaborate on these issues, 
given that his work predates the appearance of environmental ethics as a distinct 
subject of enquiry. Simmel's observations on nineteenth century feelings about 
nature date from a lecture given in 1917. 
39 See, for example, Margaret Munro-Clark, Communes in Rural Australia: The 
Movement Since 1970, (Sydney: Hale & Iremonger, 1986), pp. 13-44. 
31 Meredith Veldman, Fantasy, the Bomb and the Greening o f Britain: 
Romantic Protest, 1945-1980, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994), 
pp. 148-149, 202-203. 
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suggests that groups that have been labeled 'anti-environmental' might 
actually qualify as environmental when it is acknowledged that the target 
of their concern is not nature or nonhuman life, but centralised control 
associated with environmental authority. With regard to a particular dispute 
over the presence of wild horses within a conservation area, Rikoon 
suggests that: 
the anti-environmental label is better characterized as an anti-
ecocracy movement, by which is meant that the core of regional 
opposition is increasingly the fear of the rise of an enlightened 
authority that attempts to bring a biocentric ecological 
rationalization to all centers of power. It is not environmental 
protection per se that people oppose, but the use of environmental 
protection as .a pretext and means for a small group of people — the 
ecocrats (here in the form of the NPS) -- to tighten their grip on 
everyday life and the social environment. If this happens, a 
biocentric ecological rationalization wielded by an ecocracy can 
threaten to infiltrate all areas of private concern — from government 
to religion.32 
This link between environmentalism and autonomy is also identified by 
Thomas Heyd who observes that in Latin America, "the primary aim of 
environmental ethics and action... may be to strengthen the community's 
autonomy and autosufficiency against outside forces, represented by large- 
32 J. Sanford Rikoon, "Wild Horses and the Political Ecology of Nature 
Restoration in the Missouri Ozarks," Geoforum 37 (2006): 209. 
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scale commercial or government entities." Such comments are 
reminiscent of concerns apparently raised by Charbonneau as to the 
authoritarian potential of `ecologism% 34 a potential that is the subject of 
detailed investigation by Richard Ellis. 35 
It thus emerges that naturalness, as defined by processes that lack human 
and societal intervention — and specifically the abstract, instrumental 
interventions characteristic of industrialised societies — is valued because it 
symbolises autonomy from such forces. Although the proportion of people 
in Western countries who actually retreat from the modern world to the 
sanctuary provided by remote wilderness, rural isolation, and other cultures 
is quite small, rare is the person who has not entertained the romantic 
thought that they might escape the demands of society by returning to a 
simpler mode of existence. This cultural tendency to link nature to 
autonomy from society has a long history, stretching back to the ancient 
cultures of Greece and China. As noted by Fox, for example, "Lao-tse, the 
Chinese philosopher of the sixth century B.C., had advised the court to find 
relief from the artificiality of its experience in the bamboo groves." 36 
Associated with these sentiments are the teachings of religious sects such 
33 Thomas Heyd, "Themes in Latin American Environmental Ethics: 
Community, Resistance and Autonomy," Environmental Values 13 (2004): 234. 
Similar themes are also apparent in Bryan K. Walton and Conner Bailey, "Framing 
Wilderness: Populism and Cultural Heritage as Organizing Principles," Society 
and Natural Resources 18 (2005): 119-34. 
34 Cerezuelle, "Nature and Freedom," p. 325. 
35 Richard J. Ellis, The Dark Side of the Left: Illiberal Egalitarianism in 
America, (Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 1998) 
36 Fox, Against the Machine, p. 123. 
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as the Amish and the Jains that salvation requires rejection of the trappings 
of modern society, the interest many have in the ruined monuments of past 
civilisations,37 and, to return to an earlier point, popular fascination with 
dystopian visions of apocalypse, 38  particularly evident in groups such as 
Earth First! 39 Yet even popular environmental authors like David Ehrenfeld 
admit to feeling a "secret comfort" upon hearing predictions of 
"widespread economic collapse and the crumbling of modern society."'" 
Similarly, Michael Pyle 'likes the thought' that humans will inevitably 
become extinct, allowing all the "peaceful, dumb species" of the Earth to 
"go back to their business of life and death and evolution, unperturbed by 
busy-busy men."4' These same motivations are likely to provide the 
foundation of that tendency within environmentalism to indulge in what 
Andrew Murphy describes as `antimodernism' and 'the rhetoric of 
37 Midas Deldcers (translated by Sherry Marx-MacDonald), The Way of All 
Flesh: The Romance of Ruins, (Gordonsville: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 2000); 
Brigitte Desrochers, "Ruins Revisited: Modernist Conceptions of Heritage," The 
Journal of Architecture 5 (2000): 3545; Christopher Woodward, In Ruins, 
(London: Vintage, 2002); Robert Ginsberg, The Aesthetics of Ruins, (Amsterdam: 
Rodopi, 2004). 
38 Mike Davis, Dead Cities and Other Tales, (New York: The New Press, 
2002), pp. 361-86. 
38 Ellis, The Dark Side of the Left, pp. 257-70; Bron Taylor, "Green 
Apocalypticism: Understanding Disaster in the Radical Environmental 
Worldview," Society'& Natural Resources 12 (1999): 377-86. 
4° David Ehrenfeld, The Arrogance of Humanism, (New York: Oxford 
University Press, 1981), p. 221. 
41 Pyle, Wintergreen, p. 277. 
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decline'.42 It can also be seen to contribute to the appeal of such notions as 
'nature knows best' and the 'balance of nature', which hold that human 
intervention in natural systems is unlikely to be anything other than 
detrimenta1.43 Such beliefs are associated with what Eugene Hargrove 
describes as "environmental therapeutic nihilism".' 
Claims that the environmental crisis is fundamentally caused by human 
captivation with technology and associated metaphysical disconnection 
from nature are ubiquitous. Yet the motive described in this chapter 
suggests that, while this blame is not misplaced, the popular feeling 
generated by the environmental crisis is not simply the result of concern for 
nature, but is greatly influenced by dissatisfaction with the technocratic 
orientation and related trends within society aside from any concern for 
nature. Heyd argues that the desire for community autonomy from 
controlling social forces can be located within the sphere of environmental 
ethics because it "directly or indirectly takes into consideration the natural 
environment or certain parts of it". 45 However, acknowledging the 
relationship between the value of nature and dissatisfaction with the 
42 Andrew R. Murphy, "Environmentalism, Antimodernism, and the Recurrent 
Rhetoric of Decline," Environmental Ethics 25 (2003): pp. 79-98. 
43  Barry Commoner, The Closing Circle: Nature, Man, and Technology, (New 
York: Knopf, 1971), p. 41. 
44 Eugene C. Hargrove, Foundations of Environmental Ethics, (Englewood 
Cliffs: Prentice Hall, 1989), pp. 137-61. 
45 Heyd, "Themes in Latin American Environmental Ethics," p. 235. 
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abstractions of modern society leads to the insight that the theme of human 
autonomy is itself one of the foundations of environmental ethics. 46 
VI. ASSOCIATED FEELINGS OF CONNECTION 
It can be seen that valuing nature for its autonomy from society, on the 
basis of desiring autonomy from society for oneself, could give rise to a 
corresponding sense of connection or identification with nature. For 
example, Jack Turner describes once being moved to violence when 
witness to the casual humiliation of a caged mountain lion by onlookers. 
However, rather than being motivated purely by empathy for all those 
various facets of the unfortunate creature's existence, he seems primarily 
driven by the conviction that the animal had a right to freedom and respect, 
which was grounded in his own "identification with wild nature".47 There 
appear to be two sources of connection here. One coalesces around the 
shared quality of autonomy from society, the other around the shared 
quality of wildness. Many authors have reflected on the latter; R. Edward 
Grumbine, for example: 
Humans, too, are wild... Our fundamental wildness presents itself 
continually: we breathe without effort; we exchange matter and 
energy with the world; we are aroused by sudden sound and 
46 This is reflected in Genie's suggestion that the focus of environmental ethics 
on nature is, perhaps, unwarranted. See James B. Genie, "Environmental Ethics: 
Should We Preserve the Red Herring and Flounder?" Journal of Agricultural and 
Environmental Ethics 16(2003): 73. 
47 Turner, The Abstract Wild, p.43. 
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movement; we wonder at lightning storms and cloud patterns. 
Wildness in humans might be characterized as the self-regulating 
aspects of the 'body' interacting with the unconscious depths of the 
'mind' -48 
Nichols Fox also notes that "the very word wildness.., implies other. It is 
what we are not; something distanced from all that we are. But this is not, 
in fact, true. Our orderliness is an illusion; we are as wild as the rest of 
nature, but we prefer to think of our lives as under control."'" Similar ideas 
are expressed by Gary Snyder: 
Our bodies are wild. The involuntary quick turn of the head at a 
shout, the vertigo at looking off a precipice, the heart-in-the-throat in 
a moment of danger, the catch of the breath... The body does not 
require the intercession of some conscious intellect to make it 
breathe, to keep the heart going. It is to a great extent self-regulating, 
it is a life of its own... The conscious agenda-planning ego occupies 
a very tiny territory, a little cubicle somewhere near the gate, 
keeping track of some of what goes in and out (and sometimes 
making expansionistic plots), and the rest takes care of itself. The 
body is, so to speak, in the mind. They are both wild. 50 
44 R. Edward Grumbine, "Wildness, Wild Use, and Sustainable Development," 
Environmental Ethics 16 (1994): 232. 
49 Fox, Against the Machine, p. 254. 
5° Gary Snyder, The Practice of the Wild, (New York: North Point Press, 1990), 
p. 16. 
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Identification on the basis of wildness, and celebration of this shared 
quality, implies rejection of rational agency and a willingness to forego the 
benefits arising from rational consideration of cause and effect. It could be 
linked to an opposition to science, to anti-intellectualism, and to the sort of 
scepticism displayed toward factual evidence described by Dick Taveme in 
his book The March Of Unreason." Identification on this basis is 
problematic insofar as it cannot provide consistent support for any change 
in human policies toward nature. While it can provide the basis for calls to 
scale back the activities of such instrumentalist entities as corporations, 
government bureaucracies, or scientific research institutes, it can make no 
allowance for the positive actions that such entities might bring about. 
Further, there can be no allowance made for the environmental impact that 
results through spontaneous human behaviour. It is interesting to note that 
environmentalists generally seek a dramatic reduction in spontaneous 
behaviour, exhorting people to remain constantly vigilant as to the 
potential ecological impact of any action taken. 
Identification on the basis of autonomy is far less contradictory as it 
requires no such rejection of rational agency. However, it might be feared 
that by upholding the value of the autonomy of the individual, the motive 
described in this chapter might encourage a laissez-faire approach to 
individual behaviour, associated with groups such as the Wise Use 
Movement. Yet, identification on this basis is crucially associated with 
respect for the autonomy of nature, and therefore the scope of individual 
51 Dick Taverne, The March Of Unreason: Science, Democracy, and The New 
Fundamentalism, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005) 
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autonomy is considerably diminished in situations where the autonomy of 
nature is threatened by the individual. 
VII. AESTHETIC AND SPIRITUAL VALUES 
Before proceeding to the next chapter, some comment is required on 
aesthetic and spiritual values. Both are frequently cited as important 
sources of nature's value, are non-instrumental and subjective, yet are not 
specifically represented by motives within the axiology of inherent value. 
In the previous chapter it was noted that a sense of 'spiritual' value can 
be associated with the first, second and third motives, and it seems 
reasonable to suggest that a deep respect for the autonomy of nature, 
arising from the fourth motive, could also have spiritual overtones. 
Spirituality, in this context, seems to relate to sensations of value that are 
largely emotive, rather than having been derived from rational 
consideration of religious meaning. As suggested by Kay Milton, "the term 
'sacred' can be applied to anything whose value is not based on reason, but 
is experienced directly, through the senses and, when necessary, asserted 
dogmatically. Sacredness is thus linked to aesthetics, to affective 
experience."52 Similarities between spiritual, aesthetic, and emotive 
sensations of value are also implied by Stan Godlovitch's comments on 
aesthetic value: 
The value found in aesthetic response to nature has numerous 
irreducible sources... Newton was struck by the miraculous 
52 K,' Milton, "Nature is Already Sacred," Environmental Values 8 (1999): 
440. 
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underlying simplicity and order of nature; many ecologists are 
overwhelmed by its impenetrable complexity and arbitrariness. 
Some take delight in the ever-changing sensuous variety nature 
offers; others in timeless patterns and regularity. John Muir found in 
nature a deep spiritual and transcendental tonic. Others find kindred 
neo-religious transport in the great stream of Life and the sweep of 
evolution. Some find love, endearment, and belonging; others find 
intellectual savouring; yet others find a seductive darkness. For some 
nature elicits amazement and wonder; for others enchantment; for 
others still awe and emotional richness. There is no one final fitting 
affective or intellectual response, no definitive hedonic or cognitive 
payoff, and with that no authoritative prescriptions from some 
master-race of nature critics and connoisseurs to be followed 
obediently by some underclass of adulatory bumlcins. There is no 
codifying of the proper objects and qualities, no privileged 
categories, no canon to worship, no tests to pass or club to join. 
There is no 'institution' regulating aesthetic response to nature and 
no 'nature-world' born in aesthetic theory... At least, no one who 
encounters nature aesthetically is under any constraint to enter into 
any such codification pacts because, whatever these pacts, none is 
privileged and none is necessary. 53 
However, aesthetic and spiritual values are not the same thing. Spiritual 
values are associated with the notion that there exists a presence in the 
world, beyond the realm of human rationality, that is somehow responsible 
for the experience of value. Seeking rational explanations for such 
experiences seems unnecessary and perhaps even undermines the 
experience of value. Aesthetic values, on the other hand, may be 
53 Stan Godlovitch, "Valuing Nature and the Autonomy of Natural Aesthetics," 
British Journal of Aesthetics 38 (1998): 184-185. 
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rationalised, and are not necessarily the result of supernatural creative 
forces. 
VIII. EFFICIENCY AND HEALTH 
It should also be noted that the motives underlying inherent values in 
nature can be supported by other important sources of human motivation 
that do not, themselves, give rise to the sense that nature is valued 'for 
itself'. One of these is the motive of efficiency. It is apparent that the 
inclination of many people to be efficient — to minimise both their 
expenditure of energy and resources and production of waste — is not a 
purely instrumental goal. It is often sought without any particular regard 
for self-benefit, and can therefore be linked to inherent value. Household 
recycling, for example, is an activity enthusiastically carried out by billions 
of people around the world. In developing countries, this is usually through 
necessity and therefore reflects the influence of instrumental values. 
However, for the millions of people in Western societies for whom 
recycling provides no economic return, this activity is often undertaken 
inherently. Little instrumental calculation accompanies the desire to 
recycle, except, perhaps, for a vague sense that it is good for nature. It 
seems that a more plausible explanation for this desire is an underlying 
inclination to efficiency and desire to minimise waste. 
Efficiency is not necessarily compatible with respect for nature. Energy 
use, for example, can be reduced by dumping raw sewage into the sea, 
rather than operating systems for its reticulation and treatment. However, 
for those whose values reflect some combination of the four motives 
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described above, efficiency encourages behaviour that is significantly 
compatible with respect for nature, such as in the case of recycling. The 
influence of efficiency can be found in the historical development of 
environmental sentiments. Eugene Hargrove, for example, indicates that 
naturalists writing in the nineteenth century were critical of those who 
killed animals only when it was "wanton" and "served no useful 
purpose."54 This could be explained as evidence of a purely instrumental 
view of nature as a resource to satisfy human needs. However, Hargrove 
does not think so, and presents three other explanations, including one that 
corresponds to the intellectual interest motive described in the previous 
chapter. 55 Another explanation is provided by the common human 
inclination to favour efficiency over wastefulness. It seems likely that 
contemporary attitudes toward the 'wanton' destruction of nature continue 
to be informed by this motive. 
The motive of efficiency is closely tied to the desire for autonomy from 
the abstractions of modern society, for through greater efficiency an 
individual may reduce their dependence on societal institutions. This is 
apparent in the goal of many alternative communities to attain self-
sufficiency or to limit their consumption to resources available locally, 
thereby minimising the energy use associated with transport. At the same 
time, efficiency is a major goal of many of the bureaucratic and profit-
oriented institutions that are implicated in the undermining of individual 
autonomy. Efficiency in this context is tied to maximising profit rather than 
54 Hargrove, Foundations of Environmental Ethics, p. 114. 
55 Ibid., pp. 115-24. 
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independence. The apparent significance of these two 'ends' would seem 
to suggest that efficiency is an instrumental rather than an inherent value, 
supporting Sagoff s contention that "efficiency has no normative claim or 
moral Worth" aside from those relating to instrumental considerations. 56 
However, just as the desire for autonomy can provide subconscious 
motivation for valuing wild nature, it may also provide subconscious 
motivation for valuing efficiency in one's own affairs. Hence, efficiency 
can be valued 'for itself ; that is, inherently. 
The motive of efficiency is useful in helping to explain nuances in 
environmental behaviour. Another supporting motive of this kind is health. 
The desire to be healthy is fundamental to human nature. As with 
efficiency, this desire is not necessarily compatible with respect for nature. 
For example, increased human life expectancy resulting from the 
application of modem medicine contributes significantly to the erosion of 
nature on a global scale. However, in other ways, such as in supporting 
efforts to reduce pollution and the threat of nuclear conflict, the motive of 
health is of great benefit to the survival of nature. 
56 Mark Sagoff, The Economy of the Earth: Philosophy, Law, and the 
Environment, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988), p. 107. 
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LX. CONCLUSION 
The idea that nature has some symbolic capacity as a counterpoint to 
society underlies a vein of criticism that is ubiquitous within environmental 
discourse, directed toward human progress, technological dependence, and 
the disempowerment of the individual by capitalism, corporations and the 
state. The role of nature within such discourse is generally that of the 
victim of anthropogenic endeavour. However, this perspective overlooks 
the possibility that disappointment with contemporary Western society is 
not only generated by concern for nature, but that concern for nature might 
itself be generated by dissatisfaction with society. This dissatisfaction 
constitutes the fourth motive of the axiology of inherent value. There are a 
number of reasons why nature might resonate with those dissatisfied with 
the abstractions of modern society, not least being that nature provides a 
place for physical escape from society, and that nature is, itself, 
autonomous from society. 
This concludes Part C of the thesis, which has been dedicated to a 
systematic articulation of the non-instrumental values associated with 
nature and naturalness. In Part D these motives are examined to determine 
the potential for conflict between the conservation of biodiversity and the 
values associated with nature. 
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PART D 
HOW DO THE VALUES 
ASSOCIATED WITH 
BIODIVERSITY AND 
NATURE CONFLICT? 
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Chapter Ten 
MOTIVE CONFLICT AND CONVERGENCE: 
ANIMAL WELFARE 
The idea that environmental ethics and animal liberation are conceptually 
distinct.., would come as a surprise to many people concerned about the 
human domination of nature. For one thing, environmentalists and animal 
liberationists have many of the same enemies: those who dump poisons 
into the air and water, drive whales to extinction, or clear rainforests to 
create pastures for cattle, to name just a few. Moreover, however one traces 
the history of the environmental movement, it is clear that it comes out of a 
tradition that expresses strong concern for animal suffering and autonomy. 
Certainly both the modern environmental and animal liberation movements 
spring from the same sources in the post-World War II period: a disgust 
with the sacrifice of everything else to the construction of military 
machines, the creation of a culture which views humans and other animals 
as replaceable commodities, and the prevailing faith in the ability of 
science to solve all of our problems... Even people today who identify 
themselves as environmentalists are likely to be as concerned about spotted 
owls as old growth forests and to think that vegetarianism is a good idea. 
Dale Jamieson (1998) 1 
It is the passionate, empathetic response, based on connection with the 
non-human world, that motivates concern for its conservation. It is this that 
needs to be nurtured. Reflective empathy and a sense of connection is the 
life-blood of conservation. But policies articulated in purely scientific 
1 Dale Jamieson, "Animal Liberation is an Environmental Ethic," 
Environmental Values 7 (1998): 42. 
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terms, and those that prescribe the routine culling of sentient animals, 
involve shutting down compassion and empathy, and distancing rather than 
connecting. 
Kate Rawles (2004)2 
I. INTRODUCTION 
The goal of Part D, comprising chapters nine and ten, is to explore whether 
a management focus on the conservation of biodiversity is compatible with 
protecting the values associated with nature. This follows on from Parts B 
and C, which described in detail the values associated with biodiversity, 
and with nature and nonhuman life more generally. The question of 
compatibility will first be considered in relation to the axiology of inherent 
value. This involves matching the values associated with a focus upon the 
conservation of biodiversity with the motives comprising the axiology, and 
then examining the potential for conflict and/or convergence between 
them. 
For the sake of brevity, each of the motives comprising the axiology will 
be assigned an abbreviation, as follows: 
Connection will refer to motive one, being the experience of 
connection with nonhuman life. 
> Scientific Concern will refer to motive two, which describes the 
concern for species, ecosystems and ecological processes generated 
by intellectual interest in nature. 
2 Kate Rawles, "Biological Diversity and Conservation Policy," in Philosophy 
and Biodiversity, ed. Marklcu Olcsanen and Juhani Pietarinen (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2004), p. 214. 
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> Larger Context will refer to motive three, being respect for the 
larger context embodies by nature. 
> Autonomy will refer to motive four, which describes dissatisfaction 
with the abstractions of modern society, and a subsequent desire for 
autonomy from the sources of such discontent. 
Two examples of conflict surrounding biodiversity conservation are then 
examined, again to assess the potential for conflict and/or convergence. 
Conflict associated with concern for animal welfare advocates will be 
examined later in this chapter, while in chapters eleven and twelve, the 
conflict between restorationists and preservationists will be considered. 
II. MOTIVE COMPATIBILITY, CONFLICT AND 
CONVERGENCE 
Through the course of Part B, it was found that instrumental justifications 
for the conservation of biodiversity were subject to various flaws, and, in 
any event, those most passionate in their advocacy on behalf of 
biodiversity are generally motivated by non-instrumental values. The 
notion that biodiversity has objective intrinsic value was found to be a 
dubious proposition, except in situations where a diversity of life is more 
beneficial to the overall flourishing of individual organisms in a given area; 
a caveat linked to other ideas unlikely to appeal to conservationists. It 
seemed more likely that claims for the intrinsic value of biodiversity 
reflected either an intense intellectual interest in, and associated concern 
for nonhuman life, or the mistaken impression that `biodiversity' was 
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equivalent to the totality of nonhuman life and nature, the intrinsic value of 
which can be more persuasively argued. 
In relation to the motives comprising the axiology of inherent value, the 
non-instrumental value of biodiversity is most closely matched to Scientific 
Concern. It can also be associated with the motive of Larger Context, 
insofar as the diversity of life is believed to be a manifestation of some 
larger context and therefore deserving of respect and protection from 
threats. With this in mind, it can be surmised that people whose principal 
motives are Connection or Autonomy might find cause to object to the 
dominant place of biodiversity within environmental legislation and 
management systems. This suggestion appears to be verified by the sort of 
debates that tend to develop among those who value nature 'for itself . One 
of these relates to the killing of sentient animals in the name of 
conservation, while the other is generated by questions concerning the 
naturalness of ecological restoration. It is apparent that the killing of 
sentient animals is most strongly opposed by people whose principle 
motive is Connection, while a deep concern for naturalness is associated 
with the motive of Autonomy (see Table One). 
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Table One: The potential for conflict between motives. 
motive one 
Connection 
motive two 
Scientific 
Interest 
motive three 
Larger Context 
motive four 
Autonomy 
How does 
motive conflict 
with the 
conservation of 
biodiversity? 
Inspires 
concern for 
individual 
organisms. 
NO 
CONFLICT 
Inspires respect 
for the 
autonomy of 
nature. 
Inspires respect 
for the 
autonomy of 
nature. 
How does 
motive conflict 
with concern for 
animal welfare? 
NO 
CONFLICT 
Inspires 
concern for 
species and 
ecosystems 
rather than 
individuals. 
Inspires 
concern for the 
permanent loss 
of species and 
ecosystems. 
Discourages 
human 
intervention to 
reduce 
suffering. 
How does 
motive conflict 
with the 
preservation of 
wildness? 
Encourages 
human 
intervention to 
reduce 
suffering. 
Encourages 
human 
intervention to 
conserve 
biodiversity. 
Encourages 
human 
intervention to 
reduce 
suffering and 
conserve 
biodiversity. 
NO 
CONFLICT 
• 
However, these two prominent debates are not totally polarised. As is 
discussed below and in the succeeding chapters, there is considerable 
convergence between the opposing positions. In relation to the axiology, 
this can be explained by the varying influence of dominant and 
subdominant motives. Those who value nature 'for itself are likely to hold 
all four motives to be important, while also finding one of these motives to 
be of most importance. Actions dictated by the dominant motive will take 
precedence over the influence of the subdominant motives. However, there 
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are many situations where the dominant and subdominant motives will be 
in agreement (see Table Two), and it is in these situations that otherwise 
conflicting outlooks may find common ground. 
Table Two: The potential for convergence between motives. 
motive one 
Connection 
motive two 
Scientific 
Interest 
motive three 
Larger Context 
motive four 
Autonomy 
How is motive 
consistent with 
the 
conservation of 
biodiversity? 
Inspires concern 
on the basis of 
human-nature 
ecological 
relationships, 
Inspires 
concern for the 
loss of 
diversity, 
Inspires 
concern for the 
permanent loss 
of components 
of biodiversity. 
Inspires 
concern for 
'native' 
components of 
biodiversity. 
How is motive 
consistent with 
concern for 
animal welfare? 
Inspires concern 
for individual 
organisms. 
Inspires 
concern for the 
loss of 
components of 
biodiversity. 
Inspires 
concern for the 
loss of 
nonhuman life, 
Inspires 
concern for the 
freedom of 
wild animals. 
How is motive 
consistent with 
the preservation 
of wildness? 
Inspires concern 
on the basis of 
shared 
autonomy from 
society. 
Inspires 
concern for 
most human 
intervention in 
natural 
processes. 
Inspires respect 
for the 
autonomy of 
nature. 
Inspires respect 
for the 
autonomy of 
nature. 
One such situation in which agreement could be expected between 
otherwise conflicting positions is when natural areas are threatened with 
destruction by development projects. Opposition to such projects is 
consistent with each of the four motives. In each of the case studies, 
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examination of the conflicting positions will be followed by consideration 
of the areas of convergence between these positions. 
Before proceeding it should be noted that the influence of Larger 
Context on the debates generated by a conservation focus on biodiversity 
will not be examined. In such debates, Larger Context can provide support 
for either position, as indicated in Table Two. In this regard, Larger 
Context always functions as a subdominant motive; subservient to one of 
the other motives or to a particular spiritual or religious perspective. 
III. THE ANIMAL WELFARE DEBATE 
The potential for conflict between species conservation and animal welfare 
attracted the early attention of environmental philosophers. One of the first 
papers to broach such issues was published by J. Baird Callicott in 1980. 3 
He suggested that the extension of human rights to sentient animals was 
incompatible with the claim that non-sentient life, and collective entities 
such as species and ecosystems, were deserving of moral consideration. 4 In 
highlighting this distinction, Callicott's ethical priorities were firmly 
oriented towards the protection of species and ecosystems; a position 
known as 'ethical holism'. His opponents were authors like Tom Regan, 
who argued that the rights of the individual animal were paramount, and 
that infringing these rights for the good of the biotic community amounts 
3 An overview of this debate is provided by Jamieson, "Animal Liberation is an 
Environmental Ethic," pp. 41-46. 
4 J. Baird Callicott, "Animal Liberation: A Triangular Affair," Environmental 
Ethics 2 (1980): 311-38. 
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to 'environmental fascism'. 5 This debate has not diminished in relevance. 
Animal welfare groups remain opposed to a variety of conservation 
practices, including the culling of sentient animals, the removal of 
individual animals from the wild, and interference with the lives of wild 
animals for monitoring purposes. Kate Rawles has characterised the 
participants in the debate in the following way: 
The conservation movement draws on science, and particularly 
ecology and conservation biology, for authority, validation, and 
direction. While not advocating avoidable suffering or cruelty, it 
may dismiss what it sees as excessive concern for individual animals 
as sentimental. Conservationists often view the animal welfare 
movement as overly emotional, irrational and, in the end, 
misguided... The animal welfare movement draws on philosophy 
and particularly ethics for its authority and validation. It can 
perceive conservationists as excessively managerial, God-playing, 
ruthless, and generally in the grip of a heartless science — and, 
ultimately, unethical. 6 
Two recent examples of conflict between conservationists and `welfarists' 
are from Anacapa Island, off the coast of California, and Guy Fawkes 
River National Park in northern New South Wales, Australia.' 
5 Tom Regan, The Case for Animal Rights, (Berkeley: University of California 
Press, 1983), pp. 359-63. 
6 Rawles, "Biological Diversity," p. 202. 
7 A number of examples from the United Kingdom are provided by Kay Milton, 
including the particularly controversial plans to cull ruddy ducks. See Kay Milton, 
Loving Nature: Towards an Ecology of Emotion, (London: Routledge, 2002), pp. 
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In October 2001, the animal rights activist, Rob Puddicombe, was 
observed distributing an antidote to rat poison on Anacapa Island by 
national park rangers, who were themselves distributing the poison in an 
attempt to eradicate the black rat, whose presence was threatening native 
bird and mouse species. Puddicombe's actions were part of a broader 
campaign against the culling of introduced animals on many islands in the 
area, and he was subsequently charged with 'feeding wildlife' and 
'interfering with a federal function'. In an article in the Washington Post, 
he was reported as saying, "To me, the idea of species is just an abstract 
concept. Species go extinct all the time... That's the philosophical 
difference. These animals are here and alive now. Their lives have value." 
Puddicombe's primary concern was the pain experienced by the rats and 
other animals that ingested the poison, leading to his impossible-to-
implement suggestion that the rats be physically removed from the island. 
The president of The Fund for Animals, an animal rights group that also 
became involved, suggested that Puddicombe was being harassed "because 
he dares confront the Park Service and its religious fervor to restore lands 
to some earlier, pristine state at the cost of the inhumane slaughter of pigs, 
123-28; Kay Milton, "Ducks out of Water: Nature Conservation as Boundary 
Maintenance," in Natural Enemies: People-Wildlife Conflicts in Anthropological 
Perspective, ed. John Knight (London: Routledge, 2000), pp. 229-46. 
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goats, sheep, rabbits and rats."8 Puddicombe was acquitted of the charges 
in July 2003 as there was insufficient evidence for a conviction. 9 
The second example comes from Australia, where considerable friction 
between conservationists and welfarists has been generated by the presence 
of wild horses, or 'brumbies', in national parks. These animals can degrade 
the physical environment in a variety of ways and there has been persistent 
pressure from conservationists for their removal from protected natural 
areas. One such area is the Guy Fawkes River National Park. During the 
1990s, the local brumby population had increased to such a level that it was 
considered to be a major conservation problem. Attempts were made to 
trap the horses using nets and mustering techniques, although this proved 
costly and resulted in considerable stress to the animals. In 2000, drought 
conditions and bushfire had resulted in large numbers of horses 
congregating in the small remaining areas of suitable pasture. This 
increased the likelihood of a successful cull, and also sparked concerns that 
the horses were in danger of starving to death. Six hundred animals were _ 
subsequently shot from a helicopter. 10 These actions generated widespread 
negative publicity because of the distress experienced by the horses during 
the cull and reports that some horses were left to die after being wounded. 
In response, the government declared a state-wide ban on the aerial culling 
8 William Booth, "On California Islets, a Clear Case of Rat and Wrong?" 
Washington Post, 5 January 2003: A03. See also Kevin Krajick, "Winning the War 
Against Island Invaders," Science 310 (2005): 1410-13. 
9 Brian Camel, "Man Acquitted of Aiding Rats," AnimalRights.net, 15 
September 2003: http://www.animalrights.net/archives/year/2003/000325.html.  
1° Anthony W. English, Report on the Cull of Feral Horses in Guy Fawkes 
River National Park in October 2000, (Sydney: NSW National Parks and Wildlife 
Service, 2000) 
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of horses." The Royal Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals 
(RSPCA) also began legal proceedings against the National Parks and 
Wildlife Service, although it later dropped all but one of the charges!' 
With pressure still remaining for the horses to be eliminated from the park 
there was renewed effort to trap the horses humanely. An alternative 
method was trialed that proved successful, and a program is currently 
underway to remove the entire population from the park. The costs of the 
exercise will be partially recouped through sale of the horses." 
The position taken here is that conflict over these issues is generated by 
differences in the motivating role played by Connection and Scientific 
Concern. Welfarists are primarily motivated by Connection and so are less 
inclined to elevate the conservation of global biodiversity above the 
welfare of individual animals. Conservationists are primarily motivated by 
Scientific Concern and so are more likely to elevate the conservation of 
global biodiversity above the welfare of individual animals. However, it is 
hypothesised that the two positions are not diametrically opposed as they 
share the same basic set of values, generated by the four motives 
I I Peta Seaton and Bob Debus, "Guy Fawkes River National Park Animal 
Slaughter," NSW Legislative Assembly Hansard, 2 November 2000; Andrew 
Fraser, Bob Debus and Peter Webb, "National Parks Wild Horse Control," NSW 
Legislative Assembly Hansard, 26 June 2002. See also 
http://www.savethebrumbies.org, http://www.brumbywatchaustralia.com, 
http://www.kbrhorse.net/news/brumby01.html,  
http://www.colongwildemess.org.au  
12 National Parks Association of NSW, "Horse Cull Court Settlement 
Vindicates National Parks," Media Release,3 July 2002. Available from the 
website of the National Parks Association (http://www.npansw.org.au/media).  
13 James Woodford, "Hay Presto: Brumbies Wild About Feed Luring," Sydney 
Morning Herald, 25 June 2005, n.p. 
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comprising the axiology of inherent value. Consequently, the two positions 
will often converge on issues relating to the protection and management of 
natural areas, whereas conflict will only arise when biodiversity is 
threatened by actions taken to prevent harm to individual animals, or when 
individual animals are harmed in order to conserve biodiversity. 
Some degree of convergence between the two positions is apparent in 
the examples described above. In subsequent legal action against the 
United States National Park Service, The Fund For Nature suggested that 
their primary concern was for the harm that might be caused to the native 
Anacapa deer mouse rather than the black rats." In the brumby example, it 
is apparent that the suffering of the horses was one of the issues considered 
by the park authorities in their decision to carry out the cull. However, it 
should be noted that concern for animal welfare is, to some extent, 
mandated by law. Although the concept of biodiversity might dominate 
contemporary environmental legislation, such legislation sits alongside 
often pre-existing laws safeguarding animal welfare. Consequently, in 
many countries, the activities of scientists and natural area managers must 
first be approved by animal ethics committees, or at least demonstrate 
some sensitivity to such concerns. 
To emphasise the potential for convergence between the two positions, 
we will now consider their respective views regarding the moral 
consideration due to wild animals in natural circumstances. 
14 The Fund for Animals, "Park Service Project Could Exterminate Rare Deer 
Mouse," San Diego Earth Times, November 2002: 
http://www.sdearthtimes.comJet1102/et1102s5.html.  
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W. CONVERGENCE - WILD ANIMALS IN 
NATURE 
An important point of difference between conservationists and welfarists 
has historically been the moral considerability of individual animals in the 
wild. However, on this issue there is greater convergence between the two 
positions than many accounts would suggest. 
In the 1980s, conflict on this issue was generated by philosophers, such 
as Tom Regan and Peter Singer, who claimed, or at least implied, that 
domesticated and wild organisms were deserving of equal moral 
consideration. As explained by Leslie Thiele, such a perspective gives rise 
to numerous problems: 
the biocentric acknowledgement of equal rights for all life may 
entail not only noninterference with other species, but, quite 
ironically, humanitarian aid for them. Ame Naess observes that "if a 
rat is discovered in an inaccessible ventilator, it is clearly cause to 
warn the SPCA to come and end its suffering — by putting it out of 
its misery." To be consistent on this score, however, should we not 
also send SPCA squads into the sewers to save rats from early 
demise... after severe storms? By deep ecological standards, sewer 
rats merit consideration just like the whales recently trapped under 
Arctic ice did... But what of those fish and microorganisms, in this 
latter case, that were robbed of a bountiful feast of whale meat as a 
result of our `lmmanitarian' intervention. Must we also compensate 
them for their loss of dinner? Furthermore, could we accomplish this 
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duty without taking yet other life in the process? The practical and 
theoretical conundrums mount. 15 
Similarly, Callicott has noted that the rigid application of animals rights 
might result in efforts to remove predators from the wild: "if carnivorous 
animals could be rounded up, housed comfortably in zoos, fed soyburgers, 
sterilized, and allowed to die natural deaths, then only herbivorous animals 
would remain in nature and the total amount of pain and suffering might be 
vastly reduced." 16 An alternative suggestion, seriously proposed by Gregg 
Easterbrook, is that wild animals be genetically modified to make 
carnivorous behaviour unnecessary. 17 Given the scale of disruption that 
could be expected from such actions, and the insurmountable conundrums 
of the sort described by Thiele, there are few animal ethicists who continue 
to suggest that domesticated and wild animals are morally equivalent. 
Within the animal welfare literature, the ethical distinctiveness of wild 
animals has been incorporated into a number of approaches that potentially 
converge with the interests of conservationists. One example is 'animal 
integrity', which describes such attributes as the genetic profile, social 
habits, and habitat, of an animal in natural circumstances. The significance 
of animal integrity is that its value is inversely proportional to the extent of 
15 Leslie Paul Thiele, 'Nature and Freedom: A Heideggerian Critique of 
Biocentric and Sociocentric Environmentalism,' Environmental Ethics 17 (1995): 
177. 
16 J. Baird Callicott, "The Search for an Environmental Ethic," in Matters of 
Life and Death, second edition, ed. Tom Regan (New York: Random House, 
1986), p. 398. 
17 Gregg Easterbrook, A Moment on the Earth: The Coming Age of 
Environmental Optimism, (Hannondsworth: Penguin, 1995), p. 671. 
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human modification to these attributes, even if such modifications were to 
increase the pleasure, and/or decrease the pain experienced by the animal. 
The exception is in cases where animals have suffered an accidental injury, 
in that intervention to heal such injury does not diminish animal integrity. 18 
Animal integrity is increased by ensuring that the conditions experienced 
by animals in captivity are such that their behaviour is similar to what 
would be expected if they were not in captivity, even if these conditions 
give rise to additional threats than would be faced in a more controlled 
environment. The concept can be practically applied to the task of ensuring 
that the environment created for captive animals is least detrimental to their 
psychological well-being. I9 However, this represents a constrained, 
pragmatic interpretation of the concept. Animal integrity is fully realised 
only in situations where the animal is able to live wild and free, or, in the 
case of domesticated animals, is subject to the minimum level of human 
stewardship required for a healthy and satisfying life. This approach is 
potentially compatible with the interests of conservationists insofar as it 
could be argued that the natural habitat requirements of animal integrity 
require ecological restoration, even in situations where such restoration 
involves the culling of sentient animals. On Anacapa Island, for example, 
18 Bernice Bovenkerlc, Frans WA. Brom and Babs J. van den Bergh, "Brave 
New Birds: The Use of 'Animal Integrity' in Animal Ethics," The Hastings Center 
Report 32 (2002): 16-22. See also J. Vorstenbosch, "The Concept of Integrity: Its 
Significance for the Ethical Discussion on Biotechnology and Animals," Livestock 
Production Science 36(1993): 109-12. 
19 Albert W. Musschenga, "Naturalness: Beyond Animal Welfare," Journal of 
Agricultural and Environmental Ethics 15 (2002): 173-79. 
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the extermination of rats might be justified by the increase in animal 
integrity of the other sentient species on the island. 
Other approaches include those suggested by Jac Swart and Gary 
Varner. Swart suggests that some management of wild animals is required, 
although only in relation to forms of suffering that have been exacerbated 
by humans. Management of this sort, which he describes as 'non-specific 
care', is targeted toward the well-being of populations rather than 
individuals, and can include "controlled hunting in order to prevent 
starving of animals due to unnatural population growth". 2° Varner also 
approves of hunting, although he does not restrict this to 'unnatural' 
conditions. Instead he defends the 'therapeutic hunting' of what he 
describes as 'obligatory management species'. Such a species is one "that 
has a fairly regular tendency to overshoot the carrying capacity of its range, 
to the detriment of future generations of it and other species". His 
examples of 'obligatory management species' are elephants, and "hooved 
mammals like.., deer, elk, and bison", while his examples of species that 
are not 'obligatory' are doves, rabbits, squirrels, and quail. 21 The principal 
distinction here is that the former are larger and more capable of causing 
lasting damage to their habitat. It is apparent that Varner's is a 
consequentialist approach that seeks to maximise the long-term viability of 
the ecosystem in order to benefit the greatest number of individuals. Again, 
20  Jac A.A. Swart, "Care for the Wild: An Integrative View on Wild and 
Domesticated Animals," Environmental Values 14 (2005): 258. 
21  Gary Varner, "Can Animal Rights Activists Be Environmentalists?" in 
People, Penguins, and Plastic Trees: Basic Issues in Environmental Ethics, second 
edition, ed. Christine Pierce and Donald VanDeVeer (Belmont: Wadsworth, 1995), 
p. 258. 
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both of these proposals provide conservationists with additional grounds 
for pursuing their species-oriented policies. As with animal integrity, both 
approaches provide some grounds for ecological restorations that require 
the removal of certain species from an ecosystem. 
Compromise on the part of welfarists is also reflected in the guidelines 
prepared by the Universities Federation for Animal Welfare (UFAW) 
regarding the reintroduction into the wild of animals bred in captivity. As 
reported by Benjamin Beck, these guidelines include the following: "If 
there are good reasons for believing that a viable wild population can be 
established from the reintroduced animals then the risk to an individual 
may be compensated for by the gain for conservation." 22 This suggests a 
willingness to prioritise the conservation of biodiversity over safeguarding 
animal welfare in certain circumstances. 
Welfarist approaches that diminish the level of concern due to individual 
wild animals are not without their flaws. For example, the high value 
placed on animal integrity reflects a fundamentally anthropocentric 
perspective on well-being. As noted by Albert Musschenga, there is a 
considerable distinction between valuing animal integrity as a means for 
improving the welfare of captive animals, and valuing animal integrity 
because of the romantic symbolism associated with the behaviour and 
appearance of wild animals. 23 Such concerns are reiterated by Bovenkerk et 
al., who question the 'objectivity' of animal integrity. 24 This issue is 
22  Benjamin Beck, "Reintroduction, Zoos, Conservation, and Animal Welfare," 
in Ethics on the Ark, ed. Norton, et al., p. 157. 
23 Musschenga, "Naturalness: Beyond Animal Welfare," p. 179. 
24 Bovenkerk, et al., "Brave New Birds," pp. 17-21. 
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discussed further in chapter twelve in relation to the anthropocentrism 
inherent in the desire to preserve wildness despite the risk of losing 
species. 
Another example of the flaws apparent in the welfarist approaches to 
wild nature is Varner's identification of 'obligatory management species'. 
An important aspect of his approach is concern for the welfare of future 
generations of larger mammals, which he argues is compromised to a 
greater extent, compared with other species, because of the increased 
likelihood that they will degrade their habitat. But, in reality, the generation 
of large mammals to follow that which exceeded the carrying capacity will 
be considerably reduced in number because of the limited resources 
available. Hence, individuals of this subsequent generation will not 
necessarily experience a less-satisfying life. This would appear to 
invalidate Varner's criterion for distinguishing 'obligatory management 
species'. An underlying explanation for his approach might be that Varner 
is attempting to rationalise the increased concern typically felt for larger 
species. Such concern arises because they are more 'charismatic' and, by 
virtue of their size, we are more likely to be aware of their suffering. 
V. EXPLANATIONS FOR CONVERGENCE 
As noted above, the convergence between the conservationist and welfarist 
positions can be explained by the different priorities attached to certain 
values within a common value set. Consequently, although conservationists 
prioritise Scientific Concern they remain influenced by Connection, and 
vice-versa for welfarists. Further, both conservationists and welfarists will 
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be influenced to some extent by Autonomy, whereby dissatisfaction with 
the abstractions of society gives rise to feelings of guilt in instances where 
the instrumental forces characteristic of contemporary society have resulted 
in harm to nonhuman life. However, in instances where suffering is the 
result of natural causes, the wild autonomy of the ecosystem is viewed as 
being more significant than the welfare of individual 'components' of the 
ecosystem. 
The influence of Autonomy is apparent in the argument employed by 
Callicott to rationalise ambivalence toward suffering in the wild: 
The natural world as actually constituted is one in which one being 
lives at the expense of others. Each organism, in Darwin's metaphor, 
struggles to maintain its own organic integrity... To live is to be 
anxious about life, to feel pain and pleasure in a fitting mixture, and 
sooner or later to die. That is the way the system works. If nature as 
a whole is good, then pain and death are also good.25 
Similarly, Bryan Norton notes that although conservationists value 
individual wild animals: 
25 Callicott, "Animal Liberation: A Triangular Affair," p. 333. Elliot Sober 
points out that, in this statement, Callicott appears to affirm the fallacious notion 
that whatever is 'natural' is right; a notion that is discussed in detail by Simon 
Hailwood. See Elliot Sober, "Philosophical Problems for Environmentalism," in 
The Preservation of Species: The Value of Biological Diversity, ed. Bryan G. 
Norton (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1986), pp. 180-84; Simon 
Hailwood, How To Be a Green Liberal: Nature, Value and Liberal Philosophy, 
(Chesham: Acumen, 2004), pp. 57-88. 
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we value their wildness more; to respect their wildness is, in effect, 
to refrain from placing a moral value on their welfare or their 
suffering... It is to treat them as a separate community, one with 
which we limit our interactions in order to encourage its autonomy 
from our own society. We also value wild animals as part of natural 
processes. I believe that our interactions with animals in the wild 
take on a moral dimension only at the population and species level, 
not at the individual leve1. 26 
However, both these responses overlook another possibility, being that the 
lack of moral consideration for wild animals in natural circumstances 
might be the product of circumstance. Most people in contemporary 
western societies are rarely exposed to suffering in the wild, and when they 
are, such as while viewing a nature documentary, during a chance 
encounter in a national park, or when a cat is seen playing with a soon to 
be eaten bird, the fate of the wild animal often concerns them. At this 
point, the motive of Connection asserts itself. This explanation bears some 
relation to Callicott's later suggestion that the lower priority attached to the 
welfare of individual wild animals results from their being less integrated 
within our evolved understanding of community than are domesticated 
animals!' However, reference to evolution here is superfluous. Someone 
who has equal contact with wild and domesticated animals may be just as 
26  Bryan Norton, "A Broader Look at Animal Stewardship," in Ethics on the 
Ark, ed. Norton, et al., p. 105. 
27 J. Baird Callicott, "Animal Liberation and Environmental Ethics: Back 
Together Again," in The Animal Rights/ Environmental Ethics Debate: The 
Environmental Perspective, ed. Eugene C. Hargrove (Albany: State University of 
New York Press, 1992), pp. 249-61. 
256 
concerned about the welfare of the former as they are about the latter, 
suggesting that the privileged place of domesticated animals within our 
'evolved' understanding of community may not be as significant in 
stimulating concern as our own personal experience of community. 
One example that illustrates many of these issues is provided by a 
program in the Netherlands whereby certain domesticated breeds of farm 
animal have been introduced into a wild setting and managed using a 
'hands-off' approach. What has attracted the concern of animal rights 
groups, not to mention members of the general public, is the mortality 
experienced by these populations during harsh winters.28 A government 
report into the effects of the 2004/05 winter indicate that 22 percent of the 
red deer, 14 percent of the horses, and 34 percent of the cattle did not 
survive. 29 The root of the community concern is that the Dutch herbivores, 
despite being wild (insofar as they form viable populations despite limited 
human intervention), are not yet perceived as wild: 
Since Henk cattle still look like cows and Konik horses look like 
riding school horses, people think that they should be treated like 
these domesticated animals. With unbrushed and matted coats they 
seem to be neglected. The rangers themselves prefer to differentiate 
28 Irene Klaver, Jozef Keulartz, Henk van den Belt and Bait Gremmen, "Born to 
be Wild: A Pluralistic Ethics Concerning Introduced Large Herbivores in the 
Netherlands," Environmental Ethics 24 (2002): 5-7. 
29 C.J.G. Wensing and H.J.L. Vonhoff, "2004-2005 Winter Mortality in Large 
Herbivores 
in the Oostvaardersplassen," Advisory report RLG 05/8a by the Council on 
Animal Affairs and the Council for Rural Areas, June 2005. 
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as little as possible between the originally domesticated animals... 
and the wild animals in their areas, the red deer and the roe. 30 
On this basis it could be expected that as the animals survive more winters 
and produce offspring better adapted to such conditions, and as people get 
used to the idea that these are wild rather than domesticated animals, there 
might be less community concern about natural threats to their welfare. 
However, because large species like horse and cow are more likely to 
arouse the motive of Connection, and because there is likely to be a high 
level of public awareness of what takes place in the Dutch reserves, 
concern for suffering experienced by these species may well persist 
indefinitely. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
With the inherent value of biodiversity primarily inspired by the motive 
of Scientific Concern, and with further consideration of Larger Context 
unwarranted because of its non-specific quality, it is apparent that 
biodiversity-focused conservation has the potential to clash with values of 
nature that reflect the dominance of Connection or Autonomy. This 
potential for conflict is reflected in actual debates surrounding animal 
welfare and the naturalness of ecological restoration. However, despite this 
potential, there are also crucial areas of convergence. 
Debate between animal welfare activists and proponents of biodiversity 
conservation is generated by the willingness of the latter to condone the 
suffering or death of sentient animals for the benefit of native species and 
30 Klaver, et al., "Born to be Wild," p. 7. 
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ecosystems. However, despite the high potential for conflict on issues 
relating to the rights of individuals versus species and ecosystems, some 
convergence between the two positions is apparent on the moral 
considerability of wild animals in natural circumstances. The explanation 
presented here is that both positions share a common set of values, 
generated by the motives comprising the axiology of inherent value. 
Connection, Scientific Concern, and Autonomy exert their influence on 
both conservationists and welfarists, although the former prioritise 
Scientific Concern, while the latter prioritise Connection. Conflict arises 
only when biodiversity is threatened by actions taken to prevent harm to 
individual animals, or when individual animals are harmed in order to 
conserve biodiversity. In relation to the welfare of wild animals in natural 
circumstances, the influence of Autonomy, combined with the lack of 
exposure of most people to animal suffering in the wild, gives rise to 
convergence between the two positions on this issue. 
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Chapter Eleven 
MOTIVE CONFLICT AND CONVERGENCE: 
ECOLOGICAL RESTORATION 
We wish to protect and preserve wild nature, but it appears that to do so we 
must accommodate a rather hard-nosed scientific positivism which in the 
biological sciences takes the form of an equally hard-nosed management 
style. The result... is that we can save natural diversity only by destroying 
nature's own wild order. The alternative, 'letting nature sort things out,' is 
not seriously considered. Indeed it has become anathema, for even our 
pathetic attempts at control would be better than letting natural order rule 
the natural world. 
Jack Turner (1996) 1 
I cannot state a preference in this wide sweep of opinions, from pure 
hands-off romanticism to thorough overmanagement (though I trust that 
most of us would condemn both extremes). Absolute answers to such 
ethical and aesthetic questions do not exist in any case. But we will not 
achieve clarity on this issue if we advocate a knee-jerk equation of 'native' 
with morally best, and fail to recognize the ethical power of a contrary 
view, supporting a sensitive cultivation of all plants, whatever their 
geographic origin, that can enhance nature and bring both delight and 
utility to humans. 
Stephen Jay Gould (1998) 2 
I Jack Turner, The Abstract Wild, (Tucson: The University of Arizona Press, 
1996), p. 117. 
2 Stephen Jay Gould, "An Evolutionary Perspective on Strengths, Fallacies, and 
Confusions in the Concept of Native Plants," Arnoldia 58 (1998): 19. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
This chapter continues the investigation of conflicts between the values of 
biodiversity and the values of nature, with the focus shifting from the 
welfare of wild animals to the debate surrounding the naturalness of 
ecological restoration. In the previous chapter it was suggested that this 
debate reflects a clash of values between those associated with Scientific 
Concern and Autonomy. As in the previous chapter, the potential for 
conflict and convergence between the opposing positions will be examined, 
but first, the respective positions must be delineated. 
II. THE NATURALNESS VERSUS WILDNESS 
DEBATE 
There has been considerable debate in the conservation literature as to 
whether wilderness areas ought to be managed to enhance naturalness or 
wildness.3 In this context, 'wildness' is generally taken to refer to the 
3 See, for example, Peter B. Landres, Mark W. Brunson, Linda Merigliano, 
Charisse Sydoriak and Steve Morton, "Naturalness and Wildness: The Dilemma 
and Irony of Managing Wilderness," in Wilderness Science in a Time of Change 
Conference — Volume 5: Wilderness Ecosystems, Threats, and Management, 
comps. David N. Cole, Stephen F. McCool, William T. Borne and Jennifer 
O'Loughlin (Ogden: Rocky Mountain Research Station, 2000), pp. 377-81; 
Michael E. Soule, "Should Wilderness Be Managed?" in Return of the Wild: The 
Future of Our National Lands, ed. Ted Kerasote (Washington, DC: Island Press, 
2001), pp. 136-52; David M. Graber, "Ecological Restoration in Wilderness: 
Natural Versus Wild in National Park Service Wilderness," The George Wright 
Forum 20 (2003): 34-41; Mark Woods, "Ecological Restoration and the Renewal 
of Wildness and Freedom," in Recognizing the Autonomy of Nature: Theory and 
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quality of being `untramelled'. As noted in chapter nine, this term is found 
in the United States Wilderness Act of 1964, and refers to the absence of 
deliberate human control. 'Naturalness' is taken to refer to species and 
ecosystems that are consistent with defined historical benchmarks. The 
'dilemma' of wilderness management is that when the Wilderness Act was 
drafted there was an expectation that wildness was conducive to 
naturalness, whereas it is now understood that without active manipulation 
natural areas are unlikely to conform with benchmarks of naturalness. 4 
An impediment to achieving clarity in this debate is the terms in which it 
is framed. In chapter six, the existence of two conflicting interpretations of 
naturalness was discussed. One of these relates to consistency with 
historical benchmarks, while the other describes processes that reflect an 
absence of rationally-planned intervention. It was suggested that the 
persistent use of the former was potentially inconsistent with the latter. 
Such inconsistencies are most apparent when it is claimed by conservation 
biologists that human intervention can enhance naturalness. Framing the 
debate in terms of 'naturalness' and 'wildness' is also problematic because 
of the ease with which they can be confused. Where 'naturalness' describes 
the absence of rationally-planned human intervention, 'wildness' describes 
behaviour that is not rationally-planned. The latter is a subset of the former. 
Considerable ambiguity occurs when these terms are used to describe the 
condition of species, ecosystems and landscapes, rather than processes and 
Practice, ed. Thomas Heyd (New York: Columbia University Press, 2005), pp. 
170-88. 
4 David N. Cole, "Paradox of the Primeval: Ecological Restoration in 
Wilderness," Ecological Restoration 18 (2000): 77-86. Landres, et al., 
"Naturalness and Wildness," pp. 377-81. 
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behaviour. This shift in context generates inconsistencies as it separates the 
terms from their core meanings. 
The naturalness versus wildness debate is closely related to the debate 
between restorationists and preservationists that features prominently 
within the environmental ethics literature. These terms are also misleading, 
•given that those who support ecological restoration do not necessarily 
oppose wilderness preservation, and vice-versa. The debate is better 
described as being between those who are inclined to believe that human 
intervention is necessary to protect the values associated with nature, and 
those who view the values of nature as demanding a minimum of human 
intervention. Interventionists are those for whom priority is accorded to the 
conservation of biodiversity, and who are primarily motivated by Scientific 
Concern, while noninterventionists are those who seek to promote the 
values of naturalness and wildness, and are primarily motivated by 
Autonomy. 
III. THE INTERVENTIONISTS 
•The promotion of interventionist policies in order to conserve biodiversity 
is most strongly associated with the scientific sub-disciplines of 
conservation biology and restoration ecology. In consequence, the 
interventionist position is now strongly entrenched within bureaucratic 
structures charged with managing natural areas. However, this is not to say 
that other perspectives have no role to play in the management of natural 
areas; criteria such as wild character, animal welfare, visitor satisfaction, 
scientific value, and economic return also play an important role. However, 
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in situations where intervention is necessary to meet biodiversity 
conservation targets, it is generally the interventionist position that will 
prevail, not least because of the international impetus for national 
governments to enshrine this course of action within legislation. 
With conservation biology and the increasing dominance of biodiversity 
described in earlier chapters, we only need briefly examine restoration 
ecology before proceeding to consideration of the noninterventionist 
position. Restoration ecology involves the manipulation of the natural 
environment in order to establish conditions beneficial for native 
biodiversity. Although restoration, at least in the United States, had long 
been a feature of nature conservation legislation, it was not until 1981 that 
the first scientific journal dedicated to this practice was established. This 
was Restoration and Management Notes, published by the University of 
Wisconsin Arboretum, the founding editor of which was William Jordan. 
In 1989, the Society for Ecological Restoration (SER) was formed and 
initiated a new journal, Restoration Ecology, in 1993. Restoration and 
Management Notes became Ecological Restoration in 1999 and, although 
still owned by the University, is run by members of the SER.' Another 
relevant journal is Ecological Management and Restoration, which was 
established in 2000 by the Ecological Society of Australia. Articles relating 
to the ethics and practice of restoration are also regularly found in the 
various journals relating to conservation biology and environmental ethics. 
According to the SER, "ecological restoration is the process of assisting 
the recovery of an ecosystem that has been degraded, damaged, or 
5  See the websites of the SER (http://ser.org/about.asp;  
http://www.ecologicalrestoration.info ). 
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destroyed." This involves "attempts to return an ecosystem to its historic 
trajectory", with the principal objective being recovery. The primary 
criterion for determining whether this has been achieved is the presence of 
"a characteristic assemblage of species". 6 There is an important distinction 
between restoration and rehabilitation, with the latter involving "the 
reparation of ecosystem processes, productivity and services" while the 
former includes "the re-establishment of the pre-existing biotic integrity in 
terms of species composition and community structure."' From the 
perspective of the conflict surrounding ecological restoration it is 
significant that the opening statement by the SER in their restoration 
primer is: "ecological restoration is an intentional activity"! 
Aside from those people who specifically consider themselves to be 
aligned with conservation biology or restoration ecology, the 
interventionist camp also includes the large number of people who consider 
themselves to be environmentalists or otherwise concerned for the fate of 
nature, who consequently believe that the conservation of biodiversity and 
the prevention of species extinction is a moral imperative, yet are relatively 
unaware of the possible conflict between this position and the preservation 
of wildness. 
6 SER, The SER International Primer on Ecological Restoration, (Tucson: 
Society for Ecological Restoration International, 2004), pp. 1-3. 
7 Ibid., p. 12. 
8 /bid., p. 1. 
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IV. THE NONINTERVENTIONISTS 
In contrast to the interventionists, who are well-represented by organised 
groups, the preservationists, or noninterventionists, tend to consist of 
individuals expressing their dissatisfaction with the dominant position.9 
Associated with the noninterventionist position are a number of 
environmental philosophers, most prominently Robert Elliot," Eric Katz" 
and Holmes Rolston, " although others, such as Neil Evemden and 
Thomas Birch, have also written about the paradox of managing 
`wildness'." More recently, the principal spokesmen have been wilderness 
advocates like Jack Tumer, I4 David Cole," and Peter Taylor." One also 
9 As discussed in chapter one, the terms 'conservationist' and 'preservationist' 
have shifted in meaning since first used in the context of the protection of nature. 
It should also be noted that use of the term 'preservationist' to describe those who 
advocate a 'hands-off' approach to managing natural areas is not consistent with 
the literal definition of the term, which could be taken to mean protecting 
something from all change, natural or anthropogenic. 
113 See, for example, Robert Elliot, "Faking Nature," Inquiry 25 (1982): 81-93; 
Robert Elliot, Faking Nature: The Ethics of Environmental Restoration, (London: 
Roudedge, 1997). 
I I See, for example, Eric Katz, "The Big Lie: The Human Restoration of 
Nature," Research in Philosophy and Technology 12 (1992): 231-41; Eric Katz, 
Nature as Subject: Human Obligation and the Natural Community, (Lanham: 
Rowman & Littlefield, 1997). 
12 See, for example, Holmes Rolston, "The Wilderness Idea Reaffirmed," 
Environmental Professional 13 (1991): 370-77. 
13 See, for example, Neil Evernden, The Natural Alien, (Toronto: University of 
Toronto Press, 1985); Neil Evernden, The Social Creation of Nature, (Baltimore: 
Johns Hopkins University Press, 1992); Thomas Birch, "The Incarceration of 
Wildness: Wilderness Areas as Prisons," Environmental Ethics 12 (1990): 3-26. 
14 See, for example, Turner, The Abstract Wild, (Tucson: The University of 
Arizona Press, 1996); Jack Turner, "The Wild and its New Enemies," in Return of 
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detects noninterventionist sympathies in many authors who have 
considered the significance of non-equilibrium ecology for conservation. 
By emphasising the inherent instability of ecosystems, whether disturbed 
by humans or not, non-equilibrium ecology casts doubt over various 
justifications for the active maintenance of particular species communities; 
a perspective compatible with the noninterventionist position!' Sympathy 
is also found among those, like Potter et al., who point out the long-term 
environmental benefits of the abandonment of agricultural land. 18 
Although organisations expressly devoted to promoting nonintervention 
in nature are rare, it has been known for such groups to be formed in 
response to particular events. For example, in the case of the 1996 Chicago 
the Wild: The Future of Our National Lands, ed. Ted Kerasote (Washington, DC: 
Island Press, 2001), pp. 119-35. 
15 See, for example, David N. Cole, "Symbolic Values: The Overlooked Values 
That Make Wilderness Unique," International Journal of Wilderness 11(2005): 
10, 23-27. 
16  Peter Taylor, Beyond Conservation: A Wild/and Strategy, (London: 
Earthscan, 2005) 
17 See, for example, Mark Sagoff, "Muddle or Muddle Through? Takings 
Jurisprudence Meets the Endangered Species Act," William and Mary Law Review 
38 (1997): 825-993; Nigel S. Cooper "How Natural is a Nature Reserve?: An 
Ideological Study of British Nature Conservation Landscapes," Biodiversity and 
Conservation 9(2000): 1140-43; Steven Trudgill, The Terrestrial Biosphere: 
Environmental Change, Ecosystem Science, Attitudes and Values, (Harlow: 
Pearson Education, 2001), pp. 117-135; William M. Adams, "When Nature Won't 
Stay. Still: Conservation, Equilibrium and Control," in Decolonizing Nature: 
Strategies for Conservation in a Post-Colonial Era, eds. William M. Adams and 
Martin Mulligan (London: Earthscan Publications, 2003), pp. 220-46. 
18 Clive Potter, Paul Burnham, Angela Edwards, Ruth Gasson and Bryn Green, 
The Diversion of Land: Conservation in a Period of Farming Contraction, 
(London: Routledge, 1991), pp. 92-93. 
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Restoration Controversy, when attempts to transform forested areas into 
historic prairie ecosystems met with public opposition, a number of 
noninterventionist community groups were formed, such as the Alliance To 
Let Nature Take Its Course. ° 
Despite the apparent dominance of the interventionist perspective, it 
cannot be said that noninterventionist sentiment has been entirely 
overwhelmed within mainstream society by a focus on biodiversity 
conservation. A study of people involved in forest management in the 
United States, for example, identified that at least half of the 44 people 
surveyed believed that 'nature knew best' and that, if left to itself, a 
'balance of nature' would be achieved." It should be noted that conflicting 
opinions regarding ecological restoration were not examined by the survey, 
and consequently many of those who believed that 'nature knew best' 
might also support intervention in nature for conservation purposes. 
Nonetheless, it does indicate a high base level of sympathy, at least among 
those who participated, for the notion that nature ought to be left to its own 
devices. 
However, this raises the important question of the extent to which 
disagreement over these issues has moved beyond the pages of academic 
journals and actually galvanised public opinion. The answer is that high 
19 Paul H. Gobster, "Restoring Nature: Human Actions, Interactions, and 
Reactions," in Restoring Nature: Perspectives from the Social Sciences and 
Humanities, ed. Paul H. Gobster and R. Bruce Hull (Washington, DC: Island 
Press, 2000), p. 3. 
20 R. Bruce Hull, David P. Robinson, David Richert, Erin Seekamp and Gregory 
J. Buhyoff, "Assumptions About Ecological Scale and Nature Knowing Best 
Hiding in Environmental Decisions," Conservation Ecology 6 (2002): 1-15. 
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profile disputes are extremely rare. The dispute subjected to the most 
analysis is that which took place in Chicago, mentioned above, while 
Debra Shore briefly describes two other cases that have gained publicity in 
the United States. 2 ' Paul Gobster, a social scientist working with the United 
States Forest Service, who was also involved in the study of the Chicago 
dispute, indicates on his website that he is currently investigating a similar 
fracas in San Francisco. 22 In Australia, evidence is difficult to find of 
restoration projects that have generated community opposition. Several 
projects have been identified that resulted in irate letters to the local 
newspaper but little more.23 
It is- apparent that the marginal status of the noninterventionist position 
is a relatively recent phenomenon. A good example of this shift is provided 
by the case of the California condor. In the mid-1980s, the wild condor 
population had dropped to such low levels that its extinction was assured, 
yet plans by such organisations as the Fish and Wildlife Service to trap the 
remaining birds in order to establish a captive breeding program were 
opposed by a variety of environmentalists: 
Condors embodied wild nature and justified the protection of 
wilderness areas as critical endangered species habitat; in return, 
wilderness endowed the condor with its symbolic capital. Some took 
21 Debra Shore, "Controversy Erupts Over Restoration in Chicago Area," 
Restoration & Management Notes 15 (1997): 28. 
22 See Paul Gobster's website (http://ncrs.fs.fed.us/people/Gobster).  
23 A controversial project proposed for a foreshore suburb of Sydney in 2004 is 
not relevant to this discussion as it involved the restoration of a suburban park, not 
a natural area. See Phil McManus, "Mangrove Battlelines: Culture/Nature and 
Ecological Restoration," Australian Geographer 37(2006): 57-71. 
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this argument even further, claiming that real condors only lived in 
the wilderness and that intensive scientific management by 
definition robbed them of their wild essence. Condors would be 
better off left alone under any circumstances, even if doing so led to 
their extinction.24 
Opinions of this sort recall the notion of 'animal integrity', discussed in the 
previous chapter. 
Peter Alagona notes that since 1992, when the first artificially reared 
condors began to be reintroduced into the wild, there has been a 
widespread conversion of those formerly opposed to the program. The vast 
majority of environmental activists are now in favour of the scientific 
management of wild nature to prevent extinctions. 25 In a similar vein, 
Turner observed in 1996 that: 
During the past five years conservation biology has extended its 
influence to radical environmentalism, inverting themes that once 
legitimized its radical content. The transformation of part of Earth 
First! into Wild Earth was a movement from personal trust and 
confrontation to trust in abstractions and conciliation with 
technology... Whereas science, technology, and modernity were 
once part of the problem, now they are a large part of the solution, 
24 Peter S. Alagona, "Biography of a 'Feathered Pig': The California Condor 
Conservation Controversy," Journal of the History of Biology 37 (2004): 568. 
25 Ibid., p. 580. 
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and I fear that the Wildlands Project may reduce Wild Earth... to the 
political arm of a scientific discipline. 26 
Another advocate of nonintervention notes the tendency of wilderness 
campaigners to resort to biodiversity-oriented arguments when their real 
concern is the need to preserve wildness. Their use of such arguments 
reflects the pragmatic recognition that, in the current climate, biodiversity 
values carry greater legal weight. 27 
As Turner suggests, the increasing conjunction of nature conservation 
and interventionist policies is associated with the rise in influence of 
conservation biology and, as discussed in chapter two, the associated 
incorporation of the concept of biodiversity within environmental 
management systems. These trends are themselves partly generated by the 
growing realisation that human pressure is causing many species to become 
extinct, and that active human management is required to create and 
maintain the environmental conditions upon which they depend. Earlier 
policies of nonintervention, employed in places like Wicken Fen in the 
United Kingdom and many of the national parks in the United States, have 
generally been superseded when it became apparent that 'hands-off 
policies led to ecosystem changes detrimental to some valued species. 28 
26 Turner, The Abstract Wild, pp. 118-19. 
27 James M. Glover, "Soul of the Wilderness: Can We Stop Trying to Control 
Nature?" International Journal of Wilderness 6 (2000): 5. 
28 Trudgill, The Terrestrial Biosphere, pp. 116-21; MaryBeth Keifer, Nathan L. 
Stephenson and Jeff Manley, "Prescribed Fire as the Minimum Tool for 
Wilderness Forest and Fire Regime Restoration: A Case Study from the Sierra 
Nevada, California," in Wilderness Science in a Time of Change Conference — 
Volume 5: Wilderness Ecosystems, Threats, and Management, comps. David N. 
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Such factors provide convincing reasons for why the noninterventionist 
position is currently out of favour with environmentalists. 
V. DISTINGUISHING THE OPPOSING POSITIONS 
The potential for convergence between the opposing positions relates to the 
difficulty involved in firmly delineating one from the other. Extreme 
positions are rarely espoused; interventionists do not, generally, feel 
comfortable with all forms of intervention, while most noninterventionists 
are willing to support intervention in certain circumstances. William 
Jordan, for example, one of the central figures in the ecological restoration 
movement, notes that an important goal of restorationists is to minimise the 
extent of human manipulation.29 Similarly, Rolston defends restoration 
against claims by other noninterventionists, noting that "restorations do not 
fake so much as facilitate nature, help it along, mostly by undoing the 
damage that humans have introduced, and then letting nature do for 
itself."3° 
It is apparent that, while noninterventionists might reject ecological 
restoration, they will generally support rehabilitation. The most basic form 
of human impact on nature consists of actions that diminish the capacity of 
the environment to support self-sustaining life. At their most extreme, 
human actions render it virtually impossible for life to flourish, and include 
Cole, Stephen F. McCool, William T. Borne and Jennifer O'Loughlin (Ogden: 
Rocky Mountain Research Station, 2000), pp. 266-69. 
29 William R. Jordan, "Autonomy, Restoration, and the Law of Nature," in 
Recognizing the Autonomy of Nature, ed. Heyd, p. 203. 
30 Holmes Rolston, Conserving Natural Value, (New York: Columbia 
University Press, 1994), p. 92. 
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the toxic pollution of land and water, the construction of impervious 
, barriers (like houses or dams) over the land or in water, the removal of soil, 
and intensive agricultural activities. In order to enable such areas to once 
again support self-sustaining life to an extent that might eventually be 
considered 'natural', rehabilitation, rather than restoration, is sufficient. 
The focus of rehabilitation is on "the reparation of ecosystem processes, 
productivity and services, whereas the goals of restoration also include the 
re-establishment of the pre-existing biotic integrity in terms of species 
composition and community structure.' 531 Rehabilitation seems largely 
consistent with the noninterventionist position, as it enables nonhuman life 
to flourish in a place where human actions had rendered it difficult. 
Andrew Light presents the beneficial outcomes of such activities in 
opposition to the claim by Katz that ecological restoration is just another 
manifestation of the human domination of nature. 32 Light's argument that 
such activities do not constitute human domination of nature is persuasive, 
although it is weakened by his failure to appreciate that such outcomes can 
largely be achieved through rehabilitation, without requiring the additional 
work associated with ecological restoration. 
Similar distinctions complicate the interpretation of a study into the 
'restoration discourses' held by 26 people involved in river and catchment 
restoration in the United States. John Woolley and Michael McGinnis 
identified four significant discourses, including one that was critical of 
many of the values associated with restoration, and preferred preservation 
31 SER, The SER International Primer, p. 12. 
32  Andrew Light, "Restoration, Autonomy, and Domination," in Recognizing 
the Autonomy of Nature, ed. Heyd, pp.158-59. 
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as a strategy. 33 A possible explanation for this apparent contradiction is that 
a common motivation for engaging in restoration activities is an altruistic/ 
ecocentric desire to reverse the damage caused to nature by humans. 34 For 
many involved in ecological restoration, this might well be associated with 
the view that human intervention in nature is only justified in situations 
where human damage is apparent, which is itself consistent with a 
preference for nonintervention, and the view that "the ideal of restoration is 
to make itself, in the long run, unnecessary. /05 However, because many 
ecological changes can be linked in some way to human activities, most 
restoration projects would, on this criterion, be deemed acceptable by those 
restorationists who actually prefer preservation. 
Distinguishing between the two positions is determined by the relative 
importance placed on global biodiversity. For the non-interventionist, 
intervention is only justified when the flourishing of life is seriously 
impeded by past human activity. The same applies to the interventionist, 
except that the flourishing of life is viewed as equivalent to the 
maintenance of global biodiversity, which is threatened by decline in 
populations of species that were well-established in an area prior to the 
advent of industrial society. The resistance of the non-interventionist to the 
need to consider global biodiversity is explained by the dominant motive of 
33 John T. Woolley and Michael Vincent McGinnis, "The Conflicting 
Discourses of Restoration," Society & Natural Resources 13 (2000): 339-57. 
34 See, for example, Robert L. Ryan and Robert E. Grese, "Urban Volunteers 
and the Environment: Forest and Prairie Restoration," in Urban Place: 
Reconnecting With the Natural World, ed. Peggy F. Barlett (Cambridge: The MIT 
Press, 2005), pp. 176-77. 
35 Bill Willers, "Introduction," in Unmanaged Landscapes: Voices for Untamed 
Nature, ed. Bill Willers (Washington, DC: Island Press, 1999), p. 2. 
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Autonomy. The high degree of abstraction involved in assessing 
biodiversity and orienting management to the conservation of biodiversity 
is inconsistent with the dissatisfactiouexperienced by the non-
interventionist toward the abstractions of modern society. This perspective 
is captured best by Turner: 
The Otherness of the natural world is consumed by current social 
policy, and the new doctors of nature go about their mission — 
evangelists laboring once more amongst wild populations (now 
plants and animals instead of peoples) bringing the gift of modern 
order and our current version of salvation — the preservation of 
biodiversity. This salvation implies trust in abstract systems, and 
since the lay person has neither the knowledge or ability to evaluate 
the foundations of these abstract systems, our trust is less a matter of 
knowledge than of faith... Trust in abstract systems and experts 
disembeds our relations to nature from their proper context. This is 
precisely why so many of us will no longer place our trust in 
science: it ignores individual places, people, flora, and fauna. 36 
In a later passage he again rails against the abstractions of conservation 
management, calling for natural areas with: 
no conservation strategies, no designer wilderness, no roads, no 
trails, no satellite surveillance, no over-flights with helicopters, no 
radio collars, no measuring devices, no photographs, no GPS data, 
36 Ter The Abstract Wild, p. 118. 
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no databases stuffed with the location of every draba of the summit 
of Mt. Moran, no guidebooks, no topographical maps. 37 
Turner's complaints echo the concerns of Neil Evemden, who warns that 
"in learning to use numbers to talk about the world, [the environmentalist] 
forgets that his initial revolt was partly precipitated by people using 
numbers to talk about the world."38 
However, for the noninterventionist, despite their resistance to such 
abstractions, it seems that the flourishing of nature must, to some extent, 
incorporate species richness. Light describes "the South African ice plant, 
an exotic in southern California that destroys the soil it is introduced to, is 
highly opportunistic and can easily spread onto degraded land, thus 
ensuring that native plants will not be able to reestablish themselves." 39 
Such a plant, although wild and flourishing, is not necessarily compatible 
with the flourishing of nature, especially if the available space in which 
nature can thrive has been severely curtailed by human development. The 
noninterventionist might hope that some natural pathogen takes hold to 
curtail the dominance of the ice plant and enable a greater diversity of 
species to establish. There is a fine line between this hope and the weed 
eradication programs of restorationists. However, a desire for some 
minimum level of species richness is quite distinct from the establishment 
of systems to conserve global biodiversity. Species richness, for example, 
does not necessarily exclude non-native species. As Mark Sagoff 
37 	p. 120. `Draba' refers to Draba ventosa, which is a rare species of small 
flowering plants. 
38 Evemden, The Natural Alien, p. 20. 
39 Light, "Restoration, Autonomy, and Domination," p. 159. 
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emphasises, there are many examples of introduced species that actually 
serve to increase local species richness.° 
Deciding what course of action to take on an issue that might involve 
'benevolent' intervention in nature will incorporate the influence of all four 
motives comprising the axiology. Although Autonomy will dominate the 
inclinations of the noninterventionist, the influence of Scientific Concern 
might tip the balance in favour of the sort of restoration program as the one 
that resulted in the eradication of black rats from Anacapa Island, 
mentioned in the previous chapter. Similarly, someone who would 
normally be associated with interventionist approaches might, through the 
influence of Autonomy, baulk at the prospect of employing genetically 
engineered pathogens to eradicate an introduced species. 4 ' Also influencing 
our decisions are the instrumental reasons we might have for preferring one 
species over another, and the persistent cultural prejudice of many people 
against invasive species, giving rise to the militaristic and nationalist 
metaphors used to describe actions taken to control them.° 
With the distinction between the interventionist and noninterventionist 
positions essentially limited to the degree to which the flourishing of nature 
is perceived as equivalent to the conservation of global biodiversity, there 
4° Mark Sagoff, "Do Non-Native Species Threaten the Natural Environment?" 
Journal of Agricultural and Environmental Ethics 18 (2005): 224-27. 
41 See Turner, "The Wild and its New Enemies," p. 122. 
42 See, for example, Matthew K. Chew and Manfred D. Laubichler, "Natural 
Enemies — Metaphor or Misconception?" Science 301 (2003): 52-53; Brendon 
M.H. Larson, "The War of the Roses: Demilitarizing Invasion Biology," Frontiers 
in Ecology and the Environment 3(2005): 495-500; William O'Brien, "Exotic 
Invasions, Nativism, and Ecological Restoration: On the Persistence of a 
Contentious Debate," Ethics, Place and Environment 9 (2006): 63-77. 
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is considerable potential for convergence between the two, as discussed in 
the following sections. This is followed by an overview of `rewilding', 
which appears to be a phenomenon that satisfies both value orientations. 
VI. HUMAN-NATURE DICHOTOMY 
Ned Hettinger describes "preservationist environmental thought" as 
involving "the following interrelated ideas": 
Nature's value is significantly a function of its degree of 
independence from humanity. Naturalness or wildness is what most 
centrally grounds nature's value. When considerably modified by 
humans, nature loses much of its value and even its essential 
character. A strong conceptual separation exists between humans 
and nature. Nature is to be understood in opposition to humanity; 
nature is the nonhuman. Wilderness is thus quintessential nature. 
Respect for nature most importantly involves the preservation of 
wilderness areas, free from significant human influence. 43 
This 'strong conceptual separation' has long been a subject of interest for 
environmental philosophers, and is seen by many as the underlying cause 
of the environmental crisis. It is claimed that if people viewed themselves 
and their world as more a part of, rather than apart from, the natural world, 
then the well-being of the latter would be understood as integral to the 
well-being of the former, and the 'crisis' would never have eventuated. To 
43 Ned Hettinger, "Respecting Nature's Autonomy in Relationship with 
Humanity," in Recognizing the Autonomy of Nature: Theory and Practice, ed. 
Thomas Heyd (New York: Columbia University Press, 2005), P.  86. 
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• this end, a holistic perspective is strenuously advocated by those associated 
with deep ecology, who seek greater moral consideration of the natural 
world on the basis of expanding the human sphere of identification to 
encompass nature." This is similarly the case for supporters of Aldo 
Leopold's 'land ethic', which also has as its moral foundation greater 
recognition of the human place within a wider non-human community." 
Many restorationists claim that their activities are guided by such goals, 
and on this basis the noninterventionist position is dismissed as one that 
perpetuates an unhealthy relationship with nature." 
Although the separation of humans and nature is widely perceived to be 
the conceptual basis of the noninterventionist position, there are various 
grounds for doubting its significance. A variety of authors have questioned 
the validity and usefulness of grounding moral arguments in the existence 
of such a dichotomy. Neil Evernden, for example, suggests that calls for 
integration, as for the recognition of difference, reinforce the separation of 
nature and humanity, because they both imply that nature is distinct from 
44 Bill Devall and George Sessions, Deep Ecology: Living as if Nature 
Mattered, (Layton: Gibbs Smith, 1985), pp. 65-67; David Rothenberg, Hand's 
End: Technology and the Limits of Nature, (London: University of California 
Press, 1993). 
45 See J. Baird Callicott, "Intrinsic Value, Quantum Theory, and Environmental 
Ethics," Environmental Ethics 7(1985): 257-75. 
46 See, for example, Michael Vincent McGinnis, "Deep Ecology and the 
• Foundations of Restoration," Inquiry 39 (1996): 203-17; William R. Jordan, 
"Sunflower Forest': Ecological Restoration as the Basis for a New Environmental 
Paradigm," in Beyond Preservation: Restoring and Inventing Landscapes, ed. A. 
Dwight Baldwin, Judith de Luce and Carl Pletsch (Minneapolis: University of 
Minnesota Press, 1994), p. 21; Tony Povilitis, "Toward a Robust Natural 
Imperative for Conservation," Conservation Biology 15 (2001): 533-35. 
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humanity. He suggests that all people need to acknowledge the otherness of 
nature, which requires us to remain open to experience and resist 
categorising wild things as either 'us' or 'them' . 47 Criticism by Bernard 
Williams is similarly grounded: 
It is one the stranger paradoxes of many people's attitudes to this 
subject... that while they supposedly reject traditional pictures of 
human beings as discontinuous from nature in virtue of reason, and 
they remind us all the time that other species share the same world 
with us on (so to speak) equal terms, they unhesitatingly carry over 
into their picture of human beings a moral transcendence over 
nature, which makes us uniquely able, and therefore uniquely 
obliged, to detach ourselves from any natural determination of our 
behaviour."'" 
Peter Fritzell identifies this tendency in the writings of Aldo Leopold, 
noting that frequent assertions of human equivalence to nature are routinely 
contradicted by other observations demonstrating that humans stand 
outside the natural order. 49 
Val Plumwood argues that although disconnecting the self from the 
other ignores the degree to which our self-understanding is dependent on 
the other: 
47 Evernden, The Social Creation of Nature, pp. 96-131. 
48 Bernard Williams, Making Sense of Humanity and Other Philosophical 
Papers 1982-1993, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995), p. 237. 
48 Peter A. Fritzell, "The Conflicts of Ecological Conscience," in Companion to 
A Sand County Almanac: Interpretative & Critical Essays, ed. J. Baird Callicott 
(Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1987), pp. 141-44. 
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we also need to stress the difference and divergent agency of the 
other in order to defeat... the colonizing dynamic that seeks to 
assimilate and instrumentalize the other, recognizing and valuing 
them only as a part of self, alike to self, or as means to self s ends. 5° 
Piers Stephens seeks recognition of the validity of both positions because 
"in order to defend nature as natural, it must be distinguishable for 
argumentative purposes, but the green insistence on the place of humanity 
in nature must also be respected." 5 ' David Cooper observes that "human 
beings stand in countless relationships to The Environment and its 
constituents, and it is senseless to ask of these en bloc whether they should 
be relationships of unity within a whole or contrast with what is `other'." 52 
Kay Milton pragmatically suggests that "conservationists cannot abandon 
the nature-culture dichotomy because it is too important to them: it is a part 
of what they are striving to conserve". 53 Similarly, in his response to deep 
ecology, Peter Reed argues that "it is our very separateness from the Earth, 
50 Val Plumwood, "Deep Ecology, Deep Pockets, and Deep Problems," in 
Beneath the Surface: Critical Essays in the Philosophy ofDeep Ecology, ed. Eric 
Katz, Andrew Light and David Rothenberg (Cambridge: MIT Press, 2000), p. 64. 
51 Piers H.G. Stephens, "Nature, Purity, Ontology," Environmental Values 9 
(2000): 270. 
52 David E. Cooper, "The Idea of Envirorunent", in The Environment in 
Question: Ethics and Global Issues, ed. David E. Cooper and Joy A. Palmer 
(London: Routledge, 1992), p. 177. 
53 Kay Milton, "Nature is Already Sacred", Environmental Values 8 (1999): 
443. 
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the gulf between the human and the natural, that makes us want to do right 
by the Earth."54 
The dominant message gleaned from such authors is that people will 
view nature as connected or separate from humanity depending on the 
context. That the interventionist position has become associated with the 
notion of humans and nature being connected can be explained by its 
apparent compatibility with a willingness to intervene in natural processes. 
Similarly, nonintervention and nature-human separateness seem connected 
because this position advocates respect for nature's autonomy. However, 
despite these seemingly straightforward associations, it is wrong to suggest 
that a particular perspective on the dichotomy is fundamental to either 
position. The primary significance of the dichotomy for environmentalists 
is that uncaring attitudes toward the loss of nature have traditionally been 
associated with a refusal to acknowledge the extent of human dependence 
on nature. The human-nature dichotomy is thus a useful way to distinguish 
environmentalists from those who view nature only as a resource. 
Restorationists therefore gain valuable moral high ground by claiming that 
preservationists share with anti-environmentalists an unwillingness to 
acknowledge ecological relationships. This claim is not baseless, insofar as 
the motive of Autonomy, and the noninterventionist position, is primarily 
associated with the value of naturalness. Hence the desire to collect and use 
ecological knowledge for human benefit can be viewed as being of 
secondary importance to promotion of naturalness. But, despite this value 
preference, noninterventionists recognise the significance to human well- 
54 Peter Reed, "Man Apart: An Alternative to the Self-Realization Approach," 
Environmental Ethics 11 (1989): 56. 
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being of minimising our impact on nature, even though this is not their 
primary reason for protecting nature. Even Katz, who is generally seen to 
personify the anti-restoration cause, strenuously promotes the necessity of 
incorporating ecological insights within environmental philosophy. 55 
The inconsistencies generated by insisting that the dichotomy represents 
a crucial distinction between different conservationist positions are 
revealed in the attempt by Callicott, Crowder and Mumford to describe 
'two new schools of conservation thought', termed `compositionalism' and 
'functionalism'. They suggest that compositionalists "tend to think that 
people are a case apart from nature", while functionalists "tend to think 
that people are a part of nature and that Homo sapiens is no less natural 
than any other species." This implies that interventionists are functionalists 
and noninterventionists are compositionalists. Yet this does not tally with 
the authors' contention that "biological diversity, biological integrity, and 
ecological restoration are more at home in the compositionalist glossary." 56 
Not only does this inconsistency suggest that Callicott et a/. did not 
consider the restoration-preservation debate when formulating their 
hypothesis, it also highlights the risks associated with translating the 
human-nature dichotomy into value distinctions discernible in the real 
world. 
Similar inconsistencies are apparent in the 'archetypical normative 
views of nature' identified by Tybirk etal. They suggest that the belief that 
55 Eric Katz, "Against the Inevitability of Anthropocentrism," in Beneath the 
Swface: Critical Essays in the Philosophy of Deep Ecology, ed. Eric Katz, 
Andrew Light and David Rothenberg (Cambridge: MIT Press, 2000), p. 30. 
56 J Baird Callicott, Larry B. Crowder and Karen Mumford, "Current 
Normative Concepts in Conservation," Conservation Biology 13 (1999): 24. 
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humans and nature are connected gives rise to the 'Ecologist View of 
Nature', while the belief that they are separate gives rise to the 'Naturalist 
View'. 57 Consequently, the values associated with the Ecologist View are 
seen as compatible with organic farming, while those associated with the 
Naturalist View are limited to the appreciation of undisturbed natural areas. 
Although this distinction makes some sense in the context of assessing the 
'nature quality' of organic farming, it is not tenable when applied to 
ecological restoration. The belief that humans and nature are connected 
suggests that the 'Ecologist View' is equivalent to the interventionist 
position, yet the authors state that "the distinction between introduced and 
native is not crucial from the Ecologist View,"58 which does not correlate 
with the demand by interventionists that introduced species be 
exterminated. 
VII. NONANTHROPOCENTRISM 
An interesting facet of the debate between reitorationists and 
preservationists that reveals the divergent influence of underlying motives 
are the claims from either side that their position is less anthropocentric. 
Stephen Budiansky, for example, suggests of the noninterventionist 
57 Knud Tybirlc, Hugo F. Alive and Pia Frederiksen, "Nature Quality in Organic 
Farming: A Conceptual Analysis of Considerations and Criteria in a European 
Context," Journal of Agricultural and Environmental Ethics 17 (2004): 253-55. 
The authors also identify a `Culturist View of Nature', although being associated 
with the utilitarian values of nature it is not relevant to this discussion. 
58 Ibid., p. 254. 
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position that "a more anthropocentric view of nature is hard to imagine." 59 
Michael Soule claims to consider the "non-anthropocentric perspective" 
when he suggests that if "all species could vote... the result of the election 
would likely be an overwhelming plurality in favor" of conserving 
biodiversity through active intervention. 60 
In opposition, Turner directs this accusation back toward 
interventionists: 
What used to be the goal of conservation — the preservation of the 
natural world and its own order — has been [reinterpreted as] 
neglect... Disagree with conservation biology and you find yourself 
in the corner of those who don't care about nature because the 
debate has been framed in anthropocentric terms: what's the best 
medicine we can give to the poor old sick world? 61 
Jack Temple Kirby likens ecological restoration to the restoration of old 
tractors; a hobby restricted to a particular social group and undertaken 
largely for personal enjoyment: 
The results of both sorts of restoration are charming and instructive, 
but insubstantial and distracting. Restoration ecology is an expensive 
self-indulgence for the upper classes, a New Age substitute for 
59 Stephen Budianslcy, Nature's Keepers: The New Science of Nature 
Management, (New York: The Free Press, 1995), p. 9. 
6° Michael E. Soule, "Should Wilderness Be Managed?" in Return of the Wild: 
The Future of Our National Lands, ed. Ted Kerasote (Washington, DC: Island 
Press, 2001), p. 143. 
61 Turner, The Abstract Wild, p. 116. 
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psychiatry. It distracts intelligent and persuasive people from 
systematic initiatives [to reduce the human impact on nature]. 62 
Similarly, Mark Davis and Lawrence Slobodldn note that "perhaps, 
'ecological architecture' might be a more apt characterization of the work 
of ecological restoration, because the term acknowledges the central roles 
played by both values and science." 63 Robert Lackey makes the point that 
"the basic idea behind a management paradigm is anthropocentric; it is to 
maximize benefits by applying a mix of decisions within defined 
constraints."" 
We might first approach this stand-off by dispensing with Soule's claim. 
Given the Darwinian self-interest of all living organisms, a comparable 
human analogy to his notion of the voting biosphere might be to conduct a 
poll of all businesses, large and small, to determine whether they would 
support subsidies from the International Monetary Fund to all those at risk 
of bankruptcy. Universal approval for subsidies is unlikely, and the same 
applies to nature. Consider all those species not in imminent danger of 
extinction, particularly those that would actually benefit from a 'hands-off' 
management approach that eschews the maintenance of disturbance 
regimes, culling of exotic species, or reintroduction of carnivores. Exotic 
62 Jack Temple Kirby, "Gardening With J. Crew: The Political Economy of 
Restoration Ecology," in Beyond Preservation: Restoring and Inventing 
Landscapes, ed. A. Dwight Baldwin, Judith de Luce and Carl Pletsch 
(Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1994), pp. 239-40. 
63 Mark A. Davis and Lawrence B. Slobodlcin, "The Science and Values of 
Restoration Ecology," Restoration Ecology 12 (2004): 1. 
64 Robert T. Lackey, "Seven Pillars of Ecosystem Management," Landscape 
and Urban Planning 40 (1998): 23. 
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species, to take one example, would be dead against ecological restoration. 
The problem with Soule's position is that he assumes the loss of species is 
itself bad for nonhuman organisms generally. This cannot be sustained. 
While he may be right to claim that the loss of species is a moral issue, it is 
not a moral issue for the nonhuman community. The question of morality 
arises because many people place a high value on preventing species 
extinction. As discussed in chapter four, the intrinsic value of biodiversity 
is difficult to justify. The strongest claim for intrinsic value is that it is held 
by species whose presence in an ecosystem is crucial for the well-being of 
many other species. To return to Soule's poll of the biosphere, we could 
expect each species to vote for themselves first, but that the greatest 
number of votes to be cast for the preservation of keystone species. This 
, could be taken to suggest that the least anthropocentric perspective was one 
that valued species according to the significance of their ecological 
function, rather than all species equally. 
Both Scientific Concern and Autonomy are associated with a degree of 
other-oriented concern, which is described by the particular sense of 
connection with nature that both inspire. For Scientific Concern this 
connection is on the basis of shared ecological interdependence, whereas 
for Autonomy it is on the basis of a shared autonomy from society. In the 
previous chapter it was reiterated that the motive of Scientific Concern, 
associated with an orientation towards the conservation of biodiversity, 
inspires concern for the survival of species and ecosystems rather than 
individual organisms. The role of Autonomy was also discussed, and found 
to be associated with a desire not to interfere in the lives of wild animals 
(dramatically reiterated above in relation to the California condor). 
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Although these motives are anthropogenic, they might not necessarily be 
anthropocentric. This possibility is considered below in relation to both 
Autonomy and Scientific  Concern. 
David Schmidtz observes that altruism can consist of both 'concern' and 
'respect', with the former describing concern for the welfare of the other, 
and the latter describing the limitations we are willing to impose on our 
own behaviour in order to benefit the other. 65 According equal moral 
weight to the two seems reasonable when human interactions are 
considered, as freedom to pursue one's own interests is a near-universal 
human value. However, it is not clear that human-nonhuman relationships 
should be considered in the same way. Nonhuman life, as far as we know, 
has no conscious desire for autonomy, and instead merely desires the 
satisfaction of certain physical needs. If nonhuman life does not 
specifically desire autonomy it follows that, unlike respect for the 
autonomy of other people, respect for the autonomy of nature cannot be 
considered an altruistic act, unless it is also informed by consideration of 
welfare. This would imply that, in addition to being anthropogenic, the 
motive of Autonomy is also anthropocentric. 
However, a different perspective is provided by Albert Musschenga in 
his discussion of 'animal integrity'. As noted in previous chapter, this 
notion entails human respect for the naturalness of an animal, which may 
be incompatible with its welfare. Musschenga suggests that commitment to 
the value of autonomy can be so entrenched within one's world view that it 
65 David Schmidtz, "Reasons for Altruism," in Altruism, ed. EF Paul, FD Miller 
& J Paul (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993), p. 53. 
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is perceived as being an intrinsic component of an animal's `goodness'. 66 
But it does not follow that the perception of goodness will result in human 
actions that are actually 'good' for the animal, which could potentially 
have a more fulfilling life in captivity than in the wild. An analogous 
situation is provided by Callicott's claim that the land ethic is ecocentric. 
The land ethic is grounded in a human genetic predisposition to maintain 
the well-being of the biotic community, which is the result of such an 
attitude having increased the survival prospects of our distant ancestors. ° 
Yet, this process of evolutionary hard-wiring leaves open a similar 
potential for our perception of goodness to differ from what might actually 
be good for the biotic community, given that our perception is ultimately 
informed by what was in the best interests of our ancestors. Consequently, 
if the land ethic can be considered nonanthropocentric, it follows that the 
motive of Autonomy can give rise to values that are nonanthropocentric, 
though it is perhaps more accurate to describe both as non-instrumental and 
'other-regarding', rather than fully nonanthropocentric. 
With regard to Scientific Concern, the recent history of the California 
condor provides a good example of how concern for species can appear to 
be good for the individuals of that species, which would provide support 
for the nonanthropocentric claims of interventionists while diminishing the 
same claims by noninterventionists. Without intervention, the condors 
would now be extinct. As a result of intervention, condors exist in the wild, 
" Albert W. Musschenga, "Naturalness: Beyond Animal Welfare," Journal of 
Agricultural and Environmental Ethics 15 (2002): 180-85. 
67 J Baird Callicott, "The Search for an Environmental Ethic," in Matters of 
Life and Death, second edition, ed. Tom Regan (New York: Random House, 
1986), pp. 403-409. 
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although they remain intensely dependent on humans for their continued 
survival, with many not adapting well to an entirely natural existence. 68 It 
could be argued that intervention to save the species is justified by the fact 
that these individual birds are now able to live a satisfying life in the wild, 
despite the necessity for ongoing management. Yet if we forget, for a 
moment, the added value these individuals have for people, resulting from 
their rarity and cultural symbolism, then it appears that they have only as 
much value as any other individual bird of prey, perhaps less given their 
incomplete reintegration into the natural ecosystem. To take a 
consequentialist stance, it would have been: of more benefit for the 
flourishing of nonhuman life generally if the large sums of money spent to 
save the California condor had instead been used to protect natural areas 
under threat of development. In this instance, the decision to save the 
condor appears to have been, at its heart, an anthropocentric one. Only 
those actions motivated primarily by the overall flourishing of nonhuman 
life are truly nonanthropocentric, and, as concluded in chapter four, such 
actions are not necessarily consistent with the conservation of biodiversity. 
It appears that while neither the interventionist nor the 
noninterventionist position can be considered nonanthropocentric in the 
same way that concern for animal welfare might be, both positions are 
other-regarding to some extent. Consequently, it is difficult to argu.e that 
one is more altruistic than the other. 
68 Alagona, "Biography of a Feathered Pig," p. 577; A.J.S. Ray!, "Becoming a 
Full-Fledged Condor," Smithsonian 35 (2004): 92-97. 
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VIII. COMMUNITY INVOLVEMENT 
Advocates of ecological restoration often emphasise the cultural and 
psychological benefits of involvement in restoration activities. These are 
described by William Jordan, who argues that such activities are 
stimulating and challenging, both physically and mentally; that they 
encourage community-building and the development of connections with 
our cultural past and less-developed societies; and that they promote love 
and respect for nature. 69 He looks forward to "the emergence of restoration 
as a major cultural event, comparable with other social rituals such as 
elections, sporting events, festivals and holidays...", and includes reference 
to "the burning of the prairies in many areas of the Upper Midwest" having 
"become a rite of spring". 70 Eric Higgs makes specific reference to the 
'Bagpipes and Bonfire' festival in Illinois, where the bonfire is made up 
from the weeds removed from the Lake Forest Preserve. 71 
Related to the social benefits of restoration activities is the claim that 
ecological restoration has 'inherent democratic potential'. This claim is 
justified by Higgs as follows: 
the qualities of restoration practice promote community engagement, 
experimentation, local autonomy, regional variation, and a level of 
creativity... It is the combination of value to nature and value to 
69 Jordan, "Sunflower Forest," pp. 21-31. 
7° Ibid., pp. 27, 31. 
-71 Eric Higgs, Nature By Design: People, Natural Process, and Ecological 
Restoration, (Cambridge: The MIT Press, 2003), p. 249. 
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community that gives it the capacity to enhance a participatory 
politics.72 
Higgs and Andrew Light take this claim further in their suggestion that 
restoration projects should be judged on such grounds: 
A bad restoration, characterized by a lack of community 
participation in the act, produces a value that is marked by this loss 
of the egalitarian potential of restoration for the community; this loss 
in value is uniquely felt at the local level where the special character 
of a community's relationship to the land is intimately tied to the 
practice of ecological restoration. The inherent democratic potential 
of ecological restoration is thus, in a strong sense, a potential for 
local human-nature relationships. 23 
However, in proclaiming these benefits, Jordan, Higgs and Light apply an 
extremely narrow perspective to the term 'community'. For them it appears 
to consist of those people whose values and lifestyles are compatible with 
the devotion of time to restoration activities; that is, people who feel that it 
is restoration that provides the basis for their 'relationship to the land'. By 
allowing our understanding of 'community' to be restricted in this way, it 
follows that the 'democratic potential' inherent to restoration is just as 
much a feature of many other potentially-egalitarian activities; road 
building, darts, or philosophical discussion, for example. 
72 Higgs, Nature By Design, p. 255. 
73 Andrew Light and Eric S. Higgs, "The Politics of Ecological Restoration," 
Environmental Ethics 18 (1996): 236. 
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Light and Higgs develop this notion of the inherent democratic potential 
of restoration in contrast to preservation. They argue that "no new value is 
produced in an act of preservation because it preserves only the values that 
exist antecedent to the act of preservation." Restorationists, on the other 
hand, are 'value makers', and it is this process of creation and participation 
that underpins the 'inherent democratic potential'. 74 This is incorrect, 
insofar as preservation both creates value and is associated with a great 
many activities that are infused with value. Areas at risk of development 
are 'preserved' not by doing nothing, but by enacting legislation that places 
constraints on the type of development that can occur, or by citizens 
joining forces to purchase land themselves. Preservation campaigns 
increase the general level of awareness and appreciation of the values 
under threat, while the process itself increases community interaction with 
the political system, all of which involve the creation of sociopolitical 
value. For some advocates of biodiversity conservation such activities are 
viewed as detrimental, with one article suggesting that the emphasis on 
"rededicating existing conservation areas as wilderness can be thought of 
as a 'threatening process', one that deploys scarce conservation dollars into 
areas that are not the most effective for biodiversity conservation." 75 Higgs 
is less partisan, admitting that his criticism of preservation "is obviously a 
contentious claim, and it is not intended to diminish the significance of 
habitat protection, park creation, and various kinds of preservation 
activities.., but they do not build constituency in the way hands-on 
74 Light and Higgs, "The Politics of Ecological Restoration," p. 235. 
75 Harry Recher and Daniel Lunney, "The Problem With Wilderness," Nature 
Australia 27 (2003): 84. 
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involvement can." Yet Higgs ignores the hands-on involvement 
associated with recreation in natural areas, encompassing activities from 
birdwatching to mountain biking, and wilderness hiking to fishing. 
Although such involvement reflects the preservation ethos, in that the 
participants do not often intentionally alter nature, they are still involved 
with nature, and each other. 
However, it is certainly true that for those who want to take an active 
role in helping nature and 'saving the planet', nature recreation will not 
satisfy the desire for action. This desire can be satisfied by contributing to 
campaigns for wilderness preservation, yet such campaigns are relatively 
infrequent, and rarely take place near where one lives. In contrast, 
restoration projects are ongoing, can be organised on almost any area of 
undeveloped land held in public ownership, and mostly involve physical, 
outdoor activity. Storm Cunningham points out that relative to 
preservation: 
restoration gets funded with comparative ease, because its more 
politically saleable: people almost universally get excited at the 
prospect of restoring something. 'Merely' conserving it too 
frequently elicits yawns. This is especially true in the United States 
where we love action (and spending money) above all else. 77 
76 Higgs, Nature By Design, p. 257. 
77 Storm Cunningham, The Restoration Economy: The Greatest New Growth 
Frontier, (San Francisco: Berrett-Koehler, 2002), p. 245. 
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In a similar vein, Marguerite Holloway observes that the attitude of 
restorationists is "just do it, do something. „78  It seems likely that when 
mention is made of the 'inherent democratic potential' of restoration, what 
is meant is its potential to attract hands-on public involvement, which is 
generated in part by the perception that nature, and biodiversity, is in 
imminent peril, which leads to a desire for action. 
kis interesting to note that the objection of Light and Higgs to 
restorations carried out by private organisations indicates that the values 
that inspire them to champion the cause of ecological restoration are 
somehow intertwined with their belief in the value of egalitarianism and 
democracy, and their disapproval of consumerism and commodification. 79 
Such perspectives reinforce the notion that Autonomy exerts a significant 
influence on the interventionist position, albeit one that is subservient to 
the dominant influence of Scientific Concern. 
REWILDING 
`Rewilding' is the term given to the process of converting developed land 
into natural areas through ecological restoration. One of the most popular, 
and controversial, aspects of the process is the reintroduction of flora and 
fauna that were once native to an area, yet are unable to naturally 
recolonise the area, or could only do so over a very long period. According 
78 Marguerite Holloway, "Nurturing Nature,” Scientific American 270 (1994): 
84. See also Christian Gamborg and Peter Sandoe, "Beavers and Biodiversity: The 
Ethics of Ecological Restoration," in Philosophy and Biodiversity, ed. Markku 
Olcsanen and Juhani Pietarinen (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004), p. 
228. 
79 Light and Higgs, "The Politics of Ecological Restoration," pp. 241-47. 
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to the rhetoric associated with rewilding, it enables the conservation of 
both biodiversity and wildness, suggesting that it is capable of reconciling 
the divergent value priorities that have sparked debate between 
interventionists and noninterventionists; a possibility that will be examined 
here. 
The first major proposal to employ the term `rewilding' was the 
Wildlands Project, which envisaged the creation of interconnected 
wilderness areas in the United States large enough to support viable 
populations of wolves and grizzly bears; species that would be 
reintroduced if necessary. This project was initially suggested in 1993 by a 
group including Dave Foreman, the founder of Earth First!, and 
conservation biologists including Soule and Reed Noss. The directors of 
the Wildlands Project have since founded the Rewilding Institute, and 
Foreman left the former to become head of the latter. ° 
In the United Kingdom there is growing interest in rewilding, with three 
issues .of the journal of the British Association of Nature Conservationists 
(ECOS) dedicated to the creation of wild land," two prominent books, 
published in 2003 (originally in 1996) and 2005, that consider this 
subject,82 the formation of the Wildland Network in 2005,83 and the 
° See the websites of the Wildlands Project (http://www.twp.org ) and the 
Rewilding Institute (http://www.rewilding.org). 
81 These are ECOS 25(1), 25(2) and 25(3/4), all published in 2004. 
82 William M. Adams, Future Nature: A Vision for Conservation, revised 
edition, (London: Earthscan Publications, 2003); Peter Taylor, Beyond 
Conservation: A Wildland Strategy, (London: Earthscan, 2005). 
83 See the website of the Wildland Network (http://www.wildland-
network.org.uk). The more established Scottish Wild Land Group has also 
expressed some interest in rewilding. See their website (http://www.swIg.org.uk ). 
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screening on television of a documentary series entitled Wild Europe. In 
Australia, the Wilderness Society in cooperation with some state 
governments has begun to implement its WildCountry plan," whereas in 
Canada the dominant rewilding program is the Yellowstone to Yukon 
conservation initiative (Y2Y), 85 although there has also been interest 
expressed in a similar project in the Appalachian region." In Europe, the 
Pan-European Ecological Network (PEEN) includes provision for the 
restoration of habitat in order to link existing reserves." 
The most ambitious national rewilding project to be undertaken so far is 
the Nature Policy Plan, unveiled by the government of the Netherlands in 
1990. It envisages expansion of the protected natural area network in that 
country from 450,000 hectares to 750,000 hectares by 2020 through the 
abandonment of cultivated land and subsequent ecological restoration. The 
Plan includes the introduction of wild species, such as deer and boar, in 
order to recreate the species assemblage that was dominant prior to 
intensive human modifications, and thereby restore 'natural' ecological 
processes. However, the large herbivores that were once part of these 
ecosystems have long since become extinct. Because grazing by these 
species was so ecologically influential in restricting the natural succession 
" See the website of the Wilderness Society (http://www.wilderness.org.au). 
85 See the website Yellowstone to Yukon Conservation Initiative 
(http://www.y2y.net). 
86 Emily M. Bateson, "Two Countries, One Forest — Deux Pays, Une Forel: 
Launching a Landscape-Scale Conservation Collaborative in the Northern 
Appalachian Region of the United States and Canada," The George Wright Forum 
22 (2005): 35-45. 
87 Council of Europe, General Guidelines for the Development of the Pan-
European Ecological Network (Nature and Environment No. 107, 2000). 
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from grassland to forests, it was decided that surrogate species were 
required. Semi-domesticated breeds of horse, cattle, sheep and goats were 
chosen whose ancestry was similar to that of the extinct species. 88 These 
areas of 'new nature' have been quite successful, although they have given 
rise to a number of animal welfare issues, discussed in the previous 
chapter. 
Rewilding has the appearance of being the perfect compromise between 
wilderness values and the conservation of biodiversity, between the 
noninterventionist and interventionist positions. The motive of Autonomy is 
satisfied by the return of developed land to nature and the emphasis on 
natural processes. The motive of Scientific Concern is satisfied by the 
increased survival prospects of species that require larger areas of natural 
habitat than is currently available. However, most rewilding projects 
appear to be primarily justified by the latter. In the US, for example, 
despite the apparent enthusiasm of proponents of the Wildlands Project for 
wildness — "wild nature is worth having because it enriches our lives and 
nourishes our souls"89 — there remains a commitment to intensive 
management if required to ensure that biodiversity targets are met." 
Similarly, although the principal objectives of the Pan-European Biological 
88 Hein-Anton van der Heijden, "Ecological Restoration, Environmentalism and 
the Dutch Politics of 'New Nature'," Environmental Values 14 (2005): 431-35. 
89 John Terborgh and Michael E. Soule, "Why We Need Megareserves: Large-
Scale Reserve Networks and How to Design Them," in Continental Conservation: 
Scientific Foundations of Regional Reserve Networks, ed. Michael E. Soule and 
John Terborgh (Washington, DC: Island Press, 1999), p. 208. 
9° Reed F. Noss, Eric Dinerstein, Barrie Gilbert, Michael Gilpin, Brian J. Miller, 
John Terborgh and Steve Trombulak, "Core Areas: Where Nature Begins," in 
Continental Conservation, ed. Soule and Terborgh, pp. 117-22. 
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and Landscape Diversity Strategy include reference to protecting "the last 
wild rivers, wetlands and coasts, and the last remaining virgin forests of 
Europe", the overwhelming focus is on the maintenance and enhancement 
of biodiversity. 91 
The UK is something of an exception, with Taylor conveying the 
impression that rewilding there is associated with a higher degree of 
interest in the re-establishment of natural processes, and scepticism 
regarding the dominance of biodiversity-oriented approaches to 
conservation. His book, which is the principal source of information on this 
topic outside of the US, is particularly critical of the dedication of 
considerable funding to the conservation of endangered species whose 
existence is dependent on human disturbance. 92 
Rewilding has not gained the total support of noninterventionists. 
Because of the biodiversity focus and scientific approach, Turner remains 
unconvinced by the Wildlands Project: 
if successful, it would become the world's largest created 
environment. Its order and structure — the cores, corridors, buffers, 
and dense-population areas — would undoubtedly be visible from 
space. I think of it as North America designed by Foreman, Noss, 
and Associates. 93 
91  See the Strategy Guide website (http://www.strategyguide.org). Note that the 
Pan-European Ecological Network, mentioned above, forms one part of the 
Strategy. 
92 See, for example, Taylor, Beyond Conservation, pp. 88-89, 217, 222. 
93 Turner, The Abstract Wild, p. 110. 
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These concerns are echoed by James Fenton from the United Kingdom, 
who states that: 
At the heart of my concern lies the fact that these upland landscapes, 
although they have been used (in that humans have modified the 
natural factors of grazing and burning), they have never been 
designed... No-one has ever consciously sat down and said, "we 
want wet heath there, a flush here, grassland here, and a woodland 
over there," and such undesigned landscapes are becoming 
increasing [sic] rare in Europe, if not the world. By planting trees, 
even in an ecologically sound manner, we are, in effect, converting a 
wild landscape into a designed one." 
It will take a long time for such areas to 'feel' wild to those who retain a 
fresh memory of the design process. An alternative for those who share the 
concerns of Turner and Fenton would be to prohibit all replanting in the 
areas set aside, thereby allowing nature to recolonise the space naturally. 
However, another option that would also retain some consistency with the 
motive of Autonomy would be to randomly distribute seed across the 
landscape, allowing species to take root where they will, thereby 
diminishing the input of human intention. 
The reintroduction of animal species might potentially be opposed by 
noninterventionists, given that there can be as much human intervention 
involved in species reintroduction as in species introduction. This position 
is articulated by Christian Gamborg and Peter Sandoe, who note that 
94 James Fenton, "Scotland: Reviving the Wild," ECOS 20 (1999): 69. 
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certain groups in Denmark have resisted beaver reintroduction as 
equivalent to "meddling with nature". 95 However, there are aspects of 
species reintroduction that are consistent with Autonomy. The new species 
are more likely to contribute to the overall flourishing of life than an exotic 
species, and will be symbolic of a desire to reverse the ecological damage 
wrought by modem society. The reintroduction of large animals will 
accelerate the rewilding process, provided they do not require ongoing 
management, as they exert their own autonomous demands on the 
landscape to a greater extent than plants. As noted in chapter six, 
carnivores are particularly symbolic of wildness, as they pose a threat to 
human safety and commercial interests. The proposal by Tim Flannery to 
introduce Komodo dragons into Australia, also noted in chapter six, tests 
the limits of what noninterventionists might be willing to condone. 
Although exotic to Australia, the dragon is similar to species that once 
survived on the continent prior to the first appearance of humans. Despite 
occupying the same ecological niche as the now-extinct native species, its 
impact on the local biota, if introduced, could be significant. Perhaps most 
crucially, after its initial reintroduction the dragon would not symbolise 
wildness, but instead the political deliberation surrounding the decision to 
unleash the lizard. This is somewhat paradoxical given that such a step into 
the unknown, inspired by a love of the wild, perfectly embodies the motive 
of Autonomy. 
95 See Christian Gamborg and Peter Sandoe, "Beavers and Biodiversity: The 
Ethics of Ecological Restoration," in Philosophy and Biodiversity, ed. Maridcu 
Oksanen and Juhani Pietarinen (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004), p. 
226. 
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As noted earlier, rehabilitation activities, including the removal of non-
living human artifacts, such as buildings, machinery, and contaminated 
soil, and the stabilisation of human-generated erosion, do not conflict with 
the noninterventionist position provided they do not require an ongoing 
human presence. However, Autonomy can also be served by leaving human 
artifacts in place, as their visible deterioration over time serves to 
emphasise the regenerative capacity of nature. Much of the attraction of 
ruins can be seen as derived from this source. However, Autonomy would 
be ill-served by an excess of deliberation on this point, which might even 
culminate in the intentional placement of artifacts in order to stimulate 
particular emotions, in a manner reminiscent of the construction of ruins by 
eighteenth century landscape architects." 
Unless the value of wildness is formally recognised within rewilding and 
reserve acquisition strategies, the ethical issues discussed here are unlikely 
to be factored into the decision making process. The assumption that 
wildness is protected by conserving biodiversity will continue to prevail, at 
least in those countries where most of the attention of conservationists is 
directed toward protecting large, wild areas from development. Interest in 
the protection of wildness independent of its relationship to biodiversity is 
perhaps more likely in countries, and particularly in urban districts, where 
the proportion of land under intense management is quite high. 97 As noted 
by Ned Hettinger and Bill Throop, with greater 'humanization' of the 
96 Paul Zucker, "Ruins: An Aesthetic Hybrid," Journal of Aesthetics and Art 
Criticism 20(1961): 119-30; Christopher Woodward, In Ruins, (London: Vintage, 
2002), pp. 126-28. 
97 Aidan Davison and Ben Ridder, "Turbulent Times for Urban Nature in 
Australia," Australian Zoologist 33:306-14. 
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landscape, wildness will increase in rarity and thereby increase in value. 98 
This could be the explanation for the apparent interest in Europe in 'urban 
wilderness'," and the greater propensity for British authors writing on the 
topic of rewilding to include serious consideration of the value of 
wildness. m In locations such as these, traditional approaches to wilderness 
management, developed for the large natural expanses found in places like 
the United States, Canada and Australia, are not always appropriate. These 
approaches tend to focus on minimum distances from roads, pristine 
habitats, and the absence of human structures; criteria that are less 
meaningful in the urban context, where wildness can still be found and 
appreciated despite the limited opportunity for absolute solitude. To enable 
such areas to be 'managed' for wildness requires some recognition that 
management itself is the problem. 
X. THE ROLE OF SCIENCE AND VALUES 
As noted above in relation to the human-nature dichotomy, there are 
situations in which noninterventionists will view concern for ecological 
relationships as being secondary to the principal value of allowing nature 
to take its course. This carries the risk that noninterventionists will promote 
courses of action with undesirable side-effects, such as those observed in 
Yellowstone National Park, that could have been avoided had there been 
98 Ned Hettinger and Bill Throop, "Refocusing Ecocentrism: De-emphasizing 
Stability and Defending Wildness," Environmental Ethics 21(1999): 13. 
99 Matthias Diemer, Martin Held and Sabine Hofmeister, "Urban Wilderness in 
Central Europe, International Journal of Wilderness 9 (2003): 7-11. 
lc* See, for example, Taylor, Beyond Conservation, pp. 88-89, 217, 222.; 
Adams, Future Nature, revised edition, pp. 159-66. 
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greater respect for the value of scientific investigation. This tendency to 
prioritise subjective values over science generates considerable criticism 
from interventionists, who often fail to acknowledge the value-laden 
aspects of their own judgements. 1°1 The apparent hypocrisy leads to Cole's 
point that the choice confronting natural area managers is not "between 
science and philosophy. The choice is between two different sets of values, 
both of which relate to somewhat conflicting views of what wilderness 
should be and the appropriate relationship between humans and 
wildemess." IO2 This is a point lost on Stephen Budiansky, who seems 
entirely unaware of the possibility that minimising human and societal 
intervention in nature could be valued as an end in itself, apparently 
believing that only physical changes are worthy of being considered 
'desirable ends': 
'Hands off' ought to be looked upon as merely one possible 
management tool for achieving a desired end. Its suitability ought to 
be judged solely according to whether it can achieve that end — 
whether that goal be protecting a beautiful landscape or an 
endangered species, maximizing biodiversity, or ensuring a 
1°1 Dwight Barry and Max Oelschlaeger, "A Science for Survival: Values and 
Conservation Biology," Conservation Biology 10 (1996): 905-911; Paul Roebuck 
and Paul Phifer, "The Persistence of Positivism in Conservation Biology," 
Conservation Biology 13 (1999): 444-46; R. Bruce Hull, David Richert, Erin 
Seekamp, David Robertson and Gregory J. Buhyoff, "Understandings of 
Environmental Quality: Ambiguities and Values Held by Environmental 
Professionals," Environmental Management 31(2003): 1-13; Tabatha J. 
Wallington and Susan A. Moore, "Ecology, Values, and Objectivity: Advancing 
the Debate," BioScience 55 (2005): 873-78. 
102 Cole, "Symbolic Values," p. 25. 
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sustainable supply of fish or lumber. Instead it has come to be seen 
as an end in itself, justified after the fact by hand-waving arguments 
that assert it can also deliver the goods. It rarely can. 1°3 
Ignorance of ecological realities does not do the noninterventionist cause 
any favours. However, the same can be said for interventionists. Consider 
the deep scepticism of Light and Higgs toward noninterventionist 
approaches. They state that "if swaths of degraded land were left 
untouched for many years, some things might come back... but there is no 
assurance that these regenerated ecosystems would be functionally and 
structurally sound."I°4 Mark Sagoff casts considerable doubt on the ability 
of ecologists to objectively distinguish between an ecosystem that has 
regenerated naturally, and one that is 'functionally and structurally 
sound'. I°5 As discussed in chapter three in relation to ecosystem services, 
many conservationists are unwilling to acknowledge that ecosystem 
function is not necessarily degraded by changes in species composition. 
Stephen Jay Gould emphasises the crucial role that science plays in such 
debates: 
When biologically based claims have such a range of political 
usages (however dubious, and however unfairly drawn some may 
103 Budiansky, Nature's Keepers, p. 23. 
1°4 Light and Higgs, "The Politics of Ecological Restoration," pp. 235-36 
(footnote). 
105 Sagoff, "Muddle or Muddle Through?" pp. 825-993; Mark Sagoff, 
"Ecosystem Design in Historical and Philosophical Context," in Ecological 
Integrity: Integrating Environment, Conservation, and Health, ed. David Pimentel, 
Laura Westra and Reed F. Noss, (Washington, DC: Island Press, 2000), pp. 61-78. 
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be), it becomes particularly incumbent upon us to examine the 
scientific validity of the underlying arguments, if only to acquire 
weapons to guard against usages that properly inspire our ethical 
opposition (for if the biological bases are wrong, then we hold a 
direct weapon; and if they are right, then at least we understand the 
argument properly, and can accurately drive the wedge that always 
separates factual claims from ethical beliefs). m6 
Such comments provide a strong case for an honest and self-reflective 
appraisal of the values underlying conservation strategies, with science 
employed to provide insights into how nature, as the focus of these values, 
will change over time, both as a result of natural processes and in response 
to our own actions. 
Many examples are available of scientists who fully acknowledge the 
significance of values for conservation biology; people like Ehrenfeld and 
Slobodkin, Soule and Taylor, Trudgill and Cole. This is emphasised by 
Taylor who appears to combine scientific rigour with a New Age 
perspective on connection with the land, including wild men's retreats, 
vision quests, yogis, witchcraft, and native American teaching. iu He 
acknowledges that this impedes the garnering of support from mainstream 
society, and his approach highlights a particular advantage of the one taken 
here. By grounding the investigation of conservation strategies in 
consideration of the motives underlying the value of nature 'for itself, 
106 Gould, "An Evolutionary Perspective," p. 13. 
107 Taylor, Beyond Conservation, pp. 15-31. 
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concern for wildness can be liberated from the alienating spirituality 
promoted by some environmental activists. 
In a forum on the contradictions inherent in managing wildness, Peter 
Landres drew attention to the following questions: 
Do the symbolic value of wildness and the ecological value of 
[biodiversity] have equal importance? Is it even appropriate to 
define a target for natural conditions in wilderness? Only after 
answering such questions and making all value judgments and 
assumptions explicit can we evaluate the relative risks and benefits 
of taking action in each situation and reach a decision on whether to 
do so. 1°8 
The four motives underlying the inherent value of nature greatly facilitate 
the exploration of such questions, which in turn will generate insights into 
how the current dominance of biodiversity-oriented management can be 
modified to ensure that all the values of nature are adequately protected. 
1°8 Peter Landres, "Managing the Wild: Should Stewards be Pilots?" Frontiers 
in Ecology and the Environment 2 (2004): 499. 
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XI. CONCLUSION 
It is in the debates between naturalness and wildness, restoration and 
preservation, intervention and nonintervention, that conflict between a 
focus on the conservation of biodiversity and the values of nature becomes 
most apparent. The management imperative associated with the motive of 
Scientific Concern is entirely at odds with the hands-off approach 
encouraged by Autonomy. However, there is considerable convergence 
between the opposing positions. In the face of development pressure, 
biodiversity and wildness advocates share a common goal in attempting to 
protect natural areas from destruction. Both positions are other-regarding 
without being entirely free of antlaropocentrism, are associated with respect 
for nature as something distinct from humanity while recognising our 
interdependence, and share the capacity to inspire intense feeling in the 
community. In relation to the inherent value approach it could be said that 
the motives of Scientific Concern and Autonomy exert a significant 
influence on each position, although they differ in the priority assigned to 
them. The relatively new phenomenon of `rewilding' has the potential to 
unite the interventionist and noninterventionist positions provided that the 
values associated with wildness are formally recognised alongside those 
associated with biodiversity. Agreement also requires noninterventionists 
to ensure that their views are firmly grounded in ecological reality, and that 
conservation biologists acknowledge the values that underpin their concern 
for biodiversity. 
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Chapter Twelve 
AN ETHICAL SOLUTION TO THE 
'PROBLEM OF BIODIVERSITY' 
The environmentalist's dilemma is explaining nature so as to change our 
way of understanding nature, which of course shapes the way the 
environmentalist explains nature in the first place. This bears a strong 
resemblance to Marx's dilemma of explaining social evolution in order to 
change our way of understanding social change, which of course shaped 
Marx's own view of social evolution in the first place. Marx saw his 
central challenge as eliminating capitalism. Environmental reformers may 
see theirs as eliminating the human exploitation of nature. But both 
reformers want to change a system that shapes their definitions of and their 
desire for change in the first place. Environmentalists must try to preserve 
nature at least partly by applying the methods of a science they believe has 
been instrumental in damaging nature... Envisioning any alternative to the 
present system necessarily seems 'utopian' or 'mystical,' in part because 
that alternative must be formulated in a vocabulary that relies for its 
meanings on associations drawn from the social or environmental status 
quo. 
Alice Ingerson (1994) 1 
I. INTRODUCTION 
At the heart of this dissertation is the concern that dominance of the 
concept of biodiversity will skew conservation away from values of nature 
that are inconsistent with the values and management of biodiversity. This 
Alice E. Ingerson, "Tracking and Testing the Nature-Culture Dichotomy," in 
Historical Ecology: Cultural Knowledge and Changing Landscapes, ed. Carole L. 
Crumley (Santa Fe: School of American Research Press, 1994), pp. 64-65. 
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chapter considers whether or not this is, in fact, a 'problem', the role that 
environmental ethics has to play in addressing this problem, and the 
possible management actions that could be taken. 
II. IS THERE A PROBLEM? 
After examining the two main areas of conflict generated by the dominance 
of the concept of biodiversity within environmental legislation it might 
seem as though the 'problem' of biodiversity has been somewhat 
overstated. In the case of animal welfare, environmental legislation has 
generally been foreshadowed by a legal framework for ensuring that 
conservation activities pay some heed to the suffering of sentient animals. 
In the case of ecological restoration and 'wildness', it appears that very few 
actual disputes have been generated by community concern that the former 
is detrimental to the latter. The conflicts that do arise tend to be intellectual 
rather than physical, and limited to the pages of academic journals. This 
begs the question: "Is the problem of biodiversity a real problem?" 
The concept of biodiversity has an unusual power within the modern 
bureaucratic and political system. Biodiversity has emerged as a legitimate 
value where so many other aspects of nature (and culture) are dismissed 
within decision making structures as being of mere subjective concern. 
Consequently, the conservation of biodiversity has attained a momentum 
that has benefited many other aspects of nature, 'wildness' included. The 
creation, through land acquisition, of protected area networks that protect a 
minimum area of each major ecosystem, has contributed immensely to the 
total area of protected wild land Landscapes that might have once been 
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excluded from protection on the grounds of their aesthetic merit are now 
targeted for inclusion to ensure that such reserve networks are 
'representative'. 2 These areas might well be managed solely for the benefit 
of threatened species and ecosystems, with very little thought given to the 
effect that such interventions have on 'wildness', but few preservationists 
would view this as being of dramatic concern. In general, such 
management is guided by respect for nature, rather than by the 
achievement of economic objectives. So, just what is 'the problem' of 
biodiversity? 
As observed by Kate Rawles: 
biological diversity is never discussed without a verb. Unlike nature, 
that just is, biological diversity is always being preserved, 
conserved, maintained, or even enhanced. Hence the concept is 
implicitly managerial, and biased against a more hands-off approach 
to conservation which some favor, or at least want to keep open as 
an option. 3 
Confident belief in the righteousness of the biodiversity conservation 
cause, without a corresponding awareness of the inherent conflict between 
wildness and the management imperative, marginalises the value of 
wildness. It implies that wildness has no value, or if it does, that this value 
2 Eduardo Crespo de Nogueira and Consuelo Martinez Flores, "Aesthetic 
Values and Protected Areas: A Story of Symbol Preservation," The George Wright 
Forum 21(2004): 46. 
3  Kate Rawles, "Biological Diversity and Conservation Policy," in Philosophy 
and Biodiversity, ed. Marklcu Olcsanen and Juhani Pietarinen (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2004), p. 209. 
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is merely superficial. It suggests that provided we protect from harm things 
known to be wild, then wildness itself will be protected, which is akin to 
suggesting that the vitality of a carnivorous animal can be maintained in a 
zoo. 
Of course, conservation biologists argue strongly that wild nature be 
protected in the wild rather than in zoos. But with their management 
rhetoric, and apparent lack of awareness that much of the value of nature 
relates to its autonomy from human society, many conservationists convey 
the impression that the full implications of the value of wildness mean 
nothing for them. For at its heart, respect for naturalness, for wildness, for 
the 'untrammeled' quality of nature, conveys an attitude to modern society; 
a dissatisfaction with its abstractions and with the callous disregard of 
management systems for humane reality. It could be argued that it is this 
dissatisfaction with society that unites environmentalists, rather than a 
largely self-interested concern for 'the environment'. It is likely that most 
conservationists sympathise with these views, and have simply not found 
an adequate way of expressing them, or have not realised the implications 
that flow from the omission of the value of nature's autonomy from the 
biodiversity discourse. If this is an accurate reflection of the situation, the 
way forward is not necessarily radical. It does not require the overthrow of 
Western governments, or the moral ascendancy of 'hands-off approaches 
to managing natural areas. What is required is greater awareness of why 
'leaving nature alone' is such a captivating alternative. 
312 
III. ENVIRONMENTAL ETHICS 
As noted in chapter one, the objective of this thesis has been descriptive 
rather than revisionary; to increase our understanding of why biodiversity 
and nature are valued rather than to argue for new ways of valuing. The 
discussion has culminated in the identification of four motives underlying 
the inherent values associated with nature. However, description and 
revision are not necessarily separate activities. Although the four motives 
are pre-existing and their influence on environmental values easily 
discernible, to explain values of nature in such a way might itself give rise 
to a shift in values. As suggested by Simon Blackburn (in a slightly 
different context), "when reinterpretations of ourselves are taken seriously, 
they not only have the power to change our view of others for the worse, 
but even more power to change our own self-definition, so that we start to 
live up to [the reinterpretations]."4 By this path, the inherent value 
approach might be transformed into an alternative ethical system to that. 
provided by the concept of biodiversity. Rather than assessing all human 
actions relative to the degree to which they benefit or harm native 
biodiversity, we can formally incorporate naturalness and wildness into 
consideration of appropriate human-nature relationships. 
The new ethical approaches to the value of nature and nonhuman life 
proposed during the 1970s and 80s — what might now be described as the 
golden age of ecophilosophy — have not weathered well the sustained 
4 	• Simon Blackburn, Ruling Passions: A Theory of Practical Reasoning, 
(Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1998), p. 153. 
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criticism of subsequent years. 5 Robert Kirkman suggests that part of the 
problem is that environmental philosophers have lost touch with the real 
world: 
the issue for many speculative environmentalists is not, ultimately, 
whether the ecological view of the world is true or whether the set of 
normative claims it fosters is valid, but only whether the worldview 
and its attendant values are adequate to the task of supporting 
environmentalism as a political movement.6 
One of the consequences is that arguments arising from such sources "are 
likely to convince only those who already agree with the conclusions."' 
Environmental pragmatists emphasise similar issues, although Kirkman is 
sceptical of their efforts also, suggesting that philosophers such as Eric 
Katz and Andrew Light remain unwilling to question the core values of 
environmentalism. 8 
The inherent value approach taken here appears to satisfy some of the 
concerns of Kirkman and environmental pragmatists such as Anthony 
Weston. Rather than ascribe rights or intrinsic value to particular aspects of 
5 See, for example, Andrew Light and Eric Katz (eds.), Environmental 
Pragmatism, (London: Routledge, 1996); Eric Katz, Andrew Light and David 
Rothenberg (eds.), Beneath the Swface: Critical Essays in the Philosophy of Deep 
Ecology, (Cambridge: The MIT Press, 2000); Wayne Ouderkirk and Jim Hill 
(eds.), Land, Value, Community: Callicott and Environmental Philosophy, 
(Albany: State University of New York Press, 2002). 
6 Robert Kirkman, Skeptical Environmentalism: The Limits of Philosophy and 
Science, (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2002), p. 142. 
7 Ibid., p. 166. 
8 Ibid., pp. 164-65. 
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nature, or work backwards from certain ideological positions, this approach 
examines the underlying motivations for why people might come to value 
nature for itself. The four motives that have been identified correspond to 
significant modes of valuing nature: 
- Concern for animal welfare, for which the experience of connection with 
nonhuman life (Connection) is the dominant motive. 
- Concern for biodiversity, which is primarily motivated by intellectual 
interest in nature (Scientific Concern). 
- Respect for nature motivated by its embodiment of some larger context 
within which human lives are embedded (Larger Context). 
- Respect for wildness and naturalness, stimulated by dissatisfaction with 
the abstractions of modern society and a subsequent desire for 
autonomy from the sources of such discontent (Autonomy). 
The pluralism entailed in this approach has the potential to encourage a 
greater degree of awareness and respect for the diversity of values that are 
ascribed to, and found in nature. For this reason it stands opposed to the 
monistic dominance of the concept of biodiversity, and provides direction 
on ameliorating this dominance through recognition of other values. 
Significantly, this involves a shift away from the intriiisic value approaches 
that have occupied so much of the energy of environmental philosophers. 
The category of inherent value reflects the capacity for people to value 
aspects of nature 'for themselves', and in the absence of an explanation for 
why they might feel this way it is apparent that the value might appear to 
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be independent of human valuing. Hence it provides an anthropocentric 
explanation for the existence of nonanthropocentric values. 
Clarification of the motives underlying the inherent value of certain 
aspects of nature will assist those attempting to protect nature from human 
exploitation and destruction. In such situations, non-instrumental values are 
frequently assigned low priority because the reasons why such aspects of 
nature might be valued are poorly defined. The four motives that comprise 
the axiology of inherent value serve to define these reasons, and will 
hopefully enable a more persuasive case to be articulated for the protection 
of things that hold no material benefit for society. Being grounded in 
people's intuitions about the value of nature, arguments derived from the 
four motives will have a deep emotional appeal. Yeuk-Sze Lo considers the 
role of environmental philosophers in developing these arguments: 
the most that non-anthropocentric environmental philosophers can 
do is to be informed and realistic about human evaluative 
psychology, and try to excite favourable moral sentiments from us 
towards the objects of environmental concern by catching our 
imagination and sympathetic understanding with their philosophical 
arguments, and hope that those sentiments will endure our 
reflections... [But] this can happen only if there are already some 
original materials of our moral psychology that underlie our 
dispositions (if any) to appreciate, respect, and care for those things, 
and give us some notion of their moral significance. Whether, and to 
what extent, there are any such original ingredients of human 
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psychology, however, are more properly seen as empirical questions 
not single-handedly answerable by philosophers a priori.9 
The inherent value approach helps to identify some of the 'original 
materials' to which Lo refers, although contrary to her final suggestion, 
philosophical approaches may actually have a distinct advantage. Although 
empirical confirmation of the significance of the four motives would 
enhance their persuasiveness, it remains that the subconscious quality of 
such motives renders them difficult to articulate and distinguish from one 
another, and therefore difficult to elicit from survey participants. ° 
The inherent value approach also provides a useful method for 
examining environmental ethics itself. It is apparent, for example, that 
while deep ecology can encompass respect for values associated with all 
four of the motives, there is little acknowledgement of the need for 
guidance on resolving conflicts between values, such as between the 
intrinsic value of biological diversity and the desire that nature be left 
wild." The motive of Autonomy is particularly useful for the insight it 
provides into the value of naturalness and the basis of support for 
preservationism. In the motive of Autonomy we can also find a 
straightforward explanation for why the idea of the social or cultural 
9 Yeuk-Sze Lo, "Making and Finding Values in Nature: From a Humean Point 
of View," Inquiry 49 (2006): 142. 
1° Theresa Satterfield, "In Search of Value Literacy: Suggestions for the 
Elicitation of Environmental Values," Environmental Values 10 (2001): 331-59. 
"Bill Devall and George Sessions, Deep Ecology: Living as i f Nature 
Mattered, (Layton: Gibbs Smith, 1985), p. 70. 
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construction of nature raises such ire among many environmentalists!' 
That our understanding of nature might be dependent on human 
perceptions and societal trends, no matter how valid this observation might 
be, undermines the value of nature as something autonomous from society. 
It is akin to discovering that a person respected for their honesty and 
frugality is actually involved in corrupt dealings with criminals and living 
an opulent lifestyle. Autonomy also suggests a non-racist explanation . for 
the inclusion of less-developed societies within the same category as the 
nonhuman, being that they, along with nature, provide a symbolic 
counterpoint to contemporary western society." 
The influence of Autonomy can be seen in the attempts by Elliot and 
Katz to employ complex philosophical arguments in order to safeguard the 
value of the autonomy of nature, such as by comparing natural ecosystems 
to rare works of art. Yet, the art analogy carries with it the spurious 
implication that people value the autonomy of nature for the same reasons 
that they might value a renaissance painting. That such arguments are 
unconvincing is not surprising given that they do not ground the value of 
naturalness in some tangible human response to nature, relying instead on 
the argument that nature's value is independent of human valuation. 
Greater understanding of the motive of Autonomy alleviates the need for 
12 See, for example, Michael E. Soule, "The Social Siege of Nature," in 
Reinventing Nature? Responses to Postmodern Deconstruction, ed. Michael E. 
Soule and Gary Lease (Washington, DC: Island Press, 1995), pp. 137-170; Eileen 
Crist, "Against the Social Construction of Nature and Wilderness," Environmental 
Ethics 26 (2004): 5-24. 
13 This issue was discussed in chapter six. 
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such devices, and provides a powerful tool with which to probe the 
noninterventionist sensibility, as demonstrated in the previous chapter. 
Simon Hailwood, among others, has observed a bias within 
environmental ethics towards approaches grounded in human connections 
and interrelationships with nature: 
much eco-philosophical and eco-political theorizing has tended to 
build on markedly holistic pictures of humanity in nature, stressing 
continuity and community membership, strongly suggesting that we 
should identify with nature as deeply as possible and radically 
downplay any human-non-human distinction." 
Autonomy provides some balance to this bias, yet because of its integration 
within a broader axiology, it does not simply replace one unbalanced 
perspective with another. Connection, Scientific Concern, and Larger 
Context remain equally valid sources of value, along with the instrumental 
and more overtly cultural values that permeate our perception of the world. 
A significant aspect of the balance provided by Autonomy is that it explains 
the extension of human concern beyond other sentient beings, and 
terrestrial life in general, to all nonhuman life, including life on other 
planets, and non-living aspects of nature. In this regard, Autonomy 
responds to Eugene Hargrove's concern that "unless we want nonliving 
natural objects like caves to be entirely dependent on the trickle-down 
14 Simon Hailwood, How To Be a Green Liberal: Nature, Value and Liberal 
Philosophy, (Chesham: Acumen, 2004), p. 12. 
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effect of nonanthropocentric arguments for the protection of living 
organisms, we still need anthropocentric justifications..." 15 
IV. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR MANAGEMENT 
It should by now be apparent that the dominance of the concept of 
biodiversity within environmental management systems does not truly 
reflect the full range of motivations people have for valuing nature, but is 
instead indicative of the influence within western societies of instrumental 
managerialism and the motive of Scientzfic Concern. The motive of 
Connection also has a strong presence within management systems through 
animal welfare legislation and animal ethics procedures. It is Autonomy, 
the noninterventionist position, and the value of wildness, that are least 
represented within environmental management systems. 16 Prioritising the 
value of biodiversity, and, to a lesser extent, animal welfare concerns, 
demands an interventionist approach, either in actively managing habitat, 
or gathering information about the biology and condition of nonhuman life. 
Without concurrent recognition of the values associated with 
nonintervention, and some guidance on how to resolve conflicts between 
them, wildness is marginalised as a value worthy of consideration. 
Although parallel management systems exist for protecting such qualities 
as 'wilderness character', these tend to apply only in large, relatively 
15 Eugene C. Hargrove, Foundations of Environmental Ethics, (Englewood 
Cliffs: Prentice Hall, 1989), P.  167. 
16 As noted in chapter ten, the values inspired by Larger Context tend to 
coincide with those associated with the other motives. 
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undeveloped natural areas — there is little recognition that small pockets of 
nature might also be valued for their wildness. 
Formal acknowledgement of the value of wildness is problematic insofar 
as the underlying motive of Autonomy is explicitly critical of many aspects 
of contemporary western society. Scepticism toward the benefits of 
corporate influence, bureaucratic centralisation, and a focus on worker 
productivity rather than happiness, are closely associated with the 
dissatisfaction described by Autonomy, and although such doubts are 
common among the populace, enshrining them within policy is politically 
difficult. Compared with the instrumental benefits that can be claimed on 
behalf of scientifically managed biodiversity sanctuaries, 
noninterventionist approaches to nature have little to offer decision makers 
focused on tangible economic outcomes. Nonetheless, the success of the 
environment movement is testament to the capacity of democratic societies 
to take non-instrumental values seriously. It is not beyond the bounds of 
possibility that mainstream western society might come to recognise the 
cultural benefit of allowing certain areas to remain unmanaged for the sole 
reason that they stand in contradistinction to the abstractions and excessive 
deliberation that characterise this information age. 
Acknowledging the value of wildness is associated with its own 
management issues, not least being to maintain the appearance of wildness 
in the face of large numbers of visitors." Practical difficulties such as these 
17 See Peter Landres, et al., Monitoring Selected Conditions Related to 
Wilderness Character: A National Framework, General Technical Report RMRS-
GTR-151, (Fort Collins: United States Forest Service Rocky Mountains Research 
Station, 2005). 
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undermine the values associated with Autonomy and ensure that there will 
always be a demand for wild places that are sufficiently dangerous or 
inaccessible that the need for management of visitor impacts is minimal. 
Ideally the casual visitor can achieve some limited experience of the 
sublime quality of such places through activities on the periphery, travel 
along marked trails, and from the information provided by visitors' centers. 
By incorporating the principles of Autonomy within management schemes 
and planning codes it should be possible for development and maintenance 
to be carried out in a manner that is consistent with the values that draw 
visitors to such places. 
The tendency for laws that protect rare species to be used as surrogate 
mechanisms for the protection of wild areas reflects the under-
representation of Autonomy within environmental legislation." The 
resolution of this issue requires legal recognition of the value of wildness 
in the same way that there is recognition of the value of historic cultural 
heritage. Development regulations that proceed from this basis will be in a 
better position to promote activities that are consistent with wildness than 
regulations whose focus is surrogate criteria for wildness. Movement in 
this direction is apparent at the international level with the consideration of 
'intangible values' by the 2003 General Assembly of the International 
Council on Monuments and Sites (ICOMOS) I9 and recent attention from 
the World Conservation Union (IUCN) on 'non-material' and 'cultural and 
18 See, for example, James M. Glover, "Soul of the Wilderness: Can We Stop 
Trying to Control Nature?" International Journal of Wilderness 6 (2000): 4-8. 
19 See the ICOMOS website 
(http://www.intemationalicomos.orgivictoriafalls2003). 
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spiritual values' of protected areas. 20 In a book commissioned on this issue 
by the IUCN, Allen Putney makes the point that: 
There is little doubt that the preservation of biodiversity is one of the 
most important challenges of our time... Yet parks, and other 
categories of protected areas, are highly valued by important 
segments of society, even when they are unfamiliar with biodiversity 
values!' 
The interest in non-material and intangible values has tended to focus on 
the spiritual traditions of indigenous people, and more recently established 
'cultural' connections between contemporary communities and particular 
natural landscapes and sites. 22 Yet, in such discussions, perhaps the most 
deserving of intangible values (from a contemporary western perspective), 
and one that is rarely mentioned in this discourse, is 'wildness'. However, 
as suggested by the number of people contributing to the defense of 
wildness within the academic literature, the growing interest in rewilding, 
and the sort of policies that have been approved in recent years in places 
like Scotland,23 it seems likely that awareness of the value of wildness is 
set to escalate. 
20 See the website for the IUCN Taskforce on Cultural and Spiritual Values 
(http://www.iucn.org/themes/wcpaitheme/values/values.html).  
21 Allen D. Putney, "Introduction: Perspectives on the Values of Protected 
Areas," in The Full Value of Parks: From Economics to the Intangible, ed. David 
Harmon and Allen D. Putney (Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield, 2003), p. 3. 
22 See, for example, Anthony J. English and Ellen Lee, "Managing the 
Intangible," The George Wright Forum 21(2004): 23-33. 
23 Policies on the significance of wildness were introduced by the Scottish 
Executive in 1998, and by Scottish Natural Heritage and the National Trust for 
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V. CONCLUSIONS 
It is clear that environmental ethics does have a role to play in balancing 
the current dominance of the concept of biodiversity within environmental 
management systems. This role primarily relates to the clarification of 
values — particularly those associated with wildness — and the provision of 
guidance for resolving conflicts between different values. The inherent 
value approach taken here can contribute productively to this process as it 
provides a clear articulation of the motives underlying the value of both 
biodiversity and wildness. However, greater balance will only be achieved 
by incorporating the value of wildness and nonintervention in nature within 
environmental legislation, development planning regulations and 
management principles. This will be politically difficult, not least because 
the motivation underlying the value of wildness is inconsistent with the 
economic, managerial focus of the dominant political and government 
structures within contemporary western society. However, there is 
evidence of change occurring at the international level. 
Scotland, in 2002. See Scottish Executive, National Planning Policy Guideline 14: 
Natural Heritage (NPPG14). Available from the website of the Scottish Executive 
(http://www.scotland.gov.uk). Scottish Natural Heritage, Wildness in Scotland's 
Countryside, (Policy Statement No. 02/03, 2002). Available from the website of 
Scottish Natural Heritage (http://www.snh.org.uk). National Trust for Scotland, 
Wild Land Policy, 2002. Available from the National Trust for Scotland website 
(http://www.nts.org.uk). 
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CHAPTER THIRTEEN 
Conclusion 
The objective of this dissertation, outlined in chapter one, was to 
examine the 'problem' of the dominance of the concept of biodiversity 
within environmental management systems. This problem arises because 
the values associated with biodiversity form only a small subset of the 
many values broadly associated with nature. Consequently, management 
oriented toward achieving biodiversity outcomes might be to the detriment 
of these other values. 
In order to direct this inquiry the following question was posed: 
"Is management undertaken to conserve biodiversity compatible with 
protecting the values associated with nature?" 
Guided by this question, and in order to satisfy the larger objective, the 
dissertation was divided into five parts and thirteen chapters. In Part A, 
which largely consisted of background material, it was found that a 
contributing factor to this problem is that `biodiversity' is often 
erroneously assumed to be equivalent to 'nature', making emphasis of the. 
distinctions between their respective values a potentially confusing 
exercise. 
In Part B, it appeared that the most powerful instrumental justifications 
for the conservation of biodiversity, being that it is essential for the 
maintenance of ecosystem services, and that it has potential commercial 
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value, were somewhat 'wobbly'. The first claim is only true for some 
ecosystem services, while the second is only persuasive as a supporting 
argument; when compared with alternative methods for making money the 
conservation of biodiversity does not appear to be a particularly sound 
investment. All instrumental arguments carry this risk, being that more 
efficient means for achieving the same end might be identified that do not 
require the protection of nature. This risk is of particular significance for 
environmentalists as the non-instrumental values of biodiversity appear to 
exert greater influence on the motivations of those who campaign for the 
conservation of biodiversity than do instrumental values. However, further 
investigation of such non-instrumental values suggested that claims for the 
intrinsic value of biodiversity were difficult to sustain and involved 
assumptions and corollaries unlikely to appeal to those who make such 
claims. The most likely sources for the non-instrumental value of 
biodiversity are its intellectual interest value, and the intrinsic value of 
nonhuman life. The latter is then mistakenly believed to be equivalent to 
the intrinsic value of biodiversity. 
The values more broadly associated with nature were considered in Part 
C. One particularly valued aspect of nature is its naturalness, although 
conflicting interpretations of this quality were identified. Defining 
naturalness with respect to historic ecological benchmarks was found to be 
associated with the desire to conserve biodiversity. This interpretation 
potentially conflicts with the alternative, which views naturalness as related 
to processes that are free of rationally-planned human intervention. Various 
explanations for the values associated with natural processes, which also 
relate to the value of wildness, and the autonomy of nature, were reviewed 
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and found to be unsatisfactory on the whole. A more systematic approach 
to articulating the values of nature was suggested, involving consideration 
of the motives apparent in contemporary western society that might 
underpin the sensation that nature is valued 'for itself. Such values are 
termed 'inherent' values. An axiology of inherent value was then proposed, 
consisting of four 'motives', as follows: 
MOTIVE ONE 	The experience of connection with 
(Connection) 	nonhuman life. 
MOTIVE TWO 	Intellectual interest in nature. 
(Scientific Concern) 
MOTIVE THREE 	Respect for the larger context. 
(Larger Context) 
MOTIVE FOUR 	Dissatisfaction with the abstractions of 
(Autonomy) 	 modern society. 
These motives, in combination with the instrumental and personal values 
associated with nature, give rise to the sense that nature and nonhuman life, 
in part or in total, are valued for themselves. In the absence of any 
explanation, such values can be perceived as independent of the process of 
valuing, and therefore intrinsic to nature. The explanation provided by the 
inherent value approach reflects the influence of culture, human genetic 
piedispositions, and the physical qualities of nature and nonhuman life. 
In Part D the potential for both conflict and convergence between the 
conservation of biodiversity and other values associated with nature was 
examined with reference to the four motives, although Larger Context was 
essentially removed from the discussion as it gives rise to values that are 
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either indistinguishable from those associated with the other motives, or 
are overly dependent on religious teachings. In keeping with the findings of 
Part B, the conservation of biodiversity was found to be primarily 
associated with Scientific Concern. The motives of Connection and 
Autonomy were also linked to actual trends within environmental thought, 
with the former inspiring concern for animal welfare, and the latter 
underpinning the value of naturalness, wildness, and a 'hands-off' 
approach to managing nature. Conflict between Scientific Concern and 
Connection is echoed in the debates between conservationists and animal 
welfare groups over the harming of introduced animals in order to benefit 
native species. Convergence between the two positions is apparent, for 
example, in the less-sympathetic attitude of welfarists toward the suffering 
of wild animals in natural circumstances, and in the sympathy experienced 
by most people when actually confronted with this situation. Such 
convergence reflects the influence of subdominant motives on the 
otherwise opposing positions. Those primarily motivated by Scientific 
Concern, for example, may also be motivated by Connection and 
Autonomy, although in conflicting situations Scientific Concern will trump 
the others. 
Conflict between Scientific Concern and Autonomy is found in the 
debates between 'naturalness' and 'wildness', restorationists and 
preservationists, intervention and nonintervention. The tension between 
these two motives gives rise to the situation where the current dominance 
of the concept of biodiversity is most likely to result in an actual loss of 
value. While concern for animal welfare has a strong presence within legal 
statutes, this is not so for the value of wildness. Nonetheless, there is also 
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significant convergence between the interventionist and noninterventionist 
positions. Both are other-regarding without being entirely free of 
anthropocentrism, are associated with respect for nature as something 
distinct from humanity while recognising our interdependence, and have 
the capacity to inspire intense feeling in the community. The increasingly 
prevalent conservation strategy of `rewilding' represents a significant point 
of contact between these two positions, although, despite the terminology 
used, in most countries such strategies remain focused on the biodiversity 
conservation imperative, with the value of wildness secondary. 
• It is apparent that the axiology of inherent value, although developed as 
a means for explaining the values of nature, might itself also constitute an 
environmental ethic. As an ethical approach to nature, the axiology is 
pluralistic, grounded in actual human responses to nature, and 
anthropocentric while remaining focused on the non-instrumental. In this 
capacity it functions as an alternative to that provided by the science and 
values associated with the concept of biodiversity. It has the potential to 
provide guidance for natural area' management, particularly in relation to 
safeguarding the values associated with Autonomy and wildness, which are 
currently under-represented within environmental management systems 
compared with the values associated with the conservation of biodiversity. 
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